To what extent can British newsreel coverage of the Korean War be considered propagandist in nature? by Cook, Peter William
TO WHAT EXTENT CAN BRITISH NEWSREEL COVERAGE OF THE KOREAN WAR 
BE CONSIDERED PROPAGANDIST IN NATURE? 
 
By  
 
PETER WILLIAM COOK 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted to the University of Birmingham  
For the Degree of 
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Department of History 
School of History and Cultures 
University of Birmingham 
March 2012 
 
                                                                                             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Birmingham Research Archive 
 
e-theses repository 
 
 
This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third 
parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect 
of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or 
as modified by any successor legislation.   
 
Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in 
accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged.  Further 
distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission 
of the copyright holder.  
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Throughout history ‘myth’ has developed from events on the battlefield, often, the 
creation and circulation of ‘propagandist interpretations’ has been deliberately pursued by 
belligerents. Nonetheless, definitive clarifications of how and why mythologies develop 
remain difficult to establish. Theorists have however provided a theoretical model facilitating 
examination of the ideologies encoded within texts. 
 
This thesis suggests social communication remains ‘self-gratifying’ to the encoder 
and decoder and will explore how and why ideological interpretations of events, forwarded 
by those who circulate information, may be considered propagandist in nature within the 
historical context of the Korean War. 
 
Significant quantities of audio-visual material provided a valuable sample of media 
coverage which constructed the ‘reality’ of events for the cinema industry’s target audience 
of predominantly working class patrons. This reality defined the United Nations only military 
clash with aggressive communism, during a period of significant international tension. This 
study will focus upon diplomatic activity, the military situation and British aspects of the 
conflict between mid-1950 and late January 1951; illustrating how audio-visual material 
sought to insulate a section of British society against the ideologies of Soviet sponsored 
communism. Thus the Cold War was fought on the cinema screen in addition to the 
battlefield. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
During the twentieth century nations and individuals alike faced no greater challenge 
than the experience of warfare. Given the frequency, geographic diversity and increasingly 
industrial nature of those experiences, perhaps the greatest challenge to face mankind during 
this period was how, in future, to avert the outbreak of all-consuming warfare. The rise of 
polarised political ideologies, following the traumatic experiences of the First World War, 
served to increase the probability of conflict. For the progressive Western liberal 
democracies, neither ideological absolute maintained particular appeal while both often 
provoked revulsion amongst Western leaders. Nazi Germany, although conservative and anti-
communist, was militaristic and expansive in temperament. The Soviet Union was viewed 
with similar suspicion due to its revolutionary doctrines, despite being a necessary ally in the 
fight against Fascism from 1941 to 1945. Thus, with the final defeat of National Socialism in 
1945, the likelihood of a clash between the liberal democracies and the world’s surviving 
totalitarian power bloc became increasingly likely. Indeed, significant political personalities 
in the West began warning of such tensions prior to the fall of the Third Reich and were 
aware of the increased dangers following the advent of nuclear weapons. 
 
Thus mankind had reached the apex of total war, as by 1949 the world’s leading and 
competing superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, possessed the power to 
effectively end civilisation. The ideological alliance system which emerged from 1945 saw 
the competing political entities experience friction in two main geographic regions: Central 
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Europe and the Far East.1 The Berlin air lift became one of the best known examples of 
increased tensions in the immediate post war era, as did the establishment of communism on 
mainland China by 1949.2  
 
The advent of atomic weapons changed the nature of warfare as total victory or 
irrecoverable defeat were no longer viable conclusions to pursue, particularly as a nuclear 
power, or one supporting an ideological satellite on the verge of defeat, may unleash its 
atomic arsenal to stave off capitulation. Thus the doctrine of ‘mutually assured destruction’ 
[MAD], entered the political vocabulary of the Cold War era.3 This nihilistic concept can 
trace its origins to the doctrine of limited war, one that had been thrashed out on the hills of 
the Korean Peninsula between 1950 and 1953 in the world’s first major post-war conflict. 
 
Initially the communist North had pursued a swift conclusion to the fighting through a 
mechanised drive into South Korea. Total victory was later courted by American military and 
political leaders, culminating in MacArthur’s drive to the Yaul River in late 1950. However, 
both sides eventually learnt that pursuit of total war aims may draw in larger powers and 
increase the risk of escalating toward nuclear confrontation in the event of general war 
between the USA and the Soviet Union. Despite a great deal of sabre rattling by the United 
States, regarding the deployment of atomic weapons on the battlefield and against mainland 
China, it is testament to American reserve that ‘the bomb’ was never deployed, during the 
                                                          
1 Although Africa and the oil rich Middle East can also be considered significant zones of 
ideological competition.  
2 For a reliable exploration of the events of the immediate post Second World War period see, 
J.L. Gaddis, The Cold War (London, 2005),  pp. 1-68. 
3 See P.M. Taylor, Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda from the Ancient World 
to the Present Day (Manchester, 2003), p. 251. 
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most dire periods of fighting, where the military situation was bleak and American casualties 
significant. However, this reserve may have been rooted in the desire to avoid antagonising 
the UN assembly, or domestic and international public opinion; particularly as the opinion of 
America’s allies was entirely opposed to an escalation of hostilities.4 
 
Thus the ‘total war’ taking place inside Korea developed, through strategic necessity, 
into the new concept of ‘limited war’. The moderate aims of this untried concept were 
effectively pursued by General Ridgway approximately seven months into the conflict. The 
transition to a limited war was a difficult one for all parties. America was riding high on 
victory in the Second World War, anti-communist hysteria at home and a desire to repel 
aggression in Korea, whilst Asiatic communism had become merged with triumphant 
nationalism. These factors encouraged both sides to initially flirt with total war objectives. As 
the war stagnated upon static lines, the threat of escalation receded gradually and the status-
quo of pre 1950 began to return around the 38th parallel, the concept of limited war became 
entrenched in the world’s military-political psyche. 
 
However, this transition presented Western authorities with significant difficulties 
beyond the military and international political spheres. The nature of authoritarian communist 
regimes allowed central control of media output by the authorities. The majority of press 
activity was directed by the party, thus the media behaved as a mouth piece of state. 
Ideological divergence would bring severe punishment, thus ensuring the media did not 
                                                          
4 The sentiment which existed amongst America’s allies was well known at the time and 
discussed by J.M. Hightower in his article for the Associated Press on 26 March 1951. This 
article, amongst other dispatches from the Korean War can be found in N. Lande, Dispatches 
from the Front: a History of the American War Correspondent (Oxford, 1996), p. 281. 
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contradict or challenge the official line. Such a structure led Taylor to conclude that the 
totalitarian bloc began the Cold War power struggle with an advantage.5  
 
However, the output of the press, operating within a liberal democracy cannot 
legitimately be centrally directed by state authorities. The exception to this would be during 
war time, where official censorship can be legally introduced and enforced. The first and 
second global wars thus required democratic authorities to introduce such codes of practice to 
govern the media, as a formal declaration of war existed. However, unlike these conflicts, the 
clash in Korea initially was not defined as ‘war’ but as a ‘police action’. This theoretically 
allowed both sides to engage in battle, without needing to pursue the total objectives of a full 
scale conflict and thus helped prevent the escalation of the fighting and further ensured the 
two superpowers remained theoretically, officially and legally at peace.  
 
The blurred distinction between official theoretical peace and practical war caused 
significant problems between Western authorities and media corporations. Full official 
censorship could not legitimately be introduced in the absence of a formal declaration of war, 
although the severity of the circumstances, particularly following Chinese intervention of 
November 1950, necessitated some form of regulation, as the media could and often 
unintentionally did, behave irresponsibly; in this respect the totalitarian bloc enjoyed an 
initial advantage controlling media output.  
 
                                                          
5 Taylor, Munitions of the Mind, p. 253. 
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Furthermore, one must additionally sympathise with Western media professionals 
who naturally resented any interference with their professional methods and output by official 
agency. However, under such volatile circumstances ‘normal’ and unofficial peace-time 
methods of influencing the democratic media may well have been insufficient to ensure 
authorities maintained sufficient control over the situation required to avoid a disaster, either 
politically, militarily or domestically amongst public opinion; a crisis within one or more of 
these spheres could well have undermined Britain’s international political position and 
presented the communist bloc with an exploitable advantage. 
 
In order to safeguard against such a scenario, following the secession of hostilities 
with Nazi Germany, British authorities retained parts of the war-time media management 
system,6 possibly through anticipation of increased tensions with the Soviet Union. The 
existence of the informal D-Notice Committee was perhaps the most significant. In addition, 
Jenks’ illuminating work suggests that experienced gained during the Second World War 
kept early Cold War journalism “tightly self-disciplined”; thus negating the need for stringent 
official control.7 The scholar furthermore argues that journalists did not feel compelled to 
challenge the ideologies of hegemonic groups, simply through acceptance of the ‘common 
sense consensus’, which many concurred with consciously or not.8  
 
Amongst other informative comments, particularly concerning a brief evaluation of 
current literature on British Cold War propaganda activities,9 Jenks discussed the activities of 
                                                          
6 J. Jenks, British Propaganda and News Media in the Cold War (2006, Edinburgh), p. 17. 
7 Jenks, British Propaganda, p. 2. 
8 Ibid., p. 1. 
9 Ibid., p. 5. 
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the officially sponsored Information Research Department [IRD], which gathered factual 
information and subsequently fed it into the mainstream media for propagandist purposes.10 
As “The full power of the information state was turned towards exposing and attacking 
Soviet Russia in every way possible”,11 Jenks details that a decade of vetting BBC staff for 
communist sympathies, undertaken by MI5 from the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, had 
ensured few Soviet sympathisers graduated into, or remained in the ranks.12  Despite Jenks’ 
claim that most vetting occurred spontaneously and was implemented organically within 
media corporations, the evidence of limited official vetting, to some extent, detracts from 
Hoggart’s “high conspiracy theory”, concerning the process of media recruitment.13  
 
However, it is important to remind ourselves that Hoggart, first writing in 1976, 
arrived during a period when Cold War tensions remained a considerable factor in global 
politics, thus the work of the Glasgow Media Group did not enjoy the transparency of archive 
material which is accessible after sufficient time has elapsed. Furthermore the scholarly body 
was at the forefront of research and thus encountered the initial reaction which often 
accompanies ground-breaking and thus often controversial research.14 Moreover, it remains 
important to recall that Stuart Hall and Hoggart studied the generic process affecting the 
communication process and ‘text construction’ and therefore could not be expected to 
account for every detail of phenomenal historical circumstances. 
                                                          
10 The most illuminating comments concerning IRD activity can be found on the following 
pages. Jenks, British Propaganda, pp. 62-67. 
11 Ibid., p. 27. 
12 Ibid., p. 47. 
 13 The ‘High conspiracy theory’ suggests that the media is influenced by government in a 
less direct and more subtle manner including the control of the process by which media 
organisations recruit employees, which in turn would help keep the agenda tightly controlled. 
R. Hoggart, Bad News (London, 1976), p. xi. 
14 So much is evident from the defence contained within Hoggart’s forward, which describes 
some media hostility to the groups work and findings. See, Hoggart, Bad News, p. ix-xiii. 
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Finally, Jenks’ most valuable comment concerns the structure of early Cold War 
propaganda. Speed and factual accuracy were the cornerstones of such material,15 which thus 
confirms the importance of news based audio-visual material to our topic of discussion, as 
both factors remain indispensable to the mediums of social communication, for its economic 
viability in the private business sphere. Thus the reader can begin to understand how the 
requirements of media industries and priorities of state remained similar, whilst maintaining 
their independence from one another. Therefore Jenks’ efforts have begun to explore how the 
official boundary of state-media interaction became blurred in response to the threats posed 
during the early stages of the Cold War. 
 
The work of Stuart Hall remains indispensable to a topic of discussion such as this, 
particularly as the scholar helps unravel the complexities of the process by which media texts 
are produced, are susceptible to an ideological interpretation/manipulation and suggests 
appropriate methods by which to study them. To briefly summarise the working method: an 
in-depth content analysis of audio-visual media texts from a selected time frame shall be 
undertaken, which, following the application of both Hall’s theoretical model and Jenks’ 
interpretations (amongst others), will allow a reader to chart the extent to which news texts 
may be considered propagandist in nature and if so, what influenced the process responsible 
for their creation. This will allow us to gain further understanding of how the early stages of 
the Cold War were reported to mass Western audiences.16  
                                                          
15 Jenks, British Propaganda, p. 100. 
16 However, we shall say little of the effect this coverage had on popular opinion as to chart 
the dynamics of such a complex entity would require a study much more vast in scope than 
found here. 
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Much debate exists concerning the compatibility of the Western media-state system 
with the values of democracy. This issue shall be briefly elaborated upon further into our 
discussion, however, for now the debate may be outlined in general terms. Some may argue 
that the process by which media content was influenced was incompatible with democratic 
values, as the end product, produced consciously or not, involved the manipulation of the 
mass audiences and thus constituted an example of social control. This interpretation, 
grounded in Marxist theory, maintains a multitude of merits, as it assists us to chart how 
power in a democratic society is transmitted, transferred, replicated and thus maintained. 
However, others may adopt a more practical approach in order to reconcile the friction 
between significant, yet theoretical, values and specific practical circumstance.  
 
Whilst it remains of fundamental importance to the maintenance of democracy to 
remain vigilant towards any attempted misuse of the state-media relationship, in order to 
prevent significant trespass, citizens must nonetheless remain aware of the value of this 
relationship in the safeguarding of shared social values. This remains a particularly 
significant issue as the media, predominantly organically, help to direct public opinion 
concerning how authorities respond or may have responded to threatening circumstances. 
Extraordinary circumstance can necessitate the implementation of measures which under 
typical circumstances would have been considered undesirable, yet remained implemented 
whilst a threat persisted.17 Both perspectives shall be employed in order to determine the 
extent, if any, to which British newsreel coverage of the Korean conflict may be considered 
                                                          
17 Jenks makes this distinction when he records that the D-Notice Committee continued to 
function into the 1960s, albeit in a modified form, as the international climate evolved. Jenks, 
British Propaganda, p. 54. 
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propagandist in nature and how events were portrayed to the domestic audience, when the 
fragile post-war peace met one of its most significant challenges in the summer of 1950. 
 
As the international situation deteriorated in the period preceding the outbreak of the 
Second World War, British authorities began to develop methods of exerting influence over 
the corporate media. This witnessed the Ministry of Information [MOI] along with the 
established British Board of Film Censors [BBFC] develop a closer relationship with the 
domestic media. For a robust exploration of the period see James Chapman’s, The British at 
War: Cinemas, State and Propaganda 1939-1945.18 It is here the reader finds the factual 
basis of Jenks’ claim that the British media of the early Cold War remained “disciplined” 
based on this experience.19  
 
However, Taylor concluded that the cinema apparatus, as a method of conveying 
officially sponsored information within the democracies, was less well developed, 
systematised and centralised, when compared to totalitarian societies.20 Naturally the reader 
would expect this when compared against autocratic state-media systems. However, given the 
multitude of factors which made cinema and later television a ‘vehicle’ through which 
desirable or undesirable ideology could be conducted, it should come as no surprise that, 
                                                          
18 J. Chapman, The British at War: Cinema, State and Propaganda, 1939-1945 (London, 
1998). 
19 Jenks, British Propaganda, p. 2. 
20 Found in Chapman, British at War, pp. 4-5. 
10 
 
during periods of emergency, military and political authorities seek to influence media 
content.21  
 
The popularity of the cinema, along with radio, as a means of mass entertainment was 
undeniable, as were the economic benefits of possessing the means of communication in a 
society whose ethos was centred on recreation and material consumption. Newsreel 
companies maintained a monopoly over public access to the moving image and thus were 
courted by advertisers and authorities alike. This may also be applied to the development of 
television as the new medium afforded an increased ability to communicate with the viewer.  
 
However, it is this curious mix of entertainment and economy which led Hoggart to 
state that the audio-visual media inherited the majority of its values from the populist end of 
the press.22 A similar conclusion may be drawn from Power without Responsibility by J 
Curran and J Seaton.23 This in itself, helps effect the composition of audience demographics 
and has led Hoggart24 and Stuart Hood,25 amongst others, to develop criteria for the 
categorisation of viewers and target audiences, which is often, but not entirely, based on 
economic and educational characteristics. Thus we shall assume the majority of the cinema 
                                                          
21 Indeed, the Foreign Office funded a newsreel camera trip to record allied naval 
manoeuvres following the signing of the Brussels Pact in 1949. Given the availability of 
funding we can assume there had been some preconceived advantage to including such 
material in cinema newsreels. Jenks, British Propaganda, p. 16. 
22 Hoggart, Bad News, p. x. 
23 J. Curran, and J. Seaton, Power without Responsibility; The Press, Broadcasting, and New 
Media in Britain (London, 2003). 
24 Hoggart, Bad News, p. 3. 
25 S. Hood, Behind the Screens, the Structure of British Television, (London, 1994). 
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newsreel audience belonged to soci-economic ‘Category C’.26 Thus it can reasonably 
assumed that the majority of those who viewed cinema newsreels covering the Korean War 
had significantly reduced access to the languages of power within a Western society, 
principally education and financial affluence. Therefore, the reader may assume that newsreel 
companies often produced features consciously tailored for consumption by such an audience 
in order to retain their entertainment value and as a result financial profitability.27 
 
This may help to explain, beyond limitations of available production resources and 
the limited running time of features, why few, if any, newsreels contained information which 
would have explained to a ‘Category C’ decoder the logic underpinning Britain’s position 
beyond claims that North Korean aggression was a challenge to freedom. In addition, the 
consideration of the target audiences mental parameters may help us to understand why 
coverage assumed such a notably moral tone, thus permitting the viewer to absorb 
information based on a well-entrenched  mental framework of simplistic social values; right 
versus wrong. In addition the newsreel coverage expressed a strong sense of the decoder’s 
participation in and responsibility toward a collectivised cause based on the moral aspect of 
defensive collective security against communist sponsored aggression.  
 
Such phraseology may have been a conscious attempt to ease the integration of 
information into the viewer’s mental ‘map of meaning’ which thus would have aided a 
                                                          
26 Hoggart’s research clearly identifies the ‘Category C’ viewer as the prime consumer of 
texts produced by the more populist end of the media spectrum. Hoggart, Bad News, pp. 2-4. 
27 Furthermore, it is possible to consider the cultural behaviour of this audience bracket to 
reflect the social ethos of the ‘Category C’ viewer which, particularly in the immediate post-
war period may be described as supporting a ‘work hard-play hard’ mentality, which mixed 
demanding physical labour with ‘stimulating’ recreational activity; the highly emotive aspect 
of this culture can additionally be considered a defining factor of the ‘Category C’ decoder. 
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successful transfer of ideology.28 Therefore, the early stage of the coverage of the Korean 
conflict exhibits high levels of simplified moral encoding within media texts, which occurred 
from a media consideration of audience bracket and populist media values of speed (and 
occasionally content values more akin to sensationalism), which resulted in over 
simplification of the issue at hand. This becomes particularly noticeable when readers 
consider that the class element of the ideological conflict was essentially ignored by newsreel 
coverage, as inclusion would have exposed audiences to oppositional ideologies within the 
Cold War context.  It is here that one may perceive the texts to exert the ‘feel’ of a public 
information campaign, similar to those found in war-time, which implored the viewer to 
positive action and also conveyed an in-group/out-group mentality commonly associated with 
the fundamental principles of deliberate persuasion and the unconscious process of social-
political communication alike.29 However, as well shall see, much of this ‘feel’ was created 
by the complex and multifaceted factors which helped shape media content in a commercial 
democracy as described by media theorists. 
 
It is now necessary to define our terms. Much scholarly effort underpins the on-going 
quest to offer an all-encompassing definition of the term propaganda and how to define an 
object that maintains propagandist qualities. To some the term simply means ‘biased 
communication’, although this may appear too simplistic given the intricacies of the process 
involved. To others like Hoggart, who consider this term too loaded, the term “artificially 
shaped” suffices to encompass the often unconscious influences that ‘the fact’ is subjected to 
                                                          
28 See the chapter of this thesis which discusses the theory underpinning the study of mass 
media in a democracy. 
29N.J. O’Shaughnessy’s ideas on this will be discussed in more detail later, within the main 
body of the thesis.  
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during the process through which it journeys.30 Jenks considers the role of the propagandist 
text one of “exploiting (often factual) information”, although this assumes a more conscious 
and deliberate process underpinning a texts creation and circulation.31  
 
O’Shaughnessy who suggests there exists a lack of consensus amongst scholars 
concerning the definition, considers the term to remain “open ended”, due to the volume of 
“historical baggage” associated with it, which leads Western culture to interpret 
‘propaganda/propagandising’ as a negative entity.32 In addition, O’Shaughnessy perceives the 
phenomenon as a purely social one.33 Furthermore the scholar suggests that a propagandist 
text or symbol is often defined primarily by its emotive significance; this remains a valid 
point as emotional manipulation can often be the swiftest route to persuasion and remains a 
common feature of texts orientated towards persuasion.34 Again however, this assumes a 
more direct and deliberate approach underpinning the matter. 
 
Whilst something that exhibits propagandist qualities will often demonstrate many of 
these characteristics, including ‘intent’ manifest within production, advocacy and appeal to 
reason (or not),35 the term ‘social phenomenon’ comes closest to helping us define 
propaganda. Social actions are spawned of human nature, whilst human nature remains the 
product of both a conscious and unconscious psychological process and responses, orientated 
                                                          
30 Hoggart, Bad News, p. ix. 
31 Jenks, British Propaganda, p. 4. 
32N.J. O’Shaughnessy, Politics and Propaganda: Weapons of Mass Destruction (Manchester, 
2004), p. 13. 
33 O’Shaughnessy, Politics and Propaganda, p. 13-36. 
34Although we must recall that emotive appeal is often a feature within or a form of 
entertainment. 
35 O’Shaughnessy, Politics and Propaganda, p. 14. 
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towards survival. Therefore, to engage in the act of communicating/propagandising may be a 
product of conscious or unconscious impulses; thus propaganda must be defined in relation to 
both psychology and human nature, as the majority of the encoding/decoding process, which 
underpins social communication, takes place within the human mind, or as Hall may term it, 
the imagination.36 Indeed, the only physical evidence scholars may acquire of this 
predominantly mental transfer of ideology is manifest within symbolic texts and the social 
response to any message they may contain. Thus Hall’s suggestion that detailed content 
analysis of media texts and the observation of social response should feature heavily within 
the researcher’s activities is well founded. 
 
The scholarly opinions offered above encompass much merit and are worthy of 
intense consideration by those who seek to expand their understanding of how the Western 
media functions. However, some disparity exists, arising from the extent scholars consider 
the creation and circulation of, what may be considered, propagandist texts to be a 
deliberate/conscious act undertaken by both the media and officialdom, as one interested 
party, to some extent, remained aware of the requirements of the other. Whilst few within the 
consensual academic majority consider the media deliberately and malignly dominated by 
hegemonic authorities,37 some including Shaw and Jenks, describe direct intervention, in the 
form of censorship, as a more common occurrence, during phenomenal circumstances, than 
others such as Hall and Hoggart. This may be the product of equally valid, yet contrasting 
approaches to the topic. Shaw and Jenks detail the interaction of state and media during the 
                                                          
36 Hall’s theoretical model will be considered in greater detail within the next chapter. 
37 However, Gramsci’s understanding of hegemony would consider the mass media and 
society as saturated with the concept to such a degree that the domination of individuals and 
society conscious can be considered fundamental, illustrated by the limited pace at which 
society changes, or in relation to this topic, the limited and ideologically distorted depiction 
of oppositional ideologies and events. See, M.W. Apple, Ideology and Curriculum (London, 
2004), pp. 4-5. 
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time of specific and intense crisis referred to as the early stages of the Cold War, based on 
archival access to files singularly related to this period. 
 
In contrast, Hall and Hoggart’s approach examines the process by which news is 
constructed in general and accordingly offer an explanation which correctly perceived little 
official influence over the media during daily practice in ‘normal’ circumstances, where the 
negotiated resolution of friction between competing social power blocs, no matter how severe 
the crisis between unions and authorities for example, does not heighten the risks of nuclear 
confrontation and thus reduces the need for official interference with media output. Media 
theorists therefore, consider the conscious and unconscious thoughts and actions of media 
professionals as central to the process, where Shaw and Jenks consider this the backbone of 
the process, only with increased official influence involved. 
 
Naturally the theoretical explanations of Hall and Hoggart’s approach contain much 
that underpins day to day media activity in times of conflict, although it perhaps lacks some 
of the more specific details recorded by Shaw and Jenks. These studies contain much that is 
relevant to the understanding and exploration of the question posed here. Therefore, a careful 
integration of the two may assist us to form an approximate understanding of the extent to 
which newsreel material may be considered propagandist in nature and if so, offer analytical 
speculation as to why this may be the case. Naturally, any conclusions drawn from this thesis 
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and the media texts it analyses, may be considered relative to the individual, given the 
individualistic nature of the transferee and interpretation of ideology.38 
 
Despite the merits manifest within the studies described above, the reader remains 
lacking a definition that accurately describes the ‘nature’ of propaganda and the ‘nature’ of 
the process responsible for its production, including an accommodation of both the 
‘deliberate’ and ‘unconscious’ shaping of the ideologies contained within a text, whilst 
equally accounting for the role of the ‘replicator’ within the communication/propagandising 
process. In essence our definition of propaganda must encompass both the deliberate and 
unconscious nature of how material orientated towards a particular perception is constructed 
and circulated. This maintains particular significance as a propagandist text, produced 
deliberately or not, relies on the media for transmission; social communication, and the act of 
propagandising consciously or not, is therefore best defined by its nature- instinctively ‘self-
gratifying’ and a product of the survival instinct, as discussed below. 
 
In the natural world the best adapted will rise to dominance, something to which 
human-kind remains no exception. The adaption of a human is based upon personal abilities 
and/or fortune of circumstance, whether created by one’s own efforts or inherited. However, 
whilst the species evolves, the animalistic nature persists and unfortunately often manifests 
its-self in our more negative behaviours including violence and self-gratifying behaviours. 
Never is this nature more apparent than when our survival is threatened. On occasion survival 
(including the maintenance of one’s own interests), may rest upon the ability to convince 
                                                          
38 A more detailed explanation of the theoretical approach to ideological communication can 
be found in Chapter Two of this thesis. 
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another of the merits of adopting a perception, or course of action, one would benefit from 
and thus advocate.39 Human nature becomes defined and motivated by survival, and the 
nature of social communication, itself a tool of survival for a social being, can be defined 
with the same term; ’instinctively selfish’. The competition which arises from such natural 
circumstance breeds an increased climate of ‘winners and losers’, or to borrow Hall’s term, 
“social relationships of dominance and subservience”. Therefore, the more competitive the 
climate the more likely the less well adapted individual/group will suffer hardship and 
subservience; a process which leads to the development of hegemony of an individual or 
group as identified by Gramsci and noted above. 
 
            ‘Selfish’ instincts are the fundamental unconscious psychological outlook required for 
individual survival in extremes or prosperity and progression in ‘normal’ circumstance. 
Whilst many individuals are rightly generous and considerate, the vast majority would fall 
short of giving to their considerable detriment, especially should this detriment result in a 
decline in their personal prospects of survival or comfort depending upon circumstance. 
Whilst those who transgress this boundary may well be considered to be responding to 
personal and therefore self-gratifying motives, gaining as much self-gratification from their 
actions as may benefit another; this includes love or loyalty to another, an ideological cause, 
maintenance of a personal self-image or fulfilment of a social-emotional contract (a 
friendship or parental responsibility). 
 
                                                          
39 Indeed it is possible to identify the development of collectivised interest politics from this 
natural process. 
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Furthermore, when threatened, or simply responding to a problematic scenario, an 
individual may be required, consciously or not, to behave in an increased self-centred 
manner, whereas some will behave in such a manner more regularly, with less justification, 
as determined by their psychological nature. For example, advertising remains consistently 
self-gratifying in nature, as it seeks economic survival/prosperity for its creator and those 
who circulate it; in this scenario, both producer and the medium of circulation benefit. A 
clash of interests may lead to conflict. Disagreements between two parties, whether of 
significant or insignificant importance, will be resolved through a process of aggression, 
negotiation or outside intervention.40 Nations behave in a similar manner; albeit on a larger 
scale, yet nonetheless seek increased or maintenance of their prosperity and if necessary, 
survival. 
 
Thus the reader has established the fundamental nature of individuals who constitute a 
society. Such social groupings respond in a similar way to many circumstances. Extreme 
occurrences, such as conflict, will breed greater levels of ‘selfishness’, where as a more 
relaxed climate may allow the interest groupings to co-exist or even assist one another, 
although assistance rendered would never be allowed to exceed beyond too greater degree of 
‘selflessness’, thus jeopardising prosperity/security of the parent interest grouping. 
 
To employ a crude analogy; in the natural world the animal seeks to attract a mate, the 
effect is progressive, survival and replication of the species, social standing and/or social 
interaction. The action undertaken to achieve this is often based on propagandist 
                                                          
40 N.J. O’Shaughnessy considers advocacy to underpin the Western legal system. 
O’Shaughnessy, Politics and Propaganda. 
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communication, through the implementation of a number of communication techniques, some 
factually based, such as physical prowess, others fictitious or alluded to through display. 
Regardless of how positive and beneficial the result may be, the process remains 
fundamentally self-gratifying in nature, as the propagandist seeks to gain by influencing the 
perception of another. So it is with competing individuals, competing groups within society, 
and competing nations, albeit a more complex practise. The effect of such activities may be 
positive or negative in result, but are nonetheless underpinned by ‘self-gratifying’ motives to 
one degree or another. 
 
It is the intention to encourage the reader, for the purpose of definition, to relinquish 
any moral connotations associated with ‘propaganda’, due to the “historical baggage” 
associated with the term.41 O’Shaughnessy’s claim that propaganda is a social phenomenon is 
correct. Social-communication bestows some benefit upon the party which invested the 
resources (time, thought, or finance), in encouraging others, consciously or not, to subscribe 
to their ideological perception. Thus it has been established that propagandising is an activity 
we all participate in on a daily basis in all aspects of our lives, private, public and political; it 
is a fundamental instinct rooted in survival and personal gratification, grounded on a desire or 
necessity, conscious or unconscious, to sway the perception of another.42 Described 
simplistically, an individual may gain little, other than an unimportant influence over the 
perceptions and behaviour of another human being, from advocating the merits/shortcomings 
                                                          
41 This remains similar to Casey’s definition, which aims to explore propaganda through its 
“neutral, scholarly definition”. S. Casey, Selling the Korean War: Propaganda, Politics and 
Public Opinion 1950-1953 (New York, 1980), p. 5. 
42 Casey’s definition of propaganda focuses upon the deliberate nature of propagandising and 
the attempt to alter perceptions and behaviour. However, although this remains entirely valid, 
the scholar has perhaps neglected the unconscious aspect of propagandising, which is a key 
feature of Hall and Hoggart’s theoretical approach; thus an amalgamation of the two may 
benefit our understanding considerably. 
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of a restaurant to a friend, yet nonetheless propagandise in its favour, or against it, during 
conversation; such is the nature of social-communication, as communication translates to 
power over perceptions and behaviour weather intend or not. 
 
However, the definition of communication/propagandising as a self-centred behaviour 
extends to include those who simply replicate and circulate the ideology of others, and in the 
course of such activity, not only replicate or create ideologies and influence perception, 
through the construction of a ‘new reality’, but ensure their personal or group 
gratification/survival by doing so. Thus the medium of transmission, the mass media, actively 
participate in propagandising, not simply through conscious ideological loyalties, but also in 
a considerably unconscious manner rooted in the necessity of economic prosperity and 
survival. Media survival is ensured by continued and uninhibited communication. 
Considerable ideological deviance, through personal commitment or accident, may invite 
economic penalties to the individual responsible, thus effecting their survival/prosperity, as 
the leaders of the social group, the individual represents, may be affronted by content, or may 
be mindful of how other socially significant groups may be affronted thus inducing self-
censorship, particularly during periods of heightened domestic or international tension. Again 
such activity is clearly instigated by the self-gratifying survival instinct as is the pursuit of 
populist media values, which seek economic prosperity. 
 
Thus personal survival may well ensure considerable conformity to the ideologies of 
hegemonic institutions, regardless of how sympathetic a media professional may be to 
oppositional ideologies (if at all). Should the professional adopt an unsympathetic stance to 
the non-hegemonic ideology, evidently the text will remain ideologically concurrent with that 
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held be elite groups. Thus the reader has identified the psychological process by which media 
theorists suggest media texts become ‘balanced’, or in Hoggart’s terms, where the battle 
between a media employee’s professional desire to maintain ‘objectivity’, often grounded 
upon higher principles, must reconcile themselves with external influences and 
considerations;43 personal economic prosperity and thus survival in a society where elite 
opinion requires consideration. The media professional, knowingly or not, is thus caught 
between two competing interest, the media-economy and elite opinion; both of which must be 
‘balanced’ to ensure economic survival.44 
 
Given the difficulties associated with the measurement of the 
propaganda/propagandising phenomenon and its impact, the employment of the term ‘nature’ 
is not only necessary, but also beneficial. To analyse the nature of something is to identify 
common factor(s) which constitute its personality, underpin and motivate its behaviour and 
thus provide us with ‘a rule of thumb’ by which an observer may measure current behaviour. 
As identified previously, self-gratification, fulfilling the social-survival instincts of a social 
animal, remains the base motivating factor underpinning most, possibly all, social 
communication, to one degree or another. Thus the scholar may only attempt to measure and 
understand this phenomenon to a ‘degree’ or an ‘extent’, based upon a generic assessment of 
its nature, hence the phraseology utilised here. Therefore, when assessing if a text may be 
considered propagandist in nature, the scholar may evaluate the extent by considering; can 
the material be considered self-gratifying, to whom and why? A simple hypothesis suggests 
that texts will primarily gratify media economic interests, but nonetheless appear 
mindful/gratifying of hegemonic ideologies, to a considerable degree, due to the peculiarities 
                                                          
43 Hoggart, Bad News, p. xii. 
44 Ibid., pp. ix-xvi. 
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of the encoding/decoding process, the filtration process and cohabitation grounded upon a 
shared social-survival instinct and desire for individual/group prosperity. 
 
On occasion one may pursue such goals deliberately; however, natural instincts will 
often render the process entirely subconscious, particularly in more challenging scenarios. 
Nevertheless, every act of communication undertaken gratifies the instigator in some manner; 
thus communication is fundamentally propagandist in nature as it seeks ideological 
gratification which potentially leads to the receiver to act in a manner which benefits the 
instigator. Given that this process can be conscious or sub-conscious, the boundary separating 
naturally occurring communication and propagandising, that is communication with a degree 
of conscious intent, becomes blurred, as all communication remains gratifying to the 
instigator; the only difference being whether or not the gratification was sought sub-
consciously or consciously.  
 
This interpretation not only accounts for the intentional ideological gratification 
sought by hegemonic authorities who release texts to the media in the form of speeches and 
official press releases, thus engaging in propagandist activity through the legitimate 
democratic act of rhetorical persuasion, but also accounts for the role of the often 
subconscious acts undertaken by the media who, intentionally or not, circulate existing and 
create new ‘substitute realities’. Thus both organs may be considered creators and circulators 
of ideologically persuasive texts, as suggested by media theorists, and therefore equally 
engaged in propagandist behaviour through conscious and/or sub-conscious pursuit of 
ideological or economic individual or group gratification dictated by both conscious and un-
conscious impulses found within human nature. 
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Survival in this individualistic yet social environment is often dependent upon 
communication. The Cold War era may be defined as a period of intense competition 
between two incompatible and thus competing  ideologies, both of whom responded to the 
challenge of survival with equal vigour and a barrage of media texts and information that 
were ‘self-gratifying’ and therefore propagandist in nature. This becomes particularly 
poignant when the reader considers that in the context of propaganda, the term ‘selfish’ 
encompasses the intentional or unintentional effect of encouraging individuals or groups to 
believe what those with access to the means of distribution would rather they believed and 
thus to transform this belief into action, including informing on suspected ideological 
dissidents or fighting for a cause on the Korean Peninsula; actions designed to ensure the 
survival of the given ideological power bloc. 
 
In order to further our understanding of how media material may be considered an 
active factor within the Cold War struggle, we shall attempt to answer the following 
questions: what, if any, content renders the source propagandist in nature and if so whom 
may have benefitted from the ‘message’? Can the source material be considered 
representative of events? Was any information included/excluded and why may have this 
come about? Was there a target audience and how were they targeted? What factors may 
have led the sources to assume any of the characteristics described above? 
 
Practical considerations require an unorthodox structure and on-going review of the 
relevant literature throughout this thesis. However, it is important to record that the pool of 
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scholarly effort documenting the Korean conflict is increasing steadily from humble origins. 
D. Rees, B. Catchpole, A. Farrar-Hockley and M. Hastings all offer considerable, informative 
and thought provoking general accounts of events whilst more specifically C. MacDonald, A. 
Salmon, R. Spurr, P.D. Chinnery and P. Paik Sun Yup, offer highly informative accounts of 
specific events or aspects of the conflict. A useful yet dated review of existing material and 
related archives, constructed by L.H. Brune in 1996, covers in detail specific aspects of the 
conflict and what has been said. In particular, a useful starting point is two remarks contained 
within Brune’s work concerning state-media interaction during the period. These include that 
it remains “unclear how far government manipulated public opinion” and that issues 
concerning “news management remained a murky area”.45 
 
In addition, works concerning aspects of the conflict related to the media remain few 
in number. Tony Shaw investigated the relationship between the British media and 
hegemonic authorities during the Cold War,46 including Korea47 and the Suez action of 
1956.48 The scholar’s significant contribution includes an analysis of the British cinema 
industry during the early Cold War, which demonstrated that the domestic media adopted a 
predominantly conservative stance during the ideological struggle and that the industry 
helped audiences establish a primary interpretation of the conflict by providing a “dominant 
frame of reference”.49 In essence, the cinema reinforced official attitudes towards the global 
                                                          
45 MacDonald, C., ‘Great Britain and the Korean War’, in L.H. Brune, (ed.), The Korean 
War: Handbook of the Literature and Research (Westport USA, 1996), p. 105- 106. 
46 T. Shaw, British Cinema and the Cold War: The State, Propaganda and Consensus 
(London, 2001). 
47 T. Shaw, ‘The Information Research Department of the British Foreign Office and the 
Korean War, 1950-1953’, Journal of Contemporary History, 2 (34) (1999), pp. 263-281. 
48 T. Shaw, Eden, Suez and the Mass Media: Propaganda and Persuasion during the Suez 
Crisis (London, 2009). 
49 Shaw, British Cinema, p. 196. 
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political situation.50 The focus of this work is centred upon the cinema industry as a whole 
and makes limited, yet accurate, references to newsreel output. Of the specific details 
provided, Shaw considers the newsreels to have been predisposed towards anti-communism 
and to have contributed to the anti-Soviet consensus of the period.51 Furthermore, Shaw 
suggests that this medium was prone to being subjective and a conveyor of misinformation.52 
Regarding newsreel coverage, the scholar states that by the time of the Korean conflict 
Gaumont-British News had abandoned all impartiality and had deepened its commitment to 
the promotion of the well-entrenched anti-communist consensus.53 The necessity for this 
micro study is vindicated as Shaw states that theoretical analysis has not been employed54 
something which is in contrast to the research undertaken in this thesis. Finally, Shaw 
understandably often focused upon headline grabbing events of the Korean conflict. This 
phenomenological approach does not necessarily convey the substance of the day to day 
events and the coverage they received and in so doing does not fully explore the sedimentary 
build-up of ideologies which is considered a key part of the process of social communication 
by theoretical scholars. This study seeks to increase the interdisciplinary nature of this field 
of historiography by further integrating theoretical analysis and military aspects into the 
wider academic coverage. Thus a micro study facilitates a deeper understanding of how 
audio-visual media contributed to the formation and sustainment of ideological consensus 
amongst audiences during the period. 
 
Perhaps Shaw’s most notable contribution was to shed light upon the ‘machinery of 
manipulation’ which is a prime contributor to the sculpting of ideologies contained within 
                                                          
 50Ibid., p. 195. 
51 Ibid., pp. 32-33. 
52 Ibid., pp. 32-33. 
53 Ibid., p. 33. 
54 Ibid., p. 4. 
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media output. The scholar suggests that during the Suez crisis, Atlee relied upon a cocktail of 
methods in order to influence the media and create “a consensus favourable to war”. Such 
techniques included the “dubious” use of censorship powers employed during the Second 
World War, the manipulation of the Downing Street press lobby and personal contact.55 The 
bureaucratic apparatus of manipulation, centred at Downing Street,56 included the 
Information Research Department set up in 1947 which enjoyed close links to the Foreign 
Office news department57 and was responsible for feeding non-attributable information to the 
media via lobby journalists amongst others channels. Shaw considers the lobby journalists, of 
1956, at the time of the Suez action to have been “self-disciplined and subservient” regarding 
the ideological content of media material and reliant on official channels for the acquisition 
of information respectively.58 Additional cogs in the machine of distortion included the 
influence of the ‘Russia committee’ concerning the coordination of information policy from 
July 1950,59 which sought to create a pro war consensus, albeit support for a limited war,60 
which illustrates attempts at mass-psychology management on behalf of authorities. 
Indigenous structures designed to govern media content were also created amongst media 
organisations, these included the British Board of Film Censors which enjoyed a positive 
relationship with Whitehall during the period.61 
 
Of particular interest is Shaw’s identification of personal and professional 
relationships amongst political authorities, bureaucratic agencies and media institutions 
which serves to illustrate that a select group of people enjoyed access to mass audiences 
                                                          
55 Shaw, Eden, Suez and the Mass Media, p. 15. 
56 Ibid., p. 16. 
57 Shaw, ‘The Information Research Department’, p. 246. 
58 Shaw, Eden, Suez and the Mass Media, pp. 18-19. 
59 Shaw, ‘The Information Research Department’, p. 267. 
60 Ibid., p. 266. 
61 Shaw, British Cinema, pp. 32-33. 
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throughout the period in question. For instance, the IRD was headed by Ralph Murray who 
had served with the Political Warfare Executive during the Second World War.62 
Furthermore, the head of the BBC’s foreign broadcasting was a former member of the Russia 
committee.63 Finally, Shaw states that the Conservative party maintained close links with the 
Gaumont-British News and British Movietone newsreel companies.64 Such interaction, 
proximity and experience help explain why Shaw considers experienced gained during the 
Second World War to maintain a particular significance to the understanding of mass media 
behaviour during the early Cold War.65 
 
 
The more general works elaborate little on any comments related to our discussion. Of 
notable significance is Casey, Selling the Korean War, Smith’s consideration of the BBC 
television newsreel coverage of the conflict, which remains highly informative, although 
devoid of remarks alluding to propaganda or the propagandist value of media material. 
Ronnie Noble’s book (1955)66 and Reginald Thompson’s Cry Korea (1951) C may be 
considered contrasting, yet significant accounts, detailing the experience of media 
professionals operating in Korea and the impression made by the war. Noble in particular 
describes an event which he considered allowed the communist side an opportunity to gain a 
“propaganda initiative”, illustrating that media personnel were indeed aware of such 
considerations.67  
                                                          
62 Shaw, ‘The Information Research Department’, p. 264. 
63 Ibid., p. 268. 
64 Shaw, British Cinema, pp. 32-33. 
65 Ibid., p. 195. 
66 R. Noble, Shoot First: Assignments of a Newsreel Cameraman (London, 1955). 
67 Noble, Shoot First, p. 212. 
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Finally, Taylor’s general account of the history of propaganda remains an essential 
starting point, offering a brief, yet concise consideration of propaganda, as does 
O’Shaughnessy in Politics and Propaganda. Finally, it may be significant that in the book of 
a seasoned media veteran discussing how the twentieth century was reported, published in 
2010, John Simpson neglects to discuss the Korean War. This may be considered testament to 
how a gap remains within the historical field, particularly concerning the British experience, 
as few, including Shaw, Jenks and to a lesser degree Casey have explored. 
 
The peculiarities concerning the chronology of the conflict and the audio-visual 
material has led this thesis to assume something of an unorthodox structure, particularly as 
the discussion focuses, in detail, upon newsreel coverage between 25 June 1950 and February 
1951. The benefit of predominantly following this chronological sequence is that an attentive 
reader will be able to focus in detail, upon a specific aspect of interest within the time-frame. 
Nevertheless, it has remained necessary to approach the subject thematically in the final 
chapter. The inescapable result of such a focus however has rendered the vast majority of the 
conflict and its coverage unaccounted for, as the period from March 1951 to the conclusion of 
hostilities on 27 July 1953, although less dramatic in nature, would nonetheless remain 
significant to this question and any study detailing the evolution of conflict coverage in the 
post-war world. 
 
The introduction has detailed the secondary sources which assist the reader to become 
acquainted with the period in question and has defined the terminology of 
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propaganda/propagandising and communication. Furthermore the reader has become 
acquainted with a brief exploration of the audience demographics such features were tailored 
toward. 
 
The second chapter will arm the reader with an understanding of the theoretical tools 
which have been developed by scholars and are required to undertake an investigation such as 
this. 
 
Chapter Three focuses upon the newsreel coverage of the United Nations in the first 
two weeks following the outbreak of hostilities. This section, detailing a period of intense 
international activity and anxiety, illustrates how the conflict was contextualised both 
politically and ideologically within the audio-visual news media of the day and how the 
feature was simplistically framed in moral terms. 
 
More substantial in length, Chapter Four discusses the period when combat footage 
became available to newsreels as UNC attempted to blunt the North Korean mechanised 
spearheads. This section considers coverage charting the steady withdrawal of UNC to the 
Pusan perimeter, the landings at Inchon and the advance into North Korea. Of particular 
interest is how the audio-visual media behaved within the context of defeats and later 
successes. 
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Chapter Five, Crisis, evaluates the output of the newsreel media during a period 
where UNC had become overstretched and was engaged by significant Chinese forces. 
However, prior to this the reader is invited to explore and consider the peculiarities of the 
state-military-media system, which although never static in nature, shaped coverage 
throughout the conflict. This section is perhaps most relevant to this study, as the demands of 
the historical scenario placed considerable pressure upon media organs and Western 
authorities alike. 
 
Finally, the reader will encounter a shorter thematic section detailing how specifically 
British interests were presented by the newsreels. Again this is particularly significant, to this 
study, as the portrayal of military assets from a media professional’s parent nation required 
individuals and companies to remain mindful of the impact coverage may have had upon a 
domestic audience that was likely to have been emotionally engaged with events on a 
personal level to some degree; which thus had a significantly more potent potential to effect 
popular opinion toward the conflict and Britain’s involvement. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE THEORETICAL APPROACH TO MEDIA ANALYSIS 
 
The exploration of the theoretical model outlined below does not seek to be all 
encompassing or a definitive account of the analytical tools which will aid discussion. It does 
however seek to offer the reader, a general introduction to the theories, which will aid our 
understanding of social communication, the news media and persuasion heuristics, in relation 
to this thesis. Before exploring the model itself, it may be prudent to consider its merits and 
shortcomings. To its credit, the theory offers a generic model of mass communication, which 
has formed the foundation of much scholarly efforts since its conception in the early 1970s. 
However, it is claimed the model is best suited to aid the analysis of news and current affairs 
media,68 thus limiting its original scope, in addition to rendering the model well suited for 
employment in a thesis such as this.  
 
Additionally the theory aids further research as any media ‘text’ can be evaluated in 
this way, as an ‘ideology’ can become manifest within texts covering any subject, for 
example in advertising, religion or politics. In relation to this thesis, the model may not be 
universally applicable, as the process of ‘political communication’, in the context of military 
conflict, is not directly referred to by Hall.69 However, the theory remains valid as a conflict 
setting would perhaps increase the likelihood of ideological texts being produced and 
circulated, particularly during an ideological conflict such as the Cold War.  
 
                                                          
68 D. Chandler, Semiotics for beginners, http://www.aber.ac.uk 10/6/2011 
69 Hall’s research focused upon media treatment of crime, class and violence. 
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Perhaps the most significant criticism of the theory concerns how we identify the 
‘preferred meaning’ of a text and if we, ‘the consumer’, place it there ourselves.70 The 
solution to this issue may well rest in questioning the motives of those who produce media 
texts, employing historiography to assess the political climate in which the text was 
conceived, whilst attempting to identify the professional or political ideologies which may 
have exerted influence over the process of text construction. Finally, the period in which the 
model was first conceived is of importance as the Marxist approach was well established in 
academia by this time, reflecting the growing interest in the history of ‘ordinary people’, in 
relation to social class and class relations of power.71 Thus Hall’s theoretical approach 
evidently embodies elements of the Marxist approach, as he sought to create a model, which 
would explain how dominant ideologies are communicated in a democratic society, where the 
state-media relationship is markedly different to that of a totalitarian system, yet produces 
media products, which appear to transmit ‘a messages’ to an audience. 
 
The theory originated from the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, once based 
at the University of Birmingham. The work of Stuart Hall, amongst others, combined 
Sociology, Psychology, semiotics and elements of the Marxist approach to history, to create a 
theoretical model, which aids our understanding of ‘political communication’. In essence, 
Hall argues the transfer of ideology, itself defined as a mental concept, based on the imagined 
relationship a person feels towards their real condition of existence,72 is dependent on a 
                                                          
70 D. Chandler, Semiotics for beginners, http://www.aber.ac.uk 10/6/2011 
71 A. Green, and K. Troup, The Houses of History: A Critical Reader in the Twentieth 
Century History and Theory (Manchester, 1999), p. 33. 
72 M.C. Heck, ‘The Ideological Dimension of Media Messages’, in S. Hall, D. Hobson, A. 
Lowe and P. Willis (ed.), Culture, Media, Language (London, 1980), p.122. 
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process information becomes encoded and decoded.73 The viewer of a news text represents 
the decoder or receiver of the message, with the news media fulfilling the role of encoder or 
sender of the message, whilst the ‘text’ and the ‘message’ being communicated, is reduced to 
a series of ‘signs’.  
 
Hall interprets this process to facilitate ‘reality construction’ and ‘maintenance’, 
where positions of ‘dominance and subservience’ are produced and reproduced in society and 
made to appear ‘natural’, as the product of “common sense”.74 Therefore, Hall views the 
mass media as a key “vehicle” for the creation and circulation of ideologies, held by the elite 
institutions of a democratic society,75 who exert some indirect/informal influence over the 
production process. 
 
The roots of this theoretical model are evident in Marxist theory, concerning the 
imposition of structures on men, via the unconscious.76 M.C Heck, drawing on the theories of 
L Althusser, elaborates, suggesting the discourse of ideology takes place in the 
subconscious.77 We may interpret this to indicate that the encoding and potential deciphering 
of ‘signs’, takes place without the knowledge of either party and could be considered an 
ideologically neutral act. However,  as we shall see, the ‘ideological innocence’ of a text is 
doubted by Hall, particularly when considering the effect of the encoding process, where a 
                                                          
73 S. Hall, ‘Encoding/decoding’, in S. Hall, D. Hobson, A. Lowe and P. Willis (ed.), Culture, 
Media, Language (London, 1980),  pp.128-138. 
74 D. Chandler, Semiotics for beginners, http://www.aber.ac.uk 10/6/2011 
75 Hall, ‘Encoding/decoding’, p.136. 
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text becomes organised by those adhering to a ‘professional code’ of practise,78 who seek 
economic survival within a competitive environment. 
 
The professional code in which the Western media operate is considered by Hoggart 
to maintain a “commitment to impartiality and balance”, where the “essential truth” of the 
story remains largely unaffected.79 However, Hoggart also acknowledges the existence of 
conflict between the pressures of the production process and this professional ethos, which 
effects the development of ideologies which become manifest within the body of a given 
media text. Thus the notion of media ‘objectivity’ becomes essentially one of ‘balance’ 
between communicating the ‘essential truth’, whilst ensuring that the nature of the text 
remains sufficiently conservative to avoid sanctions from the hegemonic elites, which 
naturally wish to restrict the exposure of information which may provoke the decoder to 
approach the ‘crisis point’, as described by Hall.  
 
This is based on the assumption that media professionals make conscious decisions 
within this context, although Hall acknowledged that subconscious “cultural bias is 
inevitable”.80 This subconscious bias may well become exaggerated when the parent ideology 
of the media professional is engaged in conflict with a culturally incompatible opponent; thus 
we can predict that a conflict such as this, taking place in Korea, between two incompatible 
political cultures, may well experience less well balanced coverage in the media than if the 
belligerents had not been so acutely culturally polarised. Therefore, the coverage may well be 
expected to maintain high levels of organically occurring subconscious cultural bias, prior to 
                                                          
78 Hall, ‘Encoding/decoding’, p. 136. 
79 Hoggart, Bad News, p. 39. 
80 Ibid., p. 17. 
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any conscious bias implemented on behalf of the media professionals involved or informal 
pressure by hegemonic elites. 
 
Within the professional ethos of mass media institutions, there exists a criterion by 
which the newsworthiness of a story is defined. The Glasgow Media Group consider such 
criteria “routine” within the production process, incorporating a consideration of what may 
hold a viewer’s attention and interest, yet nonetheless assign to such values a significance 
concerning the production of the ideological content of a text.81 Such an ethos constitutes one 
of Hoggart’s four filters, which the Glasgow Media Group identified as exerting great 
influence over the media, their thinking and decision making process, all of which help 
ensure, although never totally, that media products will help support the social status-quo and 
will only irregularly and limitedly challenge the hegemonic perception of events; this is 
achieved through a process of reality construction and definition, aided by the media’s ability 
to set the agenda of audience awareness, understanding and debate.82  
 
Veron qualifies that due to the subconscious nature of the transmission process, 
ideologies constitute a set of rules, which determine the organisation of concepts in a 
particular persons mind,83 and that such a mental system functions due to the employment of 
a code, which those communicating are largely unaware of.84  ‘Signs’ therefore, can only be 
correctly decoded by a sub-conscious, which had previously been ‘primed’ to receive them 
through possession of a similar code. This process is based on ‘socialisation’ and is rooted in 
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the existence of a shared cultural value system amongst those communicating, which 
incorporates history, language and culture amongst other elements, forming the basis of 
Hall’s and Hoggart’s observations. 
 
Veron considers this code to be the mental medium underpinning all acts of social 
communication, its organisation and levels of significance.85 Thus we can see the process of 
social communication becoming ideological in nature as a ‘socialised’ mind, that is one 
primed to receive and decode structured information, is susceptible to manipulation, if the 
sender were to organise the content of a ‘text’ in a way, deliberately or not, which supported 
a preferred ideology. The potential for ideologies to be organised, transferred and received in 
this manner, directed Heck to state that, “Social communication is susceptible to an 
ideological reading”86 and Hall to claim, that the media is rendered a conveyer of 
ideologies.87 
 
Clearly, should ideology permeate the textual material being encoded and decoded, 
which Hall argues is the case, as the concept of a neutral text is flawed by the very nature of 
the communication process,88 the power of influence would rest with the sender, not the 
receiver, particularly if the latter consume the textual product en mass; although Hall by no 
means considers the receiver passive or powerless in the process. This justifies the Marxist 
approach toward the subject some academics uphold and legitimises the study of social 
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communication, past or present, as it constitutes a method of “soft social control”,89 as the 
process may influence public opinion and thus political action.  
 
Therefore, the phenomenon known as ‘political communication’ remains a significant 
area for academic study, as the process can be considered unique to a democratic society, as 
the phenomenon is intrinsically linked to the Western style of government, with its inherent 
ideas of freedom and democratic values; coercion is not a valid option in a democracy, but 
persuasion remains so.90 However, the question remains as to what extent this process 
contributes to the maintenance of a democratic value system or is indeed at odds with it, as 
Noam Chomsky has suggested.91  Such issues become increasingly significant to this study 
when we consider the remarks of Professor Phillip Taylor, who describes the Cold War “as 
an atmosphere where propaganda could only flourish”.92 
 
M. C. Heck considers ‘codification’ to be a process by which information is selected 
and organised into combinations, which constitute the structure of a message.93 Furthermore 
the scholar suggests that only by understanding the semantic rules of codification can we 
begin to penetrate to the core of a message.94 Thus a scholar wishing to investigate the 
underlying ideology of a text, would have to undertake close content analysis of media texts, 
by applying the theoretical methodology described here; an approach advocated by Hall.95 
                                                          
89 O’Shaughnessy, Politics and Propaganda, p. 49. 
90 Ibid., p.51. 
91 N. Chomsky, Media Control: The Spectacular Achievements of Propaganda (New York, 
2002). 
92 Taylor, Munitions of the Mind, p. 251. 
93 M.C. Heck, ‘The Ideological Dimension of Media Messages’, p. 124. 
94 Ibid., p. 124. 
95 D. Chandler, Semiotics for beginners, http://www.aber.ac.uk 10/6/2011 
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For the purpose of this study, the audio-visual material of the newsreels will be analysed in 
relation to this theoretical standpoint , allowing us to investigate the structure and ‘signs’, in a 
scholarly and objective manner. 
 
The concept of ‘signs’ encompasses word meaning and is described as fundamental to 
the process, as the ‘sign’ will often have a dominant literal meaning (denotation), and 
possibly an additional meaning ascribed by sub-groups.96 Furthermore ‘signs’, in this case 
words and images, also have associated meanings (connotations), which Hall suggests are 
interwoven  with the literal meaning.97  Heck offers the example ‘pig’. The word signifies an 
animal, universally understood, although in certain social sub groups the ‘signifier’ may take 
on a different meaning, including policeman or male chauvinist. Additionally, the ‘sign’ ‘pig’ 
also implies bacon as an associated word.98 This subconscious process illustrates that the 
decoder is not rendered passive and is equally important to Hall’s model, as their degree of 
association with the signs will vary based upon their personal mental ‘map of meaning’, 
which will help the decoder to assign a significance value to a received sign or code. 
 
Clearly those wishing to publicise an ideology, a particular perception of a given 
situation, event, or philosophy to a mass audience, via a medium of mass social 
communication, would have to be mindful of ‘signs’ selected when organising a text, as the 
association of words and images alike could easily be interpreted in different ways by 
individual decoders based on their ‘personal maps of meaning’. Thus, the difficult nature of 
                                                          
96 S. Hall, Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse (Centre for Cultural Studies, 
University of Birmingham, 1973), pp. 11-13. 
97 Hall, ‘Encoding/decoding’, p. 133. 
98 Heck, ‘The Ideological Dimension of Media Messages’, p. 124. 
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‘deliberate’ ideological encoding becomes apparent as the process becomes increasingly 
complex in view of the mass audience response to the texts they are exposed to.  
 
The phenomenon of war is likely to encourage the employment of ‘deliberate’ 
encoding due to the high stakes involved. Historically speaking, the Cold War saw two geo-
political ideologies rise to the forefront, Capitalism in the west and communism in the east, 
both seeking to secure and expand the boundaries of their respective ideological influence, 
domestically and internationally. Therefore, the selection and reception of ‘signs’, selected 
during the encoding process, to publicise a desired view of an event by either of the 
ideological poles, were of the utmost importance if the dominant ideology was to avoid what 
Hall terms the ‘crisis point’, where a ‘dominant’ or ‘negotiated’ communication process 
between coder and consumer, becomes an ‘oppositional reading’; a scenario, which could 
lead to the hegemony of the parent ideology, the society in which the media operate, being 
challenged or rejected by decoders. 
 
However, the process of text construction undertaken by the mass media assumes a 
less deliberate and direct nature and thus requires a more complex treatment when attempting 
to decipher any message a text may contain. Hall suggests that the production of media text is 
governed by ‘professional codes of practice’, which operate within and reaffirm the 
ideologies of the dominant power structures of society.99  These codes of professional 
conduct, along with other influences, help shape the ideological message contained within the 
                                                          
99 Hall, Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse, p. 17. 
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media ‘product’. Additionally, he describes three types of audience response to media texts 
based on their pre-existing mapping of norms and values.100  
 
The decoder may agree with the ideologies contained within a text, which is termed a 
‘dominant’ discourse. However, should the decoder not be sympathetic to the texts 
ideological standpoint,101 they may adopt a ‘negotiated’ position, where they agree with some 
aspects of the ideology and disagree with others. Additionally, an ‘oppositional’ stance may 
be adopted where the conclusions of the dominant ideology are challenged by the decoder, 
thus rejecting the dominant ideology of the society. Additionally, Hall measures the extent of 
the receivers ‘consumption’ of such ideological messages by assessing their social actions;102 
the decoder’s behaviour thus becomes a point of reference, illustrating the extent of 
consumption.  
 
During the early Cold War, the BBC allowed communists and communism a voice in 
British society, albeit based on a ratio which mirrored the size of the communist voting 
electorate. A memo, dated 1950, serves testament to the informal pressure being exerted on 
such institutions to reconsider their policy towards the non-preferred ideology.103 It is here 
that we see the importance of the media, in what Hall terms ‘the politics of signification - the 
struggle in discourse’, between the dominant ideology and what it felt the masses of receivers 
in British society, should be exposed to regarding competing ideologies. 
                                                          
100 Hall, ‘Encoding/decoding’, p. 134. 
101 Hall gives the ideology of opposing social class as one possible cause of this friction. S. 
Hall, ‘Cultural Studies and the Centre: Some Problematics and Problems’, in S. Hall, D. 
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A number of points relating to the production of news and current affairs 
programmes, described by Hall, maintain a particular significance to our discussion. Firstly 
the ‘stylisation’ of coding is significant, as the development of the genre of news reporting, a 
format which is repetitive in nature, allows a greater degree of familiarity to develop between 
encoder and decoder. This, according to Hall’s model, aides the encoding/decoding process, 
as the decoder will find the encoding style easily recognisable due to a developing familiarity 
based on repeated exposure.104 This is significant as the twice weekly newsreels consistently 
adhered to the same formatted style throughout their coverage of the Korean War and is also 
recognisable in the repeated use of stylised symbols, which make up the content of news 
reports.  
 
Secondly, this allows for a significant degree of ‘habitualisation’ to occur, where an 
historical reality, for instance the outbreak of war, which had previously been ‘Naturalised’ 
firstly by its conversion to the ‘symbolic’ and ‘mythical’ by the media, to occupy the 
background of a news feature, thus allowing new specific segments of information, which act 
in support of the increasingly habitual message to take centre stage.105 Thus the original 
message is ever present in the background, whilst additional items of news information are 
superimposed over it, creating an appearance of freshness and originality. This is what Hall 
terms the ‘sedimentary’ process,106 where repeated exposure encourages the decoder to 
accept the “artificially shaped” interpretation as “common sense”.107 
                                                          
104 Hall, Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse, pp. 5-6. 
105 Ibid., pp. 6-10. 
106 Ibid., p. 10. 
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Thirdly and perhaps most importantly, Hall suggests that the visual sign is less likely 
to cause the decoder to miss-interpret the message forwarded by the material, compared to a 
linguistic one, as the visual symbol is ‘universal’.108 We may interpret this to mean that visual 
images are of particular significance to the encoding/decoding process as they offer the least 
problematic and most widely ‘readable’ method of conveying a message to an audience. The 
visual image thus becomes the lowest common denominator of the political communication 
process, as it is accessible to the majority of decoders, by transcending language barriers. 
Thus the cinema and television newsreels analysed for this thesis, theoretically constitute the 
most widely accessible coverage of events in Korea, particularly if we exclude the practical 
qualification of television ownership, the cost of a cinema ticket and social habits, which 
naturally reduce public exposure to the message and thus create a target audience of more 
limited scale and restricted demographics.109 
 
In summary, Hall regards the process of political communication and its inherent 
transfer of ideology to be both subconscious and conscious in nature. The process is 
facilitated by the existence of a shared cultural code based on ‘socialisation’; this includes 
shared moral values and language amongst other elements including the existence of 
professional codes of practice, which govern the working practice of the encoder. Audience 
agreement with and/or acceptance of the dominant ideologies perception of an event is 
achieved by the influences such factors exert over the encoding of news material. The ‘story’ 
is compressed into the ‘symbolic’, with all inherent connotations and stylisation, by the 
                                                          
108 Hall, Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse, pp. 11-12. 
109 Such qualifications are barely applicable today as television ownership is taken for 
granted by the majority in Western societies. 
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nature of news production and creates ‘myth’, which portrays the event in a manner 
predominantly compatible with the dominant ideologies perception. This view of the event is 
then subjected to a process of repetition, within media features, which may lead to the 
‘sedimentation’ of the ‘dominant reading’, in the mind of the viewer, as the message is 
continuously replicated and reinforced by the continuation of the item, as a news feature, 
based on its topical value, public interest and its value as entertainment.  
 
This process renders the likelihood of a successful encoding/decoding exchange, all 
the more probable, as the levels of familiarity are increased between the two parties. Over 
time the inherent message becomes ‘normalised’ and entrenched in the popular mind-set, as 
‘common sense’. The decoder is free to object to the view of events he/she is presented with, 
but is nonetheless contradicting the now seemingly consensually established ideological 
standpoint and is thus subjected to the pressures, of becoming an outsider, in relation to the 
larger group. Therefore the media becomes the creator and maintainer of the hegemonic 
ideology, as it possesses the ‘means of production’ and transmission required to promote and 
establish one view, whilst excluding the views of rival power blocs, which may be 
incompatible with those held by those who meet media access qualifications.110 Thus we have 
established the theoretical background of our discussion concerning how the Cold War was 
encoded by the media and the extent to which British cinema newsreels of the Korean War 
period can be considered propagandist in nature.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
COVERAGE OF DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY AT THE UNITED NATIONS JUNE 
TO JULY 1950 
 
The North Korean invasion of the Southern Republic began on the 24 June 1950. The 
following day British Movietone News recorded footage covering the meeting of the Security 
Council at the United Nations headquarters near Lake Success,111 where proceedings appear 
to have been conducted in haste, albeit during a well-attended assembly. This material 
contextualised events in Korea as having always been a UN problem and visually stressed the 
solidarity of the organisations members by the raising of national flags. Throughout the ten 
minutes of footage, delegates from the United States and additional ‘friendly powers’ were 
depicted addressing the Security Council. Coverage also included South Korea’s complaint of 
foreign aggression.  
 
The sudden and unexpected nature of the North Korean ‘Blitzkrieg’ and the response 
of the international community would inevitably be deemed newsworthy, as events 
conformed to criteria employed by media professionals who selected features to be included 
in news coverage. Brian Dutton and Denis McShane identified numerous criteria, many of 
which remain applicable to the coverage of the Korean scenario.112 The ‘unexpected’ nature 
of the invasion rendered the conflict an attractive feature for the newsreels which operated 
within the context of the cinema entertainment industry. The sensationalist value of the 
narrative would shock and entertain; thus generating revenue. In addition, the ‘threshold’ or 
                                                          
111 See Primary source index for British Movietone News, 25/06/1950. 
112 Dutton and McShane, In the Media, http://www.rssmediastudies.co.uk  02/10/2011. 
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scale of the event would also render the invasion newsworthy, as would the involvement of 
‘elite nations’ and socially significant ‘personalities’. The ‘meaningfulness’ or ‘familiarity’ of 
the event would further encourage media coverage, particularly as the decoder would have 
been familiar with ‘conflict’ due to the proximity of the Second World War and more 
recently, increased friction with global communism. 
 
Furthermore, ‘cultural proximity’ and the ‘threat to the community’ in this case, the 
threat to the democratic community, aided the ‘unambiguity’ of coverage. Unambiguity 
refers to the clarity of the ‘message’ contained within audio-visual news coverage; in essence 
the coverage must only offer the decoder a limited number of interpretive ‘meanings’. That is 
to say, the viewer is offered little other information than that which may encourage an 
interpretation of the material which conforms to the ‘common sense’ ideological 
interpretation of events, held by social elites, who maintain influence in Western society and 
thus media content, based on access criteria. Therefore media theorists would argue that the 
coverage became ‘systematically distorted’ as its ‘balance’ of interpretation would have been 
based upon the ideological outlook of those with influence over production, both media 
professionals and other parties, and further filtered by the criteria governing how news-media 
organisations select features in order to ensure economic prosperity.  
 
Upon more detailed examination of the material, the reader may identify certain 
elements of distortion, affecting how the viewer interpreted the feature. The reader may 
record the absence of dissenting opinion, from that held by the United States or her allies, 
regarding either oppositional or neutral views. As the material was recorded in the United 
States, it is logical to conclude that the camera crew were American staff employed by an 
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American based company. This would render the organisation and subsequently its 
employees, vulnerable to pressure exerted by the virulent anti-communist movement, 
championed by Senator McCarthy.113  Clearly, such professionals would have no desire to 
jeopardise their livelihoods by representing oppositional ideologies, even if grounded on a 
professional desire to maintain objectivity or balance. Thus one may suggest that the 
existence of the anti-communist movement in the united states facilitated in curbing media 
objectivity/balance from the outset of the war and thus effected the ideological content of the 
coverage British audiences were exposed to.114  
 
However, additional explanations may be offered in that the media, indulged in self-
censorship, having taken its cue from the increasingly anti-communist stance adopted by the 
US Government from 1947 onwards or that media professionals shared the ideology in 
dominance and did not wish to publicise an oppositional ideology. The latter point, based on 
an understanding of media theory, suggests that media professionals shared a value code with 
the parent society and therefore would not seek to challenge this,115 nor circulate information 
that would encourage viewers to adopt an oppositional reading. Thus the reader has 
encountered an example of how a media text may become ideologically distorted and thus 
appear propagandist in nature, by simply replicating the ideology of the society it operates 
within, as suggested by Hall and Hoggart.  
 
                                                          
113 S. Casey states that the McCarthy witch hunts for political subversives scarred the 
American political land scape in the run up to the Korean War. Casey, Selling the Korean 
War, p. 15. 
114 This assumption is based on Smith’s remarks concerning the pooling arrangements 
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Furthermore, it is possible that no dissenting voices were heard inside the UN as the 
Soviet Union had boycotted proceeding at this time in protest of communist Chinas exclusion 
from representation at the body.116  Thus, in the absence of a Soviet delegate, the resolution 
was passed by nine votes to zero, with Yugoslavia abstaining.117 Thus there was little decent 
for the media to report. This rendered the coverage, to a limited degree objective, concerning 
the presentation of ‘facts’; although one should remain mindful that such information cannot 
be considered ideologically deviant in relation to dominant Western values and was thus not 
difficult to include in news products. 
 
David Rees suggests the Soviet boycott was an attempt to invalidate the international 
legal authority of the UN and the resolution it produced.118 The newsreel coverage, via direct 
speech and connative association, counteracted this by emphasising the legality and solidarity 
of the United Nations in the face of the crisis. The proceedings and personalities concerned 
maintained an image of dignity and formality, which lends credibility to the legal 
righteousness of the sanctioned actions. Additionally, by asserting that Korea had historically 
always been a UN problem, it was implied that the body was again responsible for acting to 
resolve the current issue. 
 
Finally, by illustrating the collective identity and unity of the United Nations the 
audience were offered a visual representation of the Security Council’s international validity. 
The ‘message’ generated by the sequence, offered the viewer reassurance and confidence that 
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their nation was acting in the interests of the international community, within a legitimate 
legal framework and additionally not isolated or making an isolated stand. Of course such a 
‘message’ may be perceived as a natural bi-product of newsreels simply recording events, 
which maintained some validity, as the Security Council passed the resolution in a speedy 
and near unanimous manner. However, the application of political communications theory 
would suggest that the recipient of this message would have confronted ‘systematically 
distorted communication’; as the influences which shaped production gradually moulded the 
feature into a text, which affirmed and replicated the hegemonic ideology, resulting in the 
decoder becoming galvanised with legal and moral validity of the Western cause. 
 
Such sentiment was echoed again by Gaumont-British News on the 3 July1950.119 
The moral and legal validity of the UN cause was once again stressed and the UN promoted 
as the “voice of the world”. However, additional elements had become entwined with the 
coverage, as the Soviet Union was branded with the responsibility for having instigated the 
conflict, with the empty Soviet chair at the Security Council described as “silent” and 
“sinister”. Thus at a time when communism was feared to be making its bid for world 
domination, responsibility for the conflict was placed at the feet of Stalin by the Western 
media. This theme continued to be entwined with coverage of UN meetings, as on the 27 
September 1950 Gaumont-British News screened footage, which illustrated delegates 
inspecting a Russian built PPSH sub-machine gun.120 The Soviet Union did indeed arm and 
train the North Korean People’s Army [NKPA] post 1945, but to what extent this was 
conceived as a defensive or offensive measure, remains open to interpretation. 
 
                                                          
119 See primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 03/07/1950. 
120 See primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 27/09/1950. 
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However, during mid-1950, the West concluded that the latter interpretation was 
befitting. Space prohibits a full discussion concerning responsibility for the outbreak of the 
war, but is perhaps best summed up by Russell Spurr, who suggested that less is known about 
the origins of the Korean War than about events, which led Alexander the Great to invade 
Persia.121 Such a statement may easily be applied to the Korean scenario as the political-
military situation in the region is evidently an on-going issue and thus, perhaps colours 
interpretation and the release of documentation necessary for historians, to ground their 
findings on. However, the consensus amongst scholars appears to be if the Soviet Union did 
not instigate the invasion of South Korea, then Moscow was indeed aware of it prior to the 
commencement of hostilities.  
 
Regardless, coverage evidently adhered to the common ‘media values’, which 
governed/govern the process of content selection, i.e. the criteria by which the media 
discriminate between the volume of events and what is newsworthy. McShane identified five 
core values which govern this process, including “conflict”, “danger to the community” and 
“scandal”.122 The focus on the submachine gun and its origin provided ‘scandal’ and thus 
intrigue, whereas ‘conflict’ both within the UN and globally, coupled with the ‘danger to the 
community’ or in this case, danger to the democratic community, illustrated by the 
juxtaposition of voters and soldiers, guaranteed this feature would be included in the final 
version of the text. 
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Additional newsreel features are relevant to our discussion concerning responsibility 
for the war. On the 21 August 1950,123 Sir Gladwyn Jebb was shown speaking to the UN, 
where he charged the Soviet Union with responsibility and dubbed the United States the 
“world policeman”. Following a diatribe concerning the Soviet outlook of state infallibility 
and its indoctrination of youth, one may have expected to see a Soviet rebuttal, in the 
interests of media objectivity professionalism and balance. However, none was forthcoming, 
with similar applicable to a Pathe News feature the following day124 and additionally a 
Gaumont-British News feature of 21 August 1950.125 Thus the reader may consider the 
sequences propagandist in nature, as the stance of the opposing ideology was entirely 
excluded from the features. Thus we have encountered an example of propaganda as 
described by O’Shaughnessy, that the denial of a message through censorship, or any other 
means regardless of how unintentional they may be, constitutes propagandist behaviour.126 
 
In addition, the American representative was presented as having dominated 
proceedings, which can readily be interpreted as an aspect of propaganda as O’Shaughnessy 
describes, as the political dominance of a symbol is a crucial feature of political power.127 In 
this case the observer sees the representatives of the dominant ideology, the USA and Britain, 
firmly controlling the symbol of international opinion: the UN assembly.  
 
The Gaumont-British News feature of 21 August 1950 featured an address made by 
American diplomat Warren Austin, who starkly stated that the Soviet Union was indeed 
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51 
 
responsible for North Korean aggression and dubbed Moscow as the proprietor of “a big lie”. 
Such sentiment was again echoed by Bevin in a speech to the UN. This address featured by 
Pathe News,128 offered the viewer a synthesised version of the key points. Bevin, although he 
appeared idealistic,129 boldly stated that Moscow maintained expansionist designs and had no 
intention of honouring its pledges. Thus the newsreel openly conveyed British and American 
foreign policy to the viewer as a bi-product of news reporting, which confirms Hall’s 
conclusion that mass media function as ideological replicators. 
 
Statesmen were clearly aware that their rhetoric would be conveyed to audiences by 
news hungry media, which in its self maintains a propaganda value, but is perhaps best 
described as advocacy and replication.130 Such activity is found as much in peace time as in 
periods of conflict as officials regularly address audiences. However, when such transparent 
lobbying of public opinion is combined with the propagandist technique of censorship, 
resulting in the effective exclusion of oppositional rhetoric, as previously identified, one may 
clearly perceive the propaganda value of such an initiative, as the decoder was prohibited 
access to information, which challenged the ideological position of his/her parent society.  
 
Therefore, the reader can readily identify the propagandist significance of news 
material such as the Pathe News feature of 21/08/1950, where the re-seated Soviet delegate to 
the UN, was shown speaking with the absence of accompanying audio or subtitled 
translation, in his native tongue or English. Significantly, the newsreels may not have 
                                                          
128 See primary source index for Pathe News, UN22958. Unfortunately no date is given for 
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possessed the technological resources required to translate, especially when in a competitive 
climate, where the swift production of news was closely linked to economic fortunes. In 
contrast, one can identify no mechanical reason why the representative could not have been 
portrayed speaking in his native language, when this service could be offered to other 
representatives. Thus, via a process of deduction, one can perceive that ideology which 
conflicted with that already in dominance was prevented from reaching an audience of any 
nationality, by the process of censoring the audio element of newsreel coverage. This may 
have been due to technical restraints, media organisations adopting self-censorship, or by 
informal prohibition requested by D-Notice.  
 
The work of Jenks supports the latter claim, as the scholar suggests that oppositional 
ideology was steadily excluded from the mainstream Western media as the West increasingly 
adopted an anti-Soviet stance in the post war era, which was openly acknowledged in Britain 
by 1948.131 In contrast however, media theory suggests that censorship would likely have 
been unnecessary as ‘media values’ would have organically excluded oppositional ideology 
through identification with the hegemonic values of democracy and thus resorted to self- 
censorship.132 Finally the speaker from the East maintained little ‘cultural proximity’ to the 
Western audience and was perhaps not considered newsworthy, despite participating in a 
cultural activity advocated by Western values; participation at the United Nations. Therefore, 
we may argue that the viewer was presented with a feature which facilitated a limited and 
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ideologically ‘safe’ number of interpretive meanings. The newsreel editors thus conformed to 
their suggested role as “gate keepers” of socially significant information.133 
 
A Gaumont-British News feature of 17 July 1950,134 maintained a thought provoking 
significance, as it illustrated the removal of a conscientious objector from the UN assembly. 
It is logical to assume that the individual had no right to interrupt the proceedings, made clear 
by the gentle but firm manner in which he was removed. The viewer of this sequence was 
directly informed by the commentator of the individual’s opinion and the treatment he then 
received as he was ejected. However, this short sequence maintained a symbolic significance 
and constitutes a readily identifiable example of a coded sign, as the inherent connotative 
associations reach far beyond what is directly illustrated within the news item.  
 
In essence, the nonconformist individual represents an oppositional ideology. This 
social group, naturally opposed to conflict with the Soviet Union, would thus have been in 
direct contradiction with the hegemonic ideology held by the UN, which had legally 
sanctioned armed resistance to aggression. The delegates shown in the footage therefore 
represented the ideology in dominance, which rejected the ideology of the lesser sub-group.  
 
Therefore, when an audience witnessed the ejection of the individual, they witnessed 
a symbolic rejection of an oppositional ideology, the existence of which was brought to the 
attention of the audience in a negative manner. The message conveyed by this sequence was 
thus: those who did not subscribe to the hegemonic interpretation were to be cast aside by 
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their parent society. Such a message therefore contained a visual representation of how 
ideological dissenters were to be treated; “gently but firmly”. Thus the reader has 
encountered a visual example of how communist sympathisers, ‘fellow travellers’ or pacifists 
were perceived and treated by hegemonic institutions. The treatment the individual received 
can in no way be interpreted as heavy handed, but does visually clarify a process documented 
by Jenks, who suggests that those who maintained a belief system, which was unwelcomed 
by the ideology in dominance, were in one fashion or another dissuaded or excluded from 
publicising their beliefs within the mainstream media during the Cold War battle for 
“dominance in persuasion and information”.135 Nevertheless, the most likely explanation for 
the inclusion of this sequence remains that it depicted a drama unfolding at a rather mundane 
yet official location; thus ideology can become unintentionally manifest within news-
entertainment, as Hall and Hoggart’s filtration process ensures coverage will remain 
sympathetic to the hegemonic ideological order. 
 
Again, the rhetoric of dissent was excluded from coverage as the opinions of the 
ideological opposition present at the UN were not conveyed to the decoder. However, 
Westerners who deviated from the dominant ideology stance were perceived as well-meaning 
victims of Soviet manipulation.136 Therefore the material demonstrated the desired response 
sanctioned by hegemonic authorities, who advocated the restrained rejection of those 
considered ideologically unreliable. The decoder therefore, was encouraged to respond in a 
similar manner; which O’Shaughnessy would consider an element generic to propaganda and 
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manifest in separating out disruptive activists from the majority (marginalisation).137 
Therefore the newsworthy, ‘unusual’ and dramatic event, which clearly adhered to media 
selection criteria, coupled with the shared ideological values held by media and elite 
institutions, combined to present the decoder with little alternative but to internalise the 
meaning of the feature in a manner compatible with elite ideology, particularly as the audio-
visual medium is considered to facilitate fewer misunderstandings, during the communicative 
process, as suggested by Hall.138 Such a response to an ideological challenge thus became 
‘naturalised’ and ‘common sense’, which effectively demonstrates how mass media 
replicated elite ideologies during the early stages of the Korean conflict, as described by Hall.  
 
The second element, which had become interwoven with coverage of UN activity, 
was the plight of South Korea, both politically and regarding humanitarian issues. The 
Gaumont-British News feature of 29 June 1950139 depicted South Korean civilians voting. 
This short sequence was immediately juxtaposed against images of Soviet troops. Although 
the soldiers were shown smiling, probably due to the pragmatic necessity of employing 
footage taken at the end of the Second World War, the message is clear; peaceful South 
Korean democracy being challenged by Soviet backed authoritarian-military rule.  
 
The humanitarian aspect of the developing crisis was first illustrated to British 
audiences by Pathe News on the 3 July 1950.140 Immediately following a ‘shot’ of the empty 
Soviet chair at the UN, fleeing Korean civilians were depicted. The imagery itself had been 
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clearly sanitised so as not to distress or depress the cinema audience in accordance with 
regulatory guidelines and economic considerations, but was however accompanied by 
commentary, which stated; “the old tragic story of war, women and children flee before the 
invader.”  Although sympathetically and emotively worded, the commentary unintentionally 
helped to make an emotive case in support of UN intervention.  
 
Thus, the reader has identified an example of how the audience was persuaded to 
support UN intervention, based on emotive appeal. Whilst one finds it hard to morally object 
to intervention, it is noteworthy that the audio-visual news media included material, which 
can be interpreted as having contained an ideological message, which in turn wholly 
supported the hegemonic ideology of the West, thus rendering it to a considerable extent 
propagandist in nature; despite the reason for the inclusion of the feature remaining entirely 
grounded upon the entertainment and thus economic value of emotive news narratives. 
 
Clearly the emotive impact of civilian plight would have proven irresistible to the 
press and newsreels as the ‘human angle’ assists in attracting and maintaining the attention of 
the decoder. Therefore the inclusion of such coverage, from the earliest possible moment, 
cannot be considered surprising, particularly as conflict often generates large numbers of 
displaced persons. The Korean War proved no exception to this, with many UNC personnel 
finding the plight of the civilian population particularly traumatic.141 The reader may 
therefore deem the coverage to have maintained elements of objectivity, albeit presented 
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within a heavily selected and ‘artificially shaped’ narrative, constructed by a process which is 
governed by both practical and, as Chomsky would suggest, ‘ideological filters’.142  
 
Practical filters, beyond guidelines detailing the boundaries of taste regarding the 
visual depiction of human suffering, would have had little impact upon coverage of this 
aspect of conflict, as the vast numbers of refugees would have provided camera teams with 
ample opportunity to find desirable imagery. However, ideological filters were clearly 
influential in the production of this feature as made evident by the editing and juxtaposition 
of imagery. Therefore we may assume that the shared ideology of a society, as described by 
Hoggart,143 had unconsciously or not permeated the audio-visual text. In addition and of note 
is the structure of the text, which although conveyed a ‘common-sense’ approach to the 
matter, did not appear natural; indeed, to a modern viewer the association between the 
oppositional ideology and civilian suffering appears bluntly obvious.  
 
However, modern audiences are said to have become more cynical as levels of 
education increase,144  thus the reader must refrain from allowing hindsight from colouring 
interpretation; particularly as the audience of 1950 would have demographically consisted of 
category ‘C’ and to a lesser extent category ‘B’.145 Decoders within this ‘target audience’ 
would therefore have been the recipients of a less privileged education may thus may have 
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been less willing or able to challenge the ideologies of hegemonic institutions and elites 
evidently manifest within the audio-visual material. 
 
In summary, the coverage of United Nations activity, which began less than twenty 
four hours after the invasion of South Korea, presented the viewer with a depiction of event, 
which may be considered accurate and informative as news items, as features often contained 
accurate ‘facts’; albeit ones selected in accordance with economically self-gratifying ‘news 
values’. However, the sequences contained the ‘message’ that the UN cause was legally and 
morally just and that the Soviet Union was responsible for instigating the conflict, whilst 
exhibiting elements, which interwove political ideology with emotive imagery and 
commentary.  
 
An objective mind finds it difficult to conclude that the footage referred to above 
contains any element of deception or falsehood beyond topical areas such as the extent of 
Soviet collusion in instigating the invasion, which remain open to historical debate and 
interpretation. However, one can readily identify the propagandist value of the material, as 
oppositional ideology was wholly excluded and the features were enthused with coding, 
which promoted the virtue of one ideology and the villainy of another. Such ideology was 
likely to have been conveyed as the text offered the decoder little material that may have 
suggested otherwise and have led to an oppositional or negotiated reading as described by 
Hall.146 Therefore, the news features exhibit some indicators of having been produced under 
an active censorship system, the kind one would expect to find in the media coverage of a 
total war.  
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However, given that official domestic censorship was not formally introduced during 
the Cold War or the Korean crisis in Britain, although the newsreels remained “technically 
subject to censorship”,147 one should seek further explanation. The exception to this, is that 
the United States introduced official military censorship, administered inside Korea from 22 
December 1950 and although this was directed at stemming the flow of sensitive operational 
information that would aid the enemy or embarrass the UN, the audio-visual material 
undergoing scrutiny here was ‘shot’ prior to the implementation of this policy.148  Therefore, 
the material confirmed the role of the mass media as a replicator of elite hegemonic ideology, 
whilst in addition demonstrating that the impartiality of news was indeed a myth, evident 
when scholars subject the reality such features constructed and circulated to close analysis.149  
 
Linda Risso, writing in 2011 suggested “a complex interplay between national 
security concerns, trans-Atlantic relations and intelligence and information sharing” existed 
during the early Cold War.150 The scholar argues that the United States advocated collective, 
international based action concerning the propaganda effort against the Soviet Union, 
whereas Britain, along with some European partners, wished to keep such departments 
operating on a national basis.151 In addition, Risso describes the difference between methods 
when dealing with subversive elements, as Britain was intent on monitoring such 
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individuals/groups, but was none the less reluctant to interfere with them physically lest it 
disrupt her more subtle propaganda efforts.152 
 
Although historiography records that the United States and Britain adopted an 
increasingly anti-communist, yet non identical stance during the initial post war period,153 
other factors of a less official nature undoubtedly had an impact. Richard Hoggart suggested 
that the ideological atmosphere of a society often permeates the media material it produces.154 
Thus the development of anti-communism in the private sphere may well have contributed to 
the bias we have identified in the coverage. Naturally, large companies, media elites 
included, would likely have harboured an intense distrust of communism based on economic 
philosophy and likely welcomed the change in official opinions. 
 
Therefore the materials support of dominant Western ideology may well have been 
instigated deliberately by media bosses or employees. Additionally, editors may well have 
practiced self-censorship based on experience of previous wars.155 Finally, there may well 
have been an element of class consciousness, as cinema audiences were perceived as 
comprising of the less well educated echelons of society. Therefore the material may have 
been structured in a specific way to take into consideration the composition of the target 
audience, as such audience demographics would have been perceived to lack the cognitive 
capacity with which to reason out argument and counter argument. Indeed, this is hinted at by 
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Jenks, who suggests British authorities held cinema newsreels in low regard.156 Of course 
such a hypothesis would require testing over a wider range of media products than found 
within this study. Regardless of the origin of the overt bias, the material would certainly have 
caused no consternation to official sensibilities should such a process have influenced media 
content. 
 
Following the Gaumont-British News feature of 27 September 1950, coverage of UN 
diplomatic activity lessened from newsreels. The UN debate had maintained the focus of the 
West during the first weeks of the conflict, as the US sought to establish a legal international 
framework to support intervention and in addition had provided newsreel companies with an 
accessible source of topical and entertaining audio-visual news footage. Although such 
features detailing diplomatic manoeuvring were kept short, probably out of consideration of 
the newsreels place within an entertainment industry, the sequences were, from a Western 
viewpoint, ideologically watertight. However, as the conflict developed and greater numbers 
of hastily deployed American troops began to arrive in theatre, naturally, public and media 
attention began to shift towards the battlefront as footage of allied air and ground units in 
action, became increasingly available. Despite this shift, the theme of Soviet complicity in 
North Korean aggression did not fade away, but simply evolved and was further illustrated by 
additional events, as shall be discussed below, which will analyse coverage of the period 
documenting the withdrawals, the sweeping UN advance and the build-up to China’s 
unforeseen intervention of October 1950.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE MILITARY SITUATION JULY TO OCTOBER 1950 
 
It remains particularly problematic to determine on which side of the Atlantic, much 
of the audio-visual material, documenting the early war period of the conflict originated. As 
the United Nations headquarters were located in the USA and the vast majority of ground 
troops to arrive in Korea, in the first weeks, were American, it may be prudent to assume that 
the majority, if not all, initial footage was of American origin. This assessment is based on 
the work of Howard Smith, who suggests that British cinema newsreels relied almost entirely 
upon American affiliated material.157 Therefore the reader may assume that most of the 
material was produced under the American media-state system, which prior to adopting 
official, in theatre, censorship on 22 December 1950, operated an informal system;158 
although material may have been subject to additional editing once it reached Britain. Thus, 
we can safely assume that British audiences often ‘consumed’ news products, which 
contained foreign hegemonic ideology, as the news material would have been produced in 
what Hoggart described as the ideological atmosphere of a society.159  
 
The ideological atmosphere of American society, during this period, had in some 
quarters become radicalised against world communism, which was perceived as expansive, 
particularly following the loss of China.160 Therefore, it cannot be considered too bold to 
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assume that elite opinion in the United States fluctuated between officially moderate anti-
communist, as evident in the policies of the Truman administration and unofficially virulently 
anti-communism amongst elements of the republican right.161 Thus media products consumed 
by British audiences would most likely have absorbed elements of this ideological climate, as 
texts would have passed through the “guided market system” described by Noam 
Chomsky,162 prior to the American introduction of official censorship in late December 1950. 
 
United States ground troops were first illustrated in action on 20 July 1950,163 which 
contextualised the fighting in Korea within the wider Cold War struggle and portrayed the 
distribution of military aid, under the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Aid scheme, being 
unloaded in foreign ports. Political contextualisation was further achieved and became 
evident in the language employed by the commentary as UN troops were described as 
“beating back Red bandits seeking to engulf the Republic”.164  A similar example may be 
found in an earlier Gaumont-British News release of 29 June 1950, which described “a top 
brass” meeting “to discuss strategy for stemming the Red flood, before the East becomes a 
sea of communism menacing world peace”,165 with a further prominent example featured on 
3 August 1950, which referred to mobilisation and stated, “to fight the Red hordes that want 
to enslave the free world”.166   
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Phraseology such as this, encountered on a regular basis within audio-visual news 
material of the early war period, although created by media artistic licence, clearly reflected 
the prevailing attitude of American foreign policy and the ideological mind-set of the society 
during the early 1950s. Furthermore, this theme evidently portrayed the enemy in a negative 
manner, which remains a common occurrence in war time propaganda. O’Shaughnessy’s 
analysis interprets such elements, as interconnecting with other sub-themes of propaganda. 
By portraying an adversary in negative terms the material promoted connotations which 
benefitted the cause of the hegemonic ideology.167 Firstly, by defining the enemy as 
representing ‘bad’, the material defines its own parent ideology as representing ‘good’, which 
was presented in a quasi-religious manner to the audience, as phrases which contained 
“righteous” and “zeal” appeared in news features.168 Additionally, this distinction illustrated 
the lack of shared cultural values between opponents, which was once more expressed in 
terms of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. Although further discussion is necessary, an additional point is 
relevant here, as by categorising the conflict in stark terms of ‘good verses bad’; the ‘wrong’ 
party becomes dehumanised, which assisted the decoder to overcome moral considerations 
concerning the application of certain weapon types.169  
 
Finally, this value-centric portrayal, shared elements with the justification of the UN 
cause, discussed above, as the resolution became the instrument by which perpetrators of 
aggression were to be defeated and punished for their moral infractions. A newsreel of 17 
July 1950,170 contained images of US wounded; the soldiers were described as “victims” of 
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“Red” tank actions that in turn, were described as “hordes with superior equipment”. The 
word “victims” highlighted the moral validity of the UN cause and implied the necessity of 
punishment, whereas “Red” and “hordes” can be considered an aspect of 
‘dehumanisation’.171 One would expect to find such phrases in the propagandist coverage of a 
total war. However, populist media values may well have underpinned much of the startling, 
emotive and arousing phraseology encountered here. 
 
Nevertheless it is necessary that readers remain mindful of Hoggart’s suggestion that 
the ideological atmosphere of the society in which ‘news’ is produced can often affect the 
ideological content of media text and thus be considered a distorting factor within Hall’s 
encoding/decoding model.172 Such distorting influences were evidently manifest within the 
features, as the decoder, was presented with little evidence to facilitate an ‘oppositional’ or 
‘negotiated’ reading of the text. In this respect the sequences were rendered propagandist, as 
the decoder was presented with textual contours, which afforded a limited number of 
interpretations, all of which encouraged support for the ideology in dominance. The 
possibility remains that the media was simply replicating information received from official 
sources; something which Hall considers a distortive factor in the process of social 
communication.173 In addition, Jenks’ evaluation that experience gained during the Second 
World War kept early Cold War journalism “tightly self-disciplined”,174 implying that 
propagandist elements were the product of media organisations reverting back to previous 
and well ingrained war-time practice remains equally applicable. 
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Of particular interest is the depiction of the military situation, which can be perceived 
as having maintained a high level of accuracy. The enemy was described as enjoying 
“superior equipment”, a statement, when compared against the historical record, exhibited 
strong indications of clarity on the newsreels behalf. Historical accounts indicate the first US 
troops to see combat lacked the necessary equipment to mount an adequate defence against 
the mechanised spearheads of the NKPA. The T-34/85 tanks, supplied to North Korea, by the 
Soviet Union, which helped construct the NKPA forces post Second World War,175 
outclassed the American infantry’s primary anti-tank weapon at the start of the war.176 In 
addition such circumstance offered the under strength and vastly outnumbered US units little 
option but to undertake fighting withdrawals.177 The odds facing UN forces were also 
reported by the newsreels,178 as was the necessity of fighting delaying actions until stronger 
units could be deployed.179  
 
Perhaps most significantly, the newsreel of 20 July employed the word “retreat” when 
describing the military situation. This journalistic clarity provides evidence to suggest that the 
negative opinion, concerning the quality of newsreel journalism, held by British officials,180 
was not particularly well founded. Nevertheless, sensationalist and populist media values 
often effected the construction of a text. Indeed, the boundaries created by self-censorship 
which would ordinarily serve to limit the media’s ability to pursue populist media values, 
during this initial phase of the war, were considered comparatively weak and lead some 
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American Generals to complain that a culture of ‘disaster journalism’ existed amongst 
reporters.181  
 
The criticism of journalists for practising “disaster” reporting was often well founded. 
This culture however was not rooted in ‘ideological subversion’, as one of MacArthur’s aids 
would later claim,182 but was manifest within the criteria which governed how media 
organisations differentiated between newsworthy and non-news worthy events. As discussed, 
such criteria often results in significant media attention being lavished upon ‘negative’ and 
therefore emotive events. Thus the reader may sympathise with Hoggart’s remark that the 
audio-visual news inherited its values from the populist end of the press spectrum.183 
Therefore, the viewer confronted encoded signs, which had become ideologically distorted, 
but also highly symbolic, due to economic necessity of the industry which necessitated the 
employment of compact signs, which remained heavily dependent upon ‘connative’ value to 
convey narratives and meaning.184 
 
Despite the often foreboding nature of coverage concerning the military situation, 
such features often maintained a positive propaganda value to the Western hegemonic 
ideology. Although the features reflected negatively upon the United States government, 
demonstrating a failure to perceive the threat to democratic Korea and neglect of the now 
retreating armed forces, the sequences conveyed the message, that the West was taken by 
surprise and was not militaristic in nature, as the power bloc had obviously been unprepared 
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for the invasion, which had been premeditated by the communist bloc. Historiography 
validates the claim that the invasion took the West by surprise, although to what extent this 
was the product of strategic and intelligence blundering on behalf of the administration, 
remains open to debate.185 Regardless, the audience was presented with further evidence to 
develop and support the ideological position adopted by American and British policy. Public 
consternation at such failings would have increased support for rearmament and increased 
defence spending, as fear of being caught off guard again by Soviet sponsored aggression in 
Western Europe fuelled such sentiment.186  
 
The often negative depiction of events helped circulate understanding and 
subsequently a valid excuse, appertaining to why UN forces were suffering defeats, as ill-
prepared troops could hardly have been expected to mount an offensive, against a well-
trained, well-equipped and “fanatical”187 enemy. The extent to which the decoder internalised 
the ‘meaning’ of these texts remains inescapably difficult to quantify and evaluate. It remains 
possible that we may have allocated the meaning ourselves.188 However, it remains probable 
that the texts successfully impressed upon the decoder, through a combination of practical 
factors and ideological influences, inherent to the encoding process, a sense of danger and 
necessity of action; two sentiments which reflect the stance of the hegemonic elites on both 
sides of the Atlantic Ocean. 
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By 1 August 1950, troops of the United Nations Command [UNC] had withdrawn 
into the Pusan perimeter and began to mount a defence of this strategically important port 
town. During the preceding four weeks of fighting, the Allies had suffered notable loss.189 
Three newsreels of Gaumont-British News featured images of wounded and dead American 
soldiers.190 Of these, two illustrated men wounded in action whilst predominantly focused on 
the walking wounded and livelier stretcher cases. Severely injured causalities and images of 
specific wounds were markedly absent from the footage. Thus, the emphasis remained on 
evacuation and highlighted that despite their injuries, troops remained in good spirits. 
 
Similarly, a sequence reporting the disembarkation of stretcher cases from a hospital 
plane in California appeared on 3 August 1950.191 A Gaumont-British News feature of 20 
July portrayed the internment of American dead in Korea with a similar Pathe News 
presentation of the same date,192 illustrating a coffin being lowered into an open grave, a 
cross at its head, with American soldiers and Korean civilians in attendance of the small 
ceremony.  
 
Naturally, one would not expect the domestic audience to be exposed to the full 
horrors of war; as such imagery would be considered distressing and disheartening for ‘home 
front’ moral. Such material may be employed to support Jenks’ claim that the media drew 
upon experience gained during previous wars. Thus, the reader encounters no surprise here, 
                                                          
189 Task force Smith had suffered one hundred and fifty five casualties alone during the 
action at Osan. Hastings, The Korean War, p. 9. 
190 Primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 17/07/1950, 20/07/1950 and 
24/07/1950. 
191 Primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 03/08/1950. 
192 Primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 20/07/1950. 
70 
 
as the curbing of sensationalism may be considered an integral part of reporting narratives 
which involve injury or death; as the fulfilment of populist media values, in any context, 
would have been expected to maintain boundaries of acceptable decency, whether enforced 
by regulation or not.  
 
Additionally, it remains doubtful that cinema organisations would opt to screen 
disturbing footage to their audience, when taking into consideration their business and 
economic interests. However, what was unexpected was the frequency of coverage 
documenting allied casualties, during the first five weeks of fighting. The four features 
discussed here, constitute a symbolic portrayal of the human cost of the war and therefore 
maintained a fair degree of clarity; although sanitised, it remains significant that images of 
the wounded and dead appeared in features destined for screening in the entertainment 
context of the cinema industry. This again serves as evidence to refute the argument that 
cinema newsreels were of poor journalistic quality, even should such coverage have been 
included for its emotive/shock value.  
 
The heavily selected, yet to an extent, objective nature of the material was further 
indicated by a report, which stated, that General William F. Dean had been posted “missing” 
when “directing operations north of Taejon”.193 Once again, one may interpret this as 
accurate and informative news, when compared with historical record,194 albeit the newsreels 
neglected to inform their audience of overall casualty statistics, unlike some written press 
reports, which often released such statistics alongside estimated enemy losses, often to the 
                                                          
193 Primary source index for Gaumont-British News, 27/07/1950. 
194 For full details of the circumstances surrounding Deans capture see, Catchpole, The 
Korean War, pp. 21-22. 
71 
 
displeasure of UNC, despite an obvious attempt on behalf of the press to offer balanced 
coverage.195  
 
However media theorists may suggest that the inclusion of such footage was the result 
of the newsreels adhering to a common and often habitual process by which the news media 
select material for inclusion in broadcasts.196 As recorded previously, Hoggart suggests the 
news media regularly display a preference for a populist style of reporting,197 often based 
upon the emotive and attention holding value of an event. Naturally the causalities incurred 
during late summer 1950 would have rated highly amongst media criteria and thus provides 
an explanation why such narratives appeared with such frequency in newsreel coverage. 
Thus, the newsreels were drawn to cover the wounded and the fatalities due to the emotive 
significance of this aspect of warfare. Furthermore, the reader may assume that the 
boundaries of taste and decency prevented camera teams covering events in graphic detail, 
which therefore sanitised coverage and provided sequences with a degree of balance. This 
may serve as evidence to confirm why official opinion of the period held the journalistic 
quality of newsreels in low regard,198 as populist and sensationalist. 
 
Sequences depicting Allied setbacks and casualties did maintain strong elements of 
selected accuracy although this was counterbalanced by elements, which maintained a 
propagandist value. By sanitising injuries the material prevented an audience from 
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encountering the full horror of the conflict; a statement supported by Casey.199 In addition, 
this denied decoders information necessary for the development of an oppositional reading. 
Nonetheless, the inclusion of such features exposed the regular cinema attendee to sufficient 
information, regarding the military situation and casualties, to develop an oppositional 
reading, due to the process of sedimentation described by Hall.200 Nevertheless, this 
sedimentary process, by which such a reading may develop, may be perceived 
counterbalanced by the regular inclusion of sequences expressing the moral validity of the 
UN cause. Thus, one sedimentary process counterbalanced another, in effect, neutralising the 
formation of an oppositional reading; as ideological conformity concerning validity of the 
cause and the curbing of sensationalism equated to texts obtaining propagandist significance. 
 
The portrayal of the deceased conveyed a sense of respectful calm as in one feature 
the casket was interned with simple, yet warm, ceremony demonstrating that the sacrifice was 
justified by the grateful expressions of participating South Korean civilians. The sequence 
therefore encouraged the viewer to generalise that all UNC casualties were treated 
accordingly, which was highly improbable, given the speed and fluidity at which the front 
lines shifted during this phase of the war. Similar comfort was offered to families of the 
wounded, as the coverage encouraged them to believe that all soldiers received good medical 
care and although injured, remained cheerful. However despite the increasing quality of 
medical care available as the war progressed,201 it remains doubtful that during the initial 
phase of fighting, efficient and well organised care could have been implemented, 
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considering the shortages endured by UNC.202 The coverage therefore maintained a 
propaganda value, despite elements of clarity, as the viewer was emotively persuaded to 
adopt a partially mythical construction of reality concerning casualty treatment. 
 
The above paragraph indicates that coverage of emotively taxing aspects of the 
conflict was toned down by the newsreels. The possible management of emotion was 
likewise evident in the coverage of defeats and setbacks, described to the audience with a 
veneer of positivism. Two examples offer the reader a representative sample with which to 
become acquainted with this theme. One feature suggested it would not be long until “we 
hear the reassuring, situation in hand”,203 whilst another states that, “although Taejon has 
fallen, artillery denies the Reds any peace”.204 These remarks may be perceived as offering 
the viewer a positive outcome, which was either on the horizon, or could not be substantiated, 
as the camera could not see the effects of the artillery fire upon the enemy; thus rendering 
both features to contain propagandist elements, as they encourage the decoder, to adopt a 
reading based on hypothetical scenarios. Despite the propagandist value of such coverage, the 
inherent messages and regulation of emotion can be considered a product of the newsreels 
‘instilling balance’ within texts. Media professionals, mindful of the dangers to business 
should they depress the viewer with emotive entertainment beyond a tolerable level, will seek 
to redress the balance of content; in this case with hypothetical positives. 
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Furthermore, by redressing the balance, the newsreels had consciously, or not, taken 
into account the interests of officialdom,205 as the equalisation of the decoder’s emotional 
response prevented the newsreels from being accused of offering a too pessimistic view of 
events to an audience who could potentially incorporate such sentiment into an oppositional 
framework. The consideration of elite opinion and the desire to avoid invoking censorship 
produced balanced audio-visual coverage and thus benefitted both media and hegemonic 
elites alike. Therefore media professionals and hegemonic authorities can be perceived as 
having engaged in propagandist behaviour, consciously or not, as this amalgamation of 
interests helped ensure the prosperity and survival of both groups and therefore may be 
perceived as facilitating the creation and circulation of material that was to an extent 
propagandist in nature, as such texts offered some degree of ideological influence over the 
decoder, whose reality was structured by the combined interests of those who met media 
access qualification. 
 
Further ‘balance’ and emotive manipulation is evident when we consider how 
immediately following the depiction of wounded personnel, the viewer was presented with a 
sequence portraying men enlisting at an army recruiting station.206 The news item therefore 
appealed to the audience emotively, as others were volunteering to ‘do their bit’ and defend 
democracy. In essence male members of the audience were encouraged to do similar. We can 
assume this sequence, amongst others that contained similar depictions, appealed to 
selflessness, which O’Shaughnessy describes as maintaining a powerful influence within 
propaganda.207 Although this feature exhibits strong signs of having been recorded in the 
United States, the message would not have been lost on a British audience, as similar 
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sequences illustrated Canadians208 and Australians,209 volunteering to fight aggression. Such 
sentiment was further encouraged by commentary including phrases such as, “men and 
machines from across the free world heading across the pacific to aid America’s gallant stand 
against the Red tide of communism”. 
 
The newsreels therefore, embarked upon a campaign of recruitment, whether as a 
result of direction from higher authority due to Britain’s military manpower shortages of the 
period,210 or as a bi-product of simply reporting topical news, deemed worthy of inclusion 
due to the narratives relation to the newsworthy event; Korea.  Regardless, the male viewer 
became subject to social pressure to enlist, by what the reader may consider an example of a 
wartime recruiting campaign, which arose from either/or; media professionals anticipating 
the needs of hegemonic institutions, based on a shared ideological perception, the simple 
replication of material provided by the military, or a pursuit of media values which ensured 
economic prosperity in a competitive climate by reporting topical news. Therefore, the reader 
may again consider the creation and circulation of media texts which, consciously or not, 
supported the interests of the two hegemonic institutions propagandist in nature, as they 
encouraged decoders to adopt a perception and an action, which would benefit hegemonic 
authority; enlisting for military service. 
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The defence of the Pusan perimeter covered by a Gaumont- British News feature of 
10 August 1950,211 illustrated UN soldiers disembarking from a troop ship and digging 
fortifications. The military situation was described as a “desperate struggle to maintain a 
foothold” and as “a fight against time as the UN holds only one tenth of South Korea”. This 
accurate depiction of the military situation calls into question the claim made by UNC that 
reporters often adhered to the ‘disaster school of journalism’. The coverage included no 
negative prediction for the future of the UN in Korea, but did convey the reality of the 
situation to the audience, thus rendering its journalism to some degree accurate.  
 
One may well interpret this as an example of the military attempting to pressure the 
media into excluding embarrassing details, which may have been perceived as tarnishing 
their image, or as scaremongering. However, Truman’s first remark to the press at the outset 
of the conflict, instructed the press; “don’t make it alarmist”.212 Thus the military may have 
been reprimanding the media for releasing details, which were disconcerting to public 
opinion and prompted demand for tougher action against communism, which would therefore 
have made it increasingly difficult to keep the conflict localised and possibly provoked full 
scale war with the Soviet Union. Regardless, readers are able to understand the stance 
adopted by UNC, as the media may not have been aware of, or elected not to report, that 
although hard-pressed, the perimeter was holding firm and UNC enjoyed the advantage of 
being close to its main supply base, something which the NKPA did not, thus conveying a 
military advantage upon UNC.213 Therefore, to some degree, the reader can assume that the 
media allowed its economic consideration, which was expressed by focusing upon selective 
and sensational events, on occasion caused the newsreels to forfeit ‘balance’ within coverage. 
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Thus, we may identify that ‘balance’ on some occasions, was the influence that provided 
newsreels with elements which rendered material susceptible to an ideological and therefore 
propagandist reading. This retains particular significance in the context of newsreels, which 
regularly detailed negative events yet concluded with a hypothetic positive. Sensationalism 
thus equated to anti-propaganda and thus facilitated the possible build-up of oppositional 
ideologies amongst decoders, whereas ‘balance’ equated to propaganda, as such positive and 
redeeming remarks enthused texts with ideology compatible with the interests of hegemonic 
institutions.  
 
As the NKPA offensive began to lose momentum around Pusan, UNC launched its 
first offensive of the war. This was reported in the newsreels on 14 August 1950 and 
illustrated US troops advancing past a burning village, as the commentary stated they 
possessed “adequate weapons” and “artillery fire, which they deserve”.214 Again the feature 
may be perceived as an adequate assessment of the military situation, as UNC forces were 
beginning to enjoy better supply, but does however break impartiality by employing the 
phrase “which they deserve”. The commentary therefore had taken sides, by labelling the 
troops as deserving and thus connectively implying their moral superiority. O’Shaughnessy 
claims that propaganda myths often focus on the superiority of a tribe or race.215 This is not to 
suggest that the material undergoing investigation here, conveyed race propaganda of the 
National Socialist style, but did unquestionably promote the ideology that UNC forces and 
the Western world were morally superior to the communist East, as the reader shall explore 
further when examining coverage of communist atrocities.  
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In addition, the sequence once again broke impartiality through pursuit of a good 
narrative, when the commentary interpreted the NKPA’s thoughts, by stating, “Reds must 
realise the growing might of the UN force”. Although the communist commanders had 
undoubtedly recognised the rapidly increasing strength of UNC forces, the report maintained 
pretence of being capable of reading the thoughts of the NKPA, thus presenting the 
hypothetical as factual news. Should media professionals have allowed ideological 
loyalty/patriotism to colour their analysis, one can readily perceive the motivation 
underpinning the choice of words, as the democratic world had been unable to undertake an 
offensive prior to this and now had positive news to convey. Nevertheless, such sentiment 
would not appear out of place within a wartime public information campaign, instigated in 
house, or by external authority. However, it is most credible that the shared ideological 
atmosphere of Anglo-American society, as described by Hoggart,216 combined with the 
informal British campaign to deny oppositional ideology access to the mainstream media,217 
weighted media material favourably toward the UN cause. Such leanings were illustrated by 
the final line of audio script, which stated, “confidence that forces of freedom will continue 
their drive back to the 38th Parallel”, although the West had released no such information 
relating to future military or political objectives. 
 
A further Gaumont-British News feature of 24 August 1950, reported the loss of a 
UNC airstrip,218 described as “a setback” and “a sad loss for American air supremacy”. 
Additionally the feature illustrated the American flag flying and stated, “It will fly again” 
over the airfield. The withdrawal was directly linked by the commentary to the Bataan action 
of the Second World War, symbolically encouraging feelings of heroic nostalgia within the 
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decoder. Thus troops fighting in Korea were associated with the heroism of the defence of 
Bataan. Therefore, the feature may be perceived as adopting a propagandist technique of 
linking current events with past events, where the heroism of today’s soldier was mirrored 
against the bravery of past soldiers, who fought for a morally just cause. However, in this 
instance, Bataan represented retreat followed by return and victory which maintained greater 
significance, as General MacArthur was and remained commander of the forces involved. 
Nevertheless, the propagandist benefits arose as a bi-product of the media creating a ‘good 
story’ around current events. 
 
However, viewers were thus assured of future victory by the symbolic employment of 
history, as a coded sign. M.C. Heck considers symbolism, often rooted in the associate value 
of language/image, to be fundamental to the process of social communication, in agreement 
with Hall’s theoretical approach.219 The reference to Bataan and its symbolic value can 
indeed be assigned an ideological value, representing future victory. However the process by 
which the encoded symbol became manifest within the media text becomes apparent when 
we consider professional media working practice. A key consideration of news/entertainment 
is ‘impact’ upon the audience, something which defines the genre and therefore exerts great 
influence over the encoding process. In this instance, impact, meaning and relevance of 
events in Korea, were exaggerated by the Bataan reference. The employment of the historical 
sign thus aided the decoder in understanding the significance of events in relation to a 
familiar previous event, which was likely well understood by war-time generations. Thus the 
sign assisted in the transfer of past ideologies into the present and therefore attached the 
ideological value of events of 1942 to that of 1950, based on a media necessity of ensuring 
newsreels had an impact upon their patrons. Thus from a media perspective, Bataan was a 
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near perfect historic reference, as it maintained suitable dramatization to ensure impact upon 
the audience, whilst offering ‘balance’ in the form of a known (i.e. past-tense) positive 
outcome, which rendered the text ideologically comparable with dominant elites and 
therefore rendered the sequence propagandist in nature, as its inherent signs appealed to a 
significant volume of the decoder’s ‘maps of meanings’, to ensure successful deciphering of 
the encoded message; which alluded to future victory despite current setbacks. 
 
Communist forces were described as “elusive”, with ambushes and sniper fire 
reported to be a common feature of the fighting. Additionally a sequence illustrating troops 
skirmishing was presented, as was an image of a captured communist flag. The combat 
footage appears authentic, but evidently heavily edited and compressed into a narrative. Hall 
describes the way in which an event is turned into a text as being a ‘moment’ of critical 
importance, to the process, by which ideology is transferred to the decoder. The main 
ideological element of this feature was manifest in the label selected to describe the enemies 
of the free world. Opposing forces were not described as the North Korean People’s Army, 
but were defined as “the Red Army”. Such terminology again defines the conflict in 
ideological terms, as the force is implied to be the army of international communism. The 
term ‘Red Army’ was familiar to most, as the Soviet armed forces that defeated National 
Socialism on the Eastern Front between 1941 and 1945, thus the term implies that the UNC 
was engaged in direct conflict with the Soviet Union. We may assume this to have been an 
example of unfortunate word choice, on behalf of the newsreel producers, particularly as 
Western leaders held no desire to see the conflict expand in scope,220 although the 
terminology did match the line adopted by Western governments, who quietly, ultimately 
perceived Soviet Russia as responsible for North Korean aggression, as previously identified. 
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 As Hall suggested and we have demonstrated, history may evolve into an 
ideologically ‘loaded’ symbol, if employed to bestow meaning upon a current event. The 
employment of the phrase “Red Army” demonstrated a further dimension to the value of 
history in the encoding process, as the associative value of the semantics can be identified as 
having undergone a transgression over a short period of time. As little as five years 
previously the associative value of the term had been positive; the Soviet Union and the Red 
Army had been gallant allies of the West.221 Therefore the value of history, in ideological 
terms, had changed from virtuous to villainy. However, to contextualise the transition of the 
term “Red Army”, one may conclude that during the Second World War, the Soviet Union 
was deemed villain and later hero, as Stalin had signed the Nazi-Soviet Pact and before long, 
had been compelled to fight Hitler, following operation Barbarossa in 1941. Therefore, the 
simplistic ‘black and white’ employment of the phrase “Red Army” may be perceived as 
having been assigned a connotative value by the dominant ideologies, to suit circumstance. 
Thus the sedimentary establishment of anti-Soviet Cold War consensus, described by Jenks, 
clearly encouraged the viewer to ‘read’ encoded audio-visual material in a manner 
compatible with the perceptions of hegemonic elites.  
 
The issue of Soviet responsibility was again raised at the UN Security Council 
meeting shown by Gaumont-British News on the 31 August 1950.222 Immediately following 
this sequence, a wheelchair bound American soldier presented an account of a communist 
atrocity. The soldier was not noticeably wounded and his testimony was described as an “eye 
witness account”.  The significance of this sequence becomes evident when we observe that it 
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was screened immediately preceding a speech made by Warren Austin to the UN, where 
blame was attached to the Soviet Union for instigating the conflict. Therefore, the sympathy 
and moral outrage inspired by the atrocity sequence may be perceived as having galvanised 
audience sentiment, thus rendering them increasingly receptive to the anti-Soviet message, 
portrayed in the following sequence. The message therefore, blamed Soviet Russia for the 
treatment received by UN POWs. The coding of the feature and the ideological apparent 
message may have occurred spontaneously, as a natural product of reporting two newsworthy 
events. However, the ideological climate of America and Britain during this period of tense 
international activity, as their armed forces were becoming increasingly embroiled in the 
Korean ‘police action’, indicates that readers have most likely encountered an element of 
deliberate encoding, as the ‘message’ helped solidify public consensus with the UN response 
to the crisis. The appalling events, which undoubtedly befell the unfortunate survivor, had 
thus been employed for political purposes, by media professionals, who through the 
arrangement of sequences, supported their nations cause in wartime, whilst fulfilling the aims 
of their industry by reporting extraordinary and highly emotive events in accordance with 
populist press values. 
 
Following the Inchon landing of 15 September 1950, UN forces began their advance 
northwards and uncovered evidence of communist atrocities against prisoners and South 
Korean civilians. A review of the historical field indicates that pro-South Korean forces did 
on occasion commit crimes against POWs, but such acts were isolated, uncommon and 
spontaneous. Indeed British troops prevented South Korean security forces executing 
communist prisoners on more than one occasion.223 In contrast, evidence suggests that 
brutality, war crimes and crimes against humanity existed as “common practice” inside the 
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NKPA, as described by Catchpole.224 This statement implies that brutality was 
institutionalised within the NKPA. Phillip Chinnery, historian for the National Ex-Prisoner of 
War Association, produced work detailing the experiences of UNC prisoners of war between 
1950 -1953.225 This remains one of the most informative and authoritative accounts of the 
Korean War, from a human perspective, as the author details atrocities including the torture 
and murder of both servicemen and civilians.226 
 
Thus, scholars are provided with historical evidence, which confirms the factual basis 
of news reports on the subject of NKPA breaches of human rights. A report featured by 
Gaumont-British News on 31 August 1950,227 was justified in stating this to be “a vicious 
war against a vicious foe”; the feature then identified Private Roy Mannering by name. The 
soldier was shown sitting on a stretcher supporting a black eye, whilst the commentary stated 
that twenty-six bounded POWs, out of the twenty-nine captured, were subsequently executed. 
Private Mannering continued by identifying one of the guards who had participated in the 
atrocity. The young NKPA soldier, was shown, wearing his UNC POW identification tag and 
as having received medical attention. The captive was seated next to the injured Private 
Mannering, who repeatedly prodded the Korean with his finger whilst described as 
maintaining a “righteous rage”. As the sequence closed the fate of either soldier was not 
alluded to. 
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Reporters and editors alike would have considered such events newsworthy as 
sensationalism, in this case moral-outrage, would have suited the newsreel companies, 
operating in the context of the entertainment industry. Nevertheless, boundaries of taste and 
decency had to be upheld, therefore explaining why images of the victims may have been 
excluded from the coverage. The nature of the fighting and the technical limitations of 
equipment may have prevented footage of the aftermath from being captured. Nonetheless 
these sequences, although heavily edited and compressed into short narratives, were heavily 
rooted in factual accuracy. Both features however exhibit elements of distortion, which 
maintained a propagandist benefit to the hegemonic ideology. Clearly, the narrative of events 
fit precisely into the media ‘frame’ of ‘good versus evil’ and ‘hero verses villain’ as 
described by O’Shaughnessy228. However, in this case, the villain was directly defined to the 
audience. One would expect the NKPA to have been held responsible, as the soldier was 
presented wearing the uniform of North Korea’s military. However, the massacre was made 
the responsibility of NKPA ideology; communism, as the feature claimed North Korean 
troops were “unfeeling, brutalised foes” and “brutalised by Red training”, implying that 
communism and therefore Soviet ideology commonly sanctioned such action.  
 
Academically, one can readily unearth historical evidence of state sponsored brutality 
within the Soviet Union, particularly during the Stalinist era,229 but as Jenks has identified, 
the British Information Research Department [IRD],230 regularly fed material of a 
propagandist nature into the mainstream British media, which helped solidify the perception 
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of Western virtue and Soviet interagency, in the early post-war period.231 Therefore, the 
media narrative of illegal NKPA abuses, neatly fed into a well-established ‘frame’, portraying 
the evils of communist ideology, which had long been established in the West and thus 
rendered elements of the coverage propagandist in nature, despite their factual accuracy 
concerning the illegal killing of UNC service personnel. 
 
Two final points are relevant to our discussion of the feature. Initially, the reader may 
note the uncommon reference to an allied soldier by name, as throughout the coverage of the 
Korean War, only names of significant personalities appeared in features. Hence, there must 
remain an underlying reason why this particular soldier was identified. Such an irregular 
occurrence may be perceived as the result of news crews conducting an interview with an 
individual, something which had been a regular thorn in the side of military media relations, 
particularly when UNC suffered defeats during the early part of the war. UNC often 
complained that reporters interviewed soldiers who had recently participated in an action, 
possibly witnessed their comrades’ fall and were thus understandably disenchanted. This 
therefore, led to the production of reports that portrayed UNC and the war in a negative 
manner.232 However, the propagandist value manifest within personal identification lent the 
report additional credibility and led the viewer to personally and emotively identify with the 
victim; two factors, which would have unwittingly increased an audience’s likelihood of 
decoding the message in accordance with the preferred ideological reading of the text and 
conformed to media selection criteria.  
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Secondly, the depiction of the captured NKPA soldier, adorned with his POW 
identification tag, visually highlighted the difference of cultural morality, which separated the 
opposing forces, as UNC adhered to the formal rules which governed conflict. Therefore, the 
decoder was reminded of the morality underpinning the UN cause. Thus the circulation of 
this symbolic text encouraged decoders to adopt perceptions which were rewarding to 
hegemonic authorities and media companies alike, in relation to ideological conformity and 
economic prosperity respectively. 
 
Additionally the humane treatment of prisoners by Western soldiers has been well 
documented, as has the often brutal nature of the South Korean regime.233 One should remain 
conscious that Korea had endured an extended period of brutal rule under the Japanese during 
the Second World War,234 and had thus been isolated from Western influence for a 
considerable time, consequently leaving the culture of brutality unchallenged. The existence 
of such a culture was confirmed by General P. Sun Yup in his memoirs, as he “regretted the 
lack of concern our government (South Korean Government) and the ROK (Republic of 
Korea) army displayed for the people of Korea.”235 Therefore, one may consider the two 
Korean states of the period to have jointly suffered from a lack of consideration for humanity 
and that it was not instilled purely following the influx of communist doctrine at the end of 
the Second World War; although Yup described Soviet troops to have suffered from poor 
discipline upon their arrival in 1945,236 which likely contributed to an already pitiless climate. 
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The chronological detour manifest in the above three paragraphs should not interrupt 
our rhythm. The battles surrounding the Pusan perimeter, between early August and the 
breakout by UNC, on 16 September 1950, merit further discussion.  US Army units were 
illustrated in action within two features.237 The situation facing UNC was described as 
defensive and symbolically illustrated by imagery of US tanks in action. The first feature 
exhibited tanks shelling a distant ridge, along with heavy machine gun fire. The commentary 
described the events as a “tank battle”; the reader may however assume this to be an example 
of artistic licence, introduced by the newsreel, as the imagery may be considered 
comparatively mundane when measured against the description offered by the audio 
commentary. Nonetheless, the reader must consider the practicalities of recording a tank 
battle as one possible explanation for the absence of material detailing such a clash. During 
this period, NKPA forces were committed to the capture of Pusan, thus rendering a small 
scale clash of armour a viable possibility. 
 
The reader is also reminded of comments made by the war reporter Reginald 
Thompson, who documented an example of how rumour and hearsay may have artificially 
shaped certain coverage. Thompson, overheard military and media personnel discussing and 
writing a dramatic account of a night attack. However, Thompson claims the attack was 
fictitious, as he had been present at the supposed location, during the apparent battle. Indeed, 
the author suggests that such inaccuracies occurred frequently.238 This is not to argue that 
military or media personnel intentionally fabricated narratives of dramatic events, but rather 
to demonstrate how misinterpretation of insignificant events could well have been 
exaggerated by confused or excitable soldiers and reporters alike. Indeed, one would not 
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expect an audience to be presented with entirely accurate material, on every occasion, due to 
the ‘fog’ and chaos of war. However, when the reader contrasts the episode reported by 
Thompson, to the one concerning the fate of General Dean, which maintained greater levels 
of factuality, we may identify significant differences between the accuracy of reports 
emerging from Korea. 
 
The newsreel of 18 September 1950, described the fighting around Pusan as “bitter” 
and that American tanks had formed “a ridge of steel”. Additionally, the “Reds” were said to 
have made no recent progress, whilst well-armed UNC riflemen were depicted occupying 
defences. Shots of armour, artillery and military transport were likewise included and visually 
demonstrated the build-up of war material UNC was experiencing at this time. Thus, the 
viewer was visually reassured that the situation in Korea had improved. Therefore, the reader 
may consider this report to maintain some, heavily symbolic, factual accuracy concerning 
events.  The two features emphasised that the USA had borne the majority of the wars burden 
thus far as Howard Smith suggests Pathe newsreels also elected to emphasise the issue.239 Yet 
again, one may consider this to be an accurate representation, as American soldiers made up 
the vast majority of UNC’s forces. Of particular interest here, is whether this emphasis on 
America’s commitment, which was prominent in coverage, developed organically based on 
entertaining yet factual reporting, or by the process of filtration, described by Chomsky, or 
alternatively, inserted in a more direct manner, in the USA or Britain, by a media who were 
sensitive to the needs of significant institutions. 
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The initial explanation suggests that media editors simply conveyed the ‘essential 
truth’ of events, which became enthused with sensational phraseology through artistic 
licence. However the viewer was presented with no clue to identify which side of the Atlantic 
the features were produced. Thus, we shall consider the propagandist value inherent in 
publicising that America carried the burden of the war, to each government respectively, 
beyond the obvious benefit to the media ‘entrepreneurs of news’. Firstly, the United States 
required allies to become more directly involved to validate the UN resolution authorising 
collective action, as the authority of the international body was maintained by consensus. 
Furthermore, the Truman administration desired to appease public opinion, which felt 
increasingly resentful toward the international community, as casualty figures began to rise 
amongst American servicemen.240 In a similar vein, Britain, although reluctant to become 
drawn into the Korean ‘police action’,241 was determined to support United States policy, 
grounded to a large degree on the fear of Soviet expansion in Western Europe.242 The British 
viewer was therefore, encouraged to support the commitment Britain was beginning to make 
toward Korea, via an emotive appeal to guilt. Therefore, the connative value of both 
sequences demonstrates that regardless of which nations media-state system produced them, 
they conveyed a message, if successfully decoded, which was mutually supportive of the 
policies of both governments and thus may be considered propagandist as they directed 
public perception and set the agenda for debate amongst decoders in a manner concurrent 
with the hegemonic ideology. 
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On 7 September 1950, British Movietone News released footage of President Truman 
delivering a speech.243 The president informed the audience that liberty was at stake and 
linked the basic freedoms enjoyed by the West to the conflict in Korea. Truman continued by 
stating that America did not desire war with China and that his nation was re-arming in order 
to secure peace only. The sequence also contained rhetoric, related to the concept of ‘just 
war’. Here the reader has encountered the classic media-state relationship, where the two 
social institutions interact in a mutually beneficial manner, as the Government desired to 
publish its message, which the media then conveyed to audiences as a newsworthy item, thus 
maintaining its economic role as a seller of socially significant information, whilst replicating 
the ideology in dominance as described by Hall. Therefore, the ideological content of the 
speech, although self-gratifying and propagandist in nature, must be interpreted as overt 
rhetorical lobbying on behalf of an ideological position, in this case, that the American lead 
UN ‘police action’ was legally and morally valid. This may be considered an example of the 
“symbiotic relationship” which exists between elite institutions and mass media,244 which 
facilitated the circulation of America’s hegemonic ideology to audiences around the free 
world. However, much of the coverage of events in Korea was produced by a more 
complicated media and state relationship than the example evident here. 
 
In the weeks preceding the Inchon landing, the newsreels contained two further points 
worthy of exploration. Firstly, the accuracy of UNC artillery, directed by light aircraft flying 
‘spotter’ sorties was emphasised.245 The coverage was an accurate depiction of events; as 
such spotter units flew regularly and were held in high esteem by the military and journalists 
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alike, as described by Catchpole.246 The propagandist value of such coverage publicised the 
military might possessed by UNC and therefore conveyed a sense of security, borne of 
strength, to the viewer. Additionally, written reports which appeared in the press of the day, 
listed the tally of targets spotter units were responsible for neutralising. The specifics, 
including 1,045 villages housing enemy troops and 1,302 troop concentrations, may well 
have been difficult to verify and as a result been subject to exaggeration or inaccuracy, 
particularly when compared against more easily quantifiable statistics such as the six bridges 
and eight locomotives such units were accredited with destroying.247  
 
Thompson, described United States Air Force ‘kill statistics’ as unreliable248 and 
when we consider the similar role of the forward air ‘spotter’, one should perhaps view the 
statistical record with similar caution. The chaos of the battlefield is a problematic and 
challenging environment and as a result, inaccuracy may be considered unavoidable. 
Additionally, human nature may have helped exaggerate statistics. However, regardless of 
causalities, such statistics may be interpreted as having maintained a positive propaganda 
value and therefore helped maintain military and civilian morale, as they demonstrated the 
military prowess and therefore security of the West, which the attentive viewer, during the 
autumn of 1950, probably desired following nearly two and a half months of set-backs in 
Korea.249 Therefore, the news media can be perceived as having replicated the ideology held 
by Tokyo headquarters, likely as a bi-product of having relied upon official military press 
releases as a primary and ‘objective’ source of information; such practice is considered 
common by media theorists, who suggest “government actions” and “credibility” coupled 
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with a common media policy of following the “path of least resistance”, often combine to 
dominate media coverage of significant events,250 thus rendering narratives enthused with 
ideology.  
 
Finally, Gaumont-British News screened a sequence depicting a high level meeting, 
in New York, between Great Britain, the United States and France.251 The feature emphasised 
links between events unfolding in Korea and the security of Western Europe, in a manner 
similar to Attlee’s speech, detailing the “distant fire” as justification for intervention.252 This 
example, illustrates how the media replicated hegemonic ideology, as the feature was 
obviously inspired by official opinion, but not created or organised by officialdom. However, 
of utmost interest to our discussion was the verbal referral to the participants as “the big 
three” which demonstrated to the audience that the cannon of power had shifted since the 
Second World War, where the Soviet Union, not France, had comprised the third member. 
Thus the reader can perceive this as an example of the process documented by Jenks, who 
suggested the British public was steadily weaned away from the view of Russia being a 
‘friendly’ allied power, during the early post war period. Therefore, this feature neatly fitted 
into the anti-Soviet ‘frame’, which had become manifest, within the British media for a 
number of years prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Korea.253 The phrase had likely been re-
coined by journalists, seeking to report news in a snappy and memorable manner, as many 
would have recalled the phrase from the previous conflict, thus rendering any propaganda 
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value maintained by the speech to have been the product of how entertainment-news was 
packaged and delivered.254  
 
However, the connative associations of this phrase may have led the decoder to recall 
the historical context in which the phrase was initially conceived. The Allies had been 
engaged in a battle against tyranny and ‘closed ranks’ in order to overcome the challenge 
presented by the Axis powers. The development of the Cold War was interpreted and framed 
in a similar manner, as the need for proactive collective security had become a key feature of 
Western policy, in order for democracy to insulate its self against authoritarianism. 
Therefore, this example of social communication was clearly susceptible to, as Hall would 
describe it, an ideological reading,255 as the feature linked the current struggle to a past 
conflict, where totalitarianism had been overcome. On the contrary, this sequence may have 
encouraged the more thoughtful viewer to consider why the West had allied its self with the 
now discredited Soviet Union to fight Nazi Germany, thus drawing attention to the change of 
tone, regarding coverage of Russia since the days of 1941;256 although the practicality of the 
alliance was probably evident to most given the circumstances Britain faced during 1940-
1941. Nevertheless the reader has encountered a feature which demonstrated, in a manner 
similar to the preceding two sequences, that a narrow range of society enjoyed access to the 
newsreel media. The personalities and statistics discussed all represented the values and 
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ideology of elite Western institutions, which matched the access “qualifications’ required 
influencing media content.257 
 
On 15 September 1950, MacArthur dramatically altered the course of the war with an 
amphibious assault on the port of Inchon, near the southern capital of Seoul. Coverage 
appeared in the newsreels on 25 September 1950 and described the operation in dynamic 
terms. Cheerful looking soldiers “swarmed ashore”, coupled with images of Marines scaling 
the sea wall. The road to Seoul was reportedly “open” and UNC casualties, described as 
“unavoidable”, were depicted being evacuated. Casualties were said “not to have been in 
vain” and shots of refugees were shown, along with burning NKPA armour, POWs and 
fatalities. UNC was described as “soon to capture Seoul”, and the “beginning of victory” was 
additionally announced. Troops and tanks were shown advancing, as a large blast 
demonstrated NKPA resistance, one suspects that the camera man was fortunate to escape 
injury judging by the proximity of the explosion. This feature demonstrates that newsreel 
crews were taking substantial risks, when shooting footage as indeed by 14 January 1951; 
thirteen reporters had been killed in Korea.258 This risk was necessitated by the economic 
need to acquire a ‘scoop’ to encourage and maintain viewer interest. The feature also 
indicates the time lag between footage being ‘captured’ and its release to the general public. 
In this instance the delay was ten days. Thus when we consider the practical limitations faced 
by the newsreel media; from ‘shooting’, clearance by military censors (post December 1950), 
transportation to either side of the Atlantic, editing, distribution and screening, we can 
determine that the newsreel media operated at a significant disadvantage when producing up 
to date news swiftly. However, this was compensated by the monopoly newsreel companies 
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maintained over the moving image and provides further explanation why camera teams 
exposed themselves to such risk.259  
 
In addition, the reader may perceive the material as having maintained a fair degree of 
openness regarding casualties, sustained by UNC, as the images of wounded carried to 
evacuation, although connectively assuring the viewer of a positive outcome, did 
acknowledge their “inevitability”; even though the viewer was quickly reassured that the 
sacrifice was not in vain. The negative aspects of the strategically significant, well-conceived 
and executed operation were thus afforded a degree of coverage and serve as testament to 
media openness, despite the connotations leading towards a less distressing conclusion, thus 
producing a less damaging effect on public morale. One may therefore perceive the newsreels 
instilling balance within coverage, as the value-driven tendency to focus upon negative 
events was counterbalanced against the validity of the cause. Furthermore, despite having 
been condensed into a narrative, comprising of multiple signs and symbols, the feature did 
accurately represent the military situation. UNC was indeed advancing in the face of NKPA 
resistance, toward the strategically valuable prize of Seoul and had inflicted casualties upon 
the enemy as represented by the burning T-34/85 and the captured and deceased NKPA. 
 
However, an anomaly may be noted relating to the depiction of enemy dead and the 
absence of allied fatalities in the field. The sequence described earlier illustrating the burial of 
UN personnel, killed in action, contrasts sharply with the inclusion of unburied NKPA left 
lying in the open. Therefore, the reader may assume that newsreels did not exclude the 
deceased through consideration of taste or decency, but rather on the less objective and more 
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selective implications to public opinion and morale.  In essence, portrayal of Allied fatalities 
would have been considered detrimental to public morale and unsettled public consensus 
concerning the conflict. By contrast, images of enemy fatalities would ensure a positive 
effect, on an audience, as such footage simultaneously illustrated victory and revenge. In this 
manner, the deceased can be perceived as having maintained a propagandist value, which is 
evident within the audio-visual material, regardless of the specifics of the process which 
shaped its structure. However, it should be emphasised that the deceased only feature 
irregularly which  in itself, may be considered propagandist in effect, as the decoder was not 
exposed to the full horrors of warfare due to the intervention of regulatory guidelines and 
were thus rendered less likely to challenge the ideology in dominance. 
 
The newsreel recording of “MacArthur’s greatest victory”, screened on 2 October 
1950,260 illustrated South Korean civilians cheering UNC forces as they advanced, wounded 
troops airlifted out and NKPA prisoners described as “glad to be out of the war” and “safe in 
UN hands”. The two remarks demonstrate how easily and subtly the newsreels could break 
any notion of ‘objectivity’ and intentionally or not, adopt a more propagandist stance. The 
latter phrase, concerning the safety of POWs, infers that the UN had in effect rescued these 
men from the North Korean regime and thus communist ideology. Given the nature of the 
North Korean regime, this may well maintain an element of truth. However, the phrase and 
its connative interpretation, fit neatly into the anti-communist frame, referred to previously, 
thus affording the comments propagandist value. 
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An additional interpretation may consider the feature to visually and verbally 
demonstrate, to the world, that UNC behaved in a far more civilised manner toward prisoners 
than the NKPA.261 The propagandist value of such a message would have again highlighted 
the moral superiority of the UN and become a weapon in the battle for opinion, which both 
ideological spheres engaged in throughout the Cold War, as described by Taylor, who 
suggests a global struggle for ideological alliances was taking place.262 The first phrase, “glad 
to be out of the war” illustrated an act of interpretation, on behalf of the audio-overlay, which 
informed the audience that NKPA units had not simply broken militarily but also 
psychologically. However accurate, critical observers are again presented with an example of 
the commentary allowing the dramatized-hypothetical to permeate coverage, therefore 
leading the viewer to assume that a lack of enemy resolve translated into impending victory. 
Nevertheless, during this phase of the war, UNC had indeed maintained a “relentless 
tempo”263 as it approached the 38th Parallel, when described by the newsreels as achieving 
“victory in South Korea”,264 which remained accurate but nonetheless avoided addressing the 
question of how victory over, or in, North Korea was to be achieved- if at all. 
 
The advance into North Korea, which resulted in the steady decline of cohesion 
between UN units,265 exposed the true extent of communist atrocities towards civilians and 
UNC soldiers alike. Gaumont-British News featured imagery of a massacre perpetrated by 
the NKPA and described the scene as “Belsen all over again”. The crimes were described as 
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inspired by “Kremlin propaganda”. The sequence began by showing allied units advancing 
and troops inspecting portraits of Stalin and other communist dignitaries, which one would 
expect to find in a political system dominated by a cult of personality. Refugees were 
depicted climbing on to trains to return to homes “the reds drove them out of”. Finally, a 
civilian, having informed communist authorities of his fellow villager’s political opinions 
was beaten by an angry mob; UNC troops were depicted rescuing the man, depositing him 
aboard a tank, as the angry mob continued to bay for his blood. This sequence was 
accompanied by the two ‘snappy’ phrases; “once a communist always a communist” and 
“traitor swaps country’s independence for a pair of jackboots”. 
 
The sequence contained an ideological message and as a result it may be considered 
propagandist in nature. The message implied that communism constituted a negative entity 
which was achieved by linking the political philosophy, to the practical deeds of those who 
represented it, by illustrating its leaders and their followers alongside examples of human 
suffering, such as the displacement of refugees and the existence of a police state, which 
relied on informants to betray their neighbours in order to facilitate mass murder. When 
compared against the historical record one can readily find evidence to validate such 
associations, as brutality was a common feature of such state systems. However, the manner 
in which the atrocity was depicted, regarding the direct link made to Nazism, infers that the 
viewer had witnessed an act of industrialised genocide, which may be considered an over 
exaggeration or sensationalism, instigated by the newsreel producers. This is not to deny the 
appalling nature of the crimes, but is intended to re-clarify them, as mass political purges and 
furthermore highlight a number of propagandist elements contained within the feature, which 
arose from media sensationalism. Initially this description helped the audience link events in 
a distant Korea to those the viewer would undoubtedly have recalled from the Second World 
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War; the Holocaust, which is a technique, employed by media organisations to assist the 
viewer to identify with events and thus potentially aid the clarity of decoding, which Hall 
argues is not assured.266  
 
Furthermore, the emotive feature induced pity, fear and hate amongst viewers. Such a 
response assisted in the maintenance of a dominant reading, on behalf of the decoder, 
particularly as O’Shaughnessy describes hate as a potent or dominant factor in propaganda.267 
Furthermore, communist ideology and leaders were directly linked to these crimes as the 
audience was presented with portraits symbolising their authority and ultimate responsibility 
for the behaviour of their subordinates. Moreover the brutality of the communist world was 
then juxtaposed against Western ideals of humanity, as the village informant was illustrated 
being rescued from understandably vengeful Koreans. This sequence was unlikely to have 
been staged, as the participants appear natural, however, this accurate news item, which 
subtly illustrated the point, via connative association, was transformed into an overtly 
propagandist piece following the remarks made by the commentary. Thus the audience were 
encouraged to ‘hate’ and fear communism due to the influence of media selection criteria and 
a connative link to past crimes against humanity, which although to some degree maintained 
elements of accuracy, had evidently become sensationalised within the text. The newsreel 
treatment of such events may allow us to further understand Jenks’ claim that British officials 
held the medium in low regard and deemed it poor quality journalism.268 However despite 
examples demonstrating a ‘low brow’ treatment of events, such sentiment may have 
contained elements of anti-Americanism due to the reliance of newsreel companies on 
American material. Regardless, such coverage did little to encourage decent amongst 
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Western decoders in relation to the hegemonic perceptions of the era and was thus self-
gratifying to the institutions which fulfilled media access criteria. 
 
The coverage of events between 19 October and 9 November 1950 illustrated UNC 
units, including British troops advancing past burnt-out NKPA armour and smoking ruins. 
Again, emphasis was placed upon the priority treatment of the wounded. Clearly such 
features, would have reassured an audience that British service personnel in Korea, should 
they become a casualty, would be well cared for. This maintained a positive propagandist 
side effect; although such features accurately informed an audience that casualties occurred, 
the treatment they received would have calmly reassured the viewer and helped prevent or 
quell the sedimentary build-up of oppositional ideological readings, to intervention in Korea; 
the reason being that although troops lives were at risk; itself justified by the morality of the 
cause, as discussed, authorities maintained a vested interest in their care should they become 
wounded. This assisted in alleviating concerns regarding sending men to war, held at the time 
amongst female members of the populace, as recorded by mass observation and detailed by 
Catchpole.269  Furthermore, such coverage may have been included on a regular basis, in 
accordance with the news selection value of “familiarity”,270 as the audience would have 
expected to see causalities receiving care. Thus, the coverage confirmed expectation and 
maintained “cultural proximity”271 to the values of the dominant Western culture, that the 
wellbeing of the individual is significant. 
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During this period, the meeting between President Truman and General MacArthur at 
Wake Island was reported.272The feature contained little of significance and moreover no 
evidence of journalistic analysis. The commentary merely stated that Truman visited 
MacArthur to “thank him for services to world peace.” This meeting has been interpreted as 
Truman attempting to re-assert his presidential authority over an increasingly out-spoken 
military commander.273  Again, we do not have sufficient space to explore in thorough detail 
the implications of this event, although further study may wish to investigate how this event 
was reported within the spectrum of the American or British press. 
 
Importantly this short sequence enables us to chart the time difference between the 
‘shooting’ of an event and its publication as a news feature. The meeting took place on 15 
October 1950 and the news clip is recorded by the archive as having been completed or 
released for public consumption on 19 October. Therefore, the time difference separating 
image ‘capture’ and feature release was approximately four days. Clearly Wake Island is not 
as distant from the United States as Korea, thus reducing transportation time. The reader can 
however safely assume that material taken at Wake Island would be less sensitive than 
footage shot in Korea, as the meeting was held behind closed doors, and therefore required 
less scrutiny by media editors practicing self-censorship, which again reduced production 
time. Thus one must remain alert when analysing audio-visual news material, as features may 
comprise of sub-sequences produced inside different time-frames, consequently disordering 
the chronological clarity of reports. In this example, the newsreel of 19 October contained a 
sub-feature illustrating the meeting of 15 October and a further sub-feature reporting the final 
stages of UNC’s capture of Seoul between 24 and 27 September 1950. We may conclude that 
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newsreels may have contained material covering events of up to three weeks prior to release, 
depending on the transportation time. In summary, the newsreel coverage of the early period 
of the war, which saw UNC withdraw to Pusan and later sweep north following the Inchon 
landings, evidently contained material which may be perceived as propagandist in nature as 
little would have provoked the decoder to challenge the established ‘common sense 
consensus’ of anti-communism. 
 
Through the application of media theory and historiography the reader has begun to 
identify and explore the ‘message’ and how it was constructed. Western ideology was 
illustrated supreme, as Eastern ideals became increasingly suspect, particularly as political 
murder was associated with National Socialist genocide. Furthermore, the validity of UN 
action was repeatedly asserted and supported by evidence from Korea, which featured in the 
newsreels due to the peculiarities of media selection criteria, the ideological climate of 
Western society and media-state interdependence at the national level.274 Finally, the reader 
can conclude that both media and state interest in events, one based on economics, the other 
on politics and policy, helped ‘set the agenda’ for the domestic audience. It is the product of 
this interaction which ensured that the decoder would be subject to receiving “systematically 
distorted” and therefore, to a notable degree, self-gratifying communications throughout the 
first six months of hostilities. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
INTERLUDE: EVENTS OF EARLY OCTOBER 1950 AND THE STATE-
MILITARY-MEDIA RELATIONSHIP 
 
During early October 1950, the newsreels reported victories as UNC advanced. The 
total unification of Korea appeared a possibility as NKPA resistance slackened following the 
defence of Seoul. On 7 November Tokyo HQ announced victory,275 as the infamous phrase 
“home by Christmas” began to be uttered.276 However, on 27 October Chinese forces had 
struck second ROK corps, which stunted the UN advance and mauled an American 
regiment.277  The following two week lull in Chinese operations, from 2 November, saw 
UNC undertake the “end the war offensive”, by pushing on to the Yalu River and the border 
with Manchuria, thus bringing the war to a decisive conclusion. However, on 25 November 
Chinese forces initiated their second phase offensive and attacked the hastily advancing units 
of UNC. It was around this period that the actions of the media and more significantly 
General MacArthur became increasingly confused. In order to develop a thorough 
understanding of the coverage of the period of crisis which surrounded Chinese intervention, 
it is necessary for us to review the state-media-military system of interaction, from the 
outbreak of the conflict. This will provide us with an understanding of how the censorship 
system initially functioned and evolved as the war developed, whilst increasing our 
understanding of the influences which helped shape newsreel coverage. The exploration will 
predominantly draw upon the work of Casey, who investigated how the Korean War was sold 
to the American public. As audio-visual material ‘consumed’ by British audiences was often 
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of American origin,278 it is necessary for us to briefly examine the American media-state-
military system.  
 
Almost immediately following his appointment as UNC commander, General 
MacArthur, from his Tokyo Headquarters, had publicised his disregard for formal and official 
censorship. This was said to have been “Abhorrent” to the General, “as it is to all believers in 
freedom of the news and a true democratic society.”279 Thus no compulsory system was 
introduced; correspondents were permitted to travel freely inside Korea and report what they 
witnessed. Instead the press were asked to practice voluntary restraint, in order to exclude 
details which may have endangered the security of UN forces or vilified them 
unnecessarily.280 As Casey records, the emphasis was now very much on the individual, as 
the media were expected to adhere to a self-imposed code.281 In addition one may assume that 
a system which lacked formal boundaries may have proved disorientating to less  experienced 
reporters, who unlike their more seasoned  colleagues, may have been unsure as to what was 
deemed acceptable or not. Therefore, the reader may reasonably assume that the formal code 
practiced during the Second World War essentially removed the responsibility from 
journalists and in some respects detracts from Jenks’ argument that the early post war British 
media was tightly self-policed due to experience gained in the Second World War.282 One 
may therefore consider similar to be applicable to the American media. Clearly any serving 
correspondent would have gained experience with the practice of self-censorship and 
boundaries, but the final responsibility was nevertheless removed from them by the 
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censorship code.283 Thus reporters who were under pressure from their editors to make a 
‘scoop’, may have found themselves in an undesirable situation; between the military ‘rock’ 
and the editorial ‘hard-place’, as it would have been problematic to keep both parties content, 
given their opposing interests, as Taylor suggests that the military wish to restrict the flow of 
information, where the media require it for economic survival.284 Therefore, it is not difficult 
to ascertain how and why many journalists, intentionally or not, enraged Tokyo Head 
Quarters from the outbreak of the war and disregarded security procedures.285 
 
However, MacArthur’s rejection of censorship maintained darker undertones. During 
the Second World War the general had developed a reputation for attempts at press control, 
censoring criticism and often making journalists reliant on his official and often 
uninformative communiqués for war news.286 This system developed during the post war 
years and employed a number of “carrot and stick” methods,287 which helped guide 
journalists in an informal manner. Those who favoured MacArthur in their correspondence 
and towed the official line were often rewarded with inside information or a place amongst 
“the palace guard” in the midst of the Generals court, as did selected wire service chiefs.288 
However those who affronted the General’s ego or covered developments unfavourably often 
became recipients of low key harassment. Such methods included being branded a security 
risk, denial of entry or expulsion, derogatory letters to employers and raids on 
accommodation.289 Casey states that once MacArthur had issued his voluntary censorship 
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code, at the beginning of the war, it was made plain to journalists that they must cooperate 
and tow the official line or face sanctions.290 Such a system did not endear MacArthur to 
members of the media; indeed press-military friction was a key feature of the war, as made 
evident by Casey’s research. The media perspective is well expressed by Thompson’s Cry 
Korea, which suggests a genuine dislike existed amongst journalist toward MacArthur and 
found some things “profoundly disturbing” about the General and the campaign.291 
Furthermore the reporter, who was an ex-British Army intelligence officer, records that subtle 
restrictions began to be applied to reporters’ travel,292 that their private thoughts went out by 
mail for fear of being expelled,293 and that a number of reporters felt the burden and left.294  
 
However, we must maintain our objectivity and consider the climate MacArthur and 
his staff operated in. MacArthur now presided over a territory which had only recently been 
liberated from authoritarian rule, he would therefore have to set an example of the superiority 
of democracy, indeed as Casey has suggested, he seized the opportunity of the Korean War to 
illustrate the moral ascendancy of democracy over the totalitarian communist world.295 
Additionally, it was most probable MacArthur was aware of the hypocritical nature of a 
democracy introducing formal censorship in peace time, as the war was officially defined as a 
‘police action’. Thus at a time when the boundaries between war and peace became blurred, it 
would seem only natural that so could the boundaries between media-military-state 
interaction. Furthermore, Casey illustrates that Tokyo did not initially have the resources 
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available to introduce a formal code during the early phase of the conflict.296 The influx of 
reporters, which quickly reached two hundred by late July 1950, would have been difficult to 
provide for even though they were often experienced members of the press.297 Finally, the 
military criticism that journalists subscribed to the ‘disaster school of journalism’ were not 
unfounded. Many reporters, based on a professional ethos, covered events from the front line, 
which rendered much of their copy negative in nature as interviews with battle shocked 
troops were inevitably pessimistic.298  
 
This micro picture, objective as it may have been, perhaps disregarded the macro 
view of the military situation as seen at Head Quarters. The initial defeats and withdrawals 
were an unpleasant yet necessary bi-product of committing under strength and ill equipped 
forces in order to stem the communist assault.299 Therefore, during the first six months of the 
conflict, the reader can identify some evidence to suggest that an informal system was 
necessary, due to practical considerations, whilst additionally remaining aware that the 
informal system, championed by MacArthur, was not as transparent or benign as perhaps he 
considered it to be. Additionally, the reader must consider that as Commander in Chief of UN 
forces, General MacArthur was wise to consider the positive effect on civilian and military 
morale that his official communiqués were intended to have,300 although it is difficult to deny 
that this positivism also helped obscure negative events, which may have publically 
discredited his image, something which he was inclined to cultivate. However, the gulf 
between more objective yet heavily selected micro reporting on behalf of reporters and the 
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macro consideration of strategy and morale emanating from Tokyo resulted in the 
development of a widening credibility gap as Casey argues.301 
 
 As the war progressed it is evident that the subtle informal restrictions began to 
increase. The methods practiced by the military became more ‘underhand’ as new vague 
clauses concerning ‘unwarranted criticism’ appeared as MacArthur charged the media with 
psychologically aiding the enemy, which increasingly prompted the press to request the 
introduction of official censorship.302 During this time various editors began to suspect that 
MacArthur was employing the ambiguity of the informal system to cover bad news,303 which 
would have tarnished his public image and provided a motive for his resistance to the 
introduction of formal censorship with defined boundaries. The media-military friction, 
described by Casey and Thompson, would only increase as UNC suffered a shock defeat as 
China embarked upon an officially undeclared yet subtly forewarned attack.304 
 
As MacArthur’s “End the war offensive” ran into trouble in the face of China’s 
second phase offensive between 25 November and 9 December 1950, the military, political 
and media crisis intensified. As UNC units began the “big bug-out”, chaotic, costly and 
demoralising fighting withdrawals took place, which saw names including the Chongchon 
River, Chosin Reservoir, Koto-ri and Hell Fire Valley passed into military history. One can 
logically argue that during this period Washington was rapidly losing control of the situation 
as UNC was in full retreat and large units were threatened with encirclement and destruction. 
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Furthermore their commander in Tokyo was not only reporting alarming warnings of 
annihilation, but was in addition calling for escalation of the war with China via bombing and 
blockade, thus publically questioning Truman’s policy for conducing the war, but also 
seeking to extricate himself of blame for the unfolding crisis. To add to this list of woes, the 
press were lacking efficient and effective guidelines of how to report the crisis. In effect, the 
media were officially free to report on events which adhered to existing media selection 
criteria. The most prominent example being the necessity of reporting negative news, which 
encouraged the viewer to emote and therefore provided an entertainment value to news 
coverage; something which led O’Shaughnessy to argue that the distinction between news 
and entertainment was not a sharp one”.305 As Casey suggests, Truman would find “crafting 
an information campaign in such an environment no easy task”.306 
 
MacArthur’s communiqués to Washington deeply troubled the administration, indeed 
the General had been a concern since the beginning of the war.307 However, the “political 
undertones” he was including, with his polarised pessimistic/ optimistic reports, initiated the 
last phase of the battle over policy.308 MacArthur lobbied Truman to take “some positive 
action”, on 2/3 December, to prevent the destruction of UNC forces, which referred to 
escalation of the conflict with China. Aside from his disquiet over his Generals attempt to 
make, rather than implement policy309 and the possibility of conducting a ‘Dunkirk style’ 
evacuation of Korea, Truman was upset by MacArthur’s public  attempts to avoid criticism 
for the calamity UNC now faced.310 The instability now evident in Tokyo, undoubtedly 
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contributed to Truman’s alarmist remark concerning “active consideration” of employing the 
atomic bomb, which prompted a media frenzy,311 a visit from Prime Minister Attlee and 
damaged Truman’s attempts to symbolically make no public fuss over developments,312 
whilst rendering fifty per cent of Americans expecting the commencement of a third world 
war.313  
 
During this period, military officials were instructed to refrain from comment,314 
although front line reporters conveyed a sense of crisis.315 Casey suggests that some media 
adopted self-censorship and refrained from attacking Truman, whilst others were less 
restrained.316 Truman issued an order designed to restrain theatre commanders from 
commenting publically, without clearance from Washington.317 However, the most revealing 
evidence of the sentiment maintained between Tokyo and the media can be accredited to an 
outburst by General Willoughby, who described journalists as “the rag pickers of modern 
literature” and accused them of “calculated treason and subversion”, whilst offering “aid and 
comfort to the enemy”.318 When coupled with MacArthur’s attempts to re-write history by 
describing the ‘End the war offensive’ as a spoiling attack aimed at disrupting the Chinese 
offensive,319 despite the well documented intelligence failures,320 the reader may clearly 
perceive that MacArthur and his staff were exceptionally sensitive to criticism, thus 
explaining the General’s resistance to formal and established censorship boundaries, as 
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discussed above. Such events only furthered the position maintained by the media that Tokyo 
had attempted to control coverage, which subsequently expanded the credibility gap 
further.321  
 
Following the tightening of restrictions, examples exist to demonstrate how 
correspondents could still behave irresponsibly, as typified by United Press during the 
retreat.322 Other examples include the military having to prevent the press from reporting on 
the situation facing X Corps, their fighting withdrawal and subsequent evacuation by sea, in 
the interests of operational security. Additionally, friction emerged over coverage of a 
missing UNC unit of approximately seven hundred men. The media wished to follow this 
story; however the military considered it distressing for the families concerned.323 One 
military official claimed that the attack from “the typewriter in the rear” was often worse than 
the enemy, and that the media followed a “misguided market” that bad news sold.324 The 
official concerned, had thus identified media selection criteria as the cause of some friction, 
as economic need to focus upon emotive negatives propelled coverage toward greater 
sensationalism. One can sympathise with both parties, although such incidents once more 
highlight the ill feeling which separated military and media, particularly as Casey suggests 
the US public had been able to follow US defeat in “graphic detail”.325 
 
The reader must now consider how this system effected the production of newsreels. 
It is necessary to employ a combination of evidence and augment it with informed and logical 
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speculation, in order to chart the influences audio-visual news material was subjected to 
between ‘shooting’ in Korea and arrival on the cinema screen in Britain. The footage often 
illustrated the proximity with which correspondents operated to the front lines, demonstrating 
the freedom of movement they enjoyed under MacArthur’s unpopular system, which allowed 
reporters to pursue their journalistic instincts and audience attention, despite the subtle 
methods of obstructions described by Thompson.326  The practicalities of filming an army in 
retreat, particularly during the early phase of the war and the lesser, yet significant 
difficulties, of reporting on an advancing military force cannot be overlooked.327 In addition 
the lack of communication facilities provided for the media would undoubtedly have affected 
newsreel crews, though perhaps not to the same extent as other varieties of journalists, who 
were bound to the written word and its speedy transmission half way around the globe.328 
Thus the reader may surmise that newsreel crews operating inside Korea under the voluntary 
system of censorship, benefited from unrestricted movements beyond those practical under 
the circumstances, as made evident by their diversity of content, but may have been subject to 
subtle obstruction by the military.  
 
Furthermore, it is conceivable that such teams engaged in self-censorship, ‘shooting’ 
selectively, in accordance with Hoggart’s theory detailing how media professionals share the 
ideological atmosphere of their parent society.329 In addition, Howard Smith has illustrated 
how BBC camera teams were issued with suggested narratives to cover by editors in the 
UK.330 Such instructions would have been primarily based on media concern for securing 
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material, which would prove stimulating to viewers and adhered to implicit industry criteria 
governing media content, but may also have been influenced by their personal ideological 
opinions, adding a further layer of ‘distortion’ to the material. However, editors would have 
been well aware of restrictions sanctioned by the D-Notice Committee described by Jenks,331 
which provided opportunity for military and government officials to informally influence 
media content. The same may be said of the Ministry of Information, particularly as the 
newsreels were “technically subject to censorship, but remained free for so long as they 
towed the line”.332    Finally, many camera teams and editors alike may have drawn on 
experience gained during the Second World War, which would have rendered them familiar 
with war time media practice and its inherent responsibilities. Such a claim becomes 
validated when considering that the BBC dispatched the veterans Cyril Page and Ronnie 
Noble to Korea333 and that the Associated and United Press also committed their veterans.334 
Therefore, reason is provided to explain why and how some of the audio-visual material, 
discussed with in this thesis, can be considered, to a fair degree, propagandist in nature, as the 
“distortion” can indeed be considered systematic as Hall suggests. 
 
As Casey has illustrated the implementation of the informal system was delegated by 
Washington to the theatre commander in Tokyo in accordance with traditional practice.335 It 
is conceivable that under the informal system audio-visual news footage was not screened 
either in Korea or Tokyo prior to its departure by air to the USA or Great Britain. However, 
when accounting for the subtle and potentially more sinister aspects of the system as 
described above, it is also conceivable that material was screened, or camera crews were 
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informally pressurised into avoiding controversy. This is particularly significant when 
considering the value placed upon the image by those who have studied and produced 
propaganda. Joseph Goebbels held the ‘optik’ element of propaganda in high regard.336 
Indeed, O’Shaughnessy claims the image remains long after the argument is forgotten,337 
which although referred to in the context of rhetorical persuasion, remains valid in relation to 
our discussion as audio-visual material combines both elements. Furthermore, Casey 
describes how visual and written material was subject to different levels of restraint and that 
the visual elements were more heavily censored, leading the scholar to claim that the US 
public received a “sterilised view” of the war.338 Such opinions all substantiate Hall’s 
consideration of the image, which he suggests gives rise to fewer misunderstandings, during 
the decoding process, which in itself increases the chance of successful decoding and 
thereafter renders the image highly significant to the transfer of ideology 339. In addition, the 
informal code adopted by Tokyo, coupled with the pre-conflict method of low key 
intimidation, may have disorientated veteran reporters who were accustomed to formal 
procedures, boundaries and guidelines. This may assist in explaining why seasoned 
journalists often succumbed to the pressure and vacated Korea, as described by Thompson, 
who harboured an intense mistrust of the MacArthur system.340  
 
One may suggest that such mistrust may well have been justified as the adoption of a 
regulated formal code with defined boundaries would have been more compatible with 
democracy as it would have maintained greater transparency, thus reducing the scope for 
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abuse, which an informal system afforded.341 Finally, by delegating the establishment and 
enforcement of censorship to theatre commanders, civilian agency can be perceived as 
relinquishing its direct authority over the system. The logic underpinning this delegation is 
clear; as it allowed the well placed military to attend to matters concerning security and as a 
positive bi-product and prevented civilian administration from being accused of direct 
interference with media output.  Additionally, regarding the Korean scenario, this may well 
be perceived as a mistake, as regulated censorship, that was accountable to civilian agency 
would have reduced the military-media friction, which was evident in many forms, as 
demonstrated by Casey, Rees and Thompson amongst others. Indeed a climate where media 
professionals were requesting guidance from authorities, thus illustrating how reporters were 
unsure of how to operate within the code,342 was likely to have had less effect on newsreels 
than other media, as the time difference, inherent in transportation and the varying stages of 
the production process, would have afforded this media time, to consider and refine their final 
content. Despite the final stages of editing and production described, as an intense affair, by 
cameraman John Turner an employee of Gaumont-British News during the final period but 
was not however directly involved in covering Korea;343 something which press journalists 
did not enjoy, as they were often under pressure to achieve ‘scoops’ and best their 
competitors.344 
 
The time gap caused by the distance involved in transporting audio-visual material 
from Korea, whilst aiding media self-censorship, despite being detrimental to newsreel 
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economic viability, benefited the military and politicians alike. Taylor, when discussing the 
Falklands conflict, which shares a number of geographic and technological similarities with 
the Korean conflict,345 suggests that ‘late news is no news’ and is thus detrimental to the 
media, yet nevertheless remains positive for military authorities for the same reason.346 Thus, 
during the Korean War, the military were fortunate in that by the time negative news reached 
an audience; the events covered were out-dated, therefore reducing any negative effects on 
public morale. Upon arrival in the US and now external to the MacArthur system, the 
material would have been subjected to an additional round of ideological filtration on behalf 
of media professionals, as part of the process described by Hoggart and Chomsky. The 
production and editing process would therefore be undertaken within a society where the 
ravages of McCarthyism were apparent and ‘witch hunts’ were common.347 Officials of state, 
alongside media employees, would most likely have desired to avoid becoming subject to one 
of the senators attacks and as a result undertaken precautions to avoid appearing sympathetic 
to communism. This process is evident within the newsreels, as the commentary frequently 
employed memorable ‘one liner’s’, referring to communism in derogatory terms, which in 
itself has been described as a method of propaganda.348 However, the inclusion of such 
rhetorical devices, which also adhered to the media disposition as a swift, compact and 
increasingly disposable entertainment product, may well have been the result of personal 
ideological bias conveyed to the audience by media employees and is accounted for within 
                                                          
345 From Taylor’s analysis it may be determined that the Falklands campaign presented 
similar problems for journalists as Korea. The geographic isolation of the war zone is evident, 
as was the reliance of the media on military communications technology, which naturally 
afforded the latter a significant degree of influence. Additional comparisons of interest 
include how reporters began to identify with the perils facing service personnel through 
shared proximity to the conflict and are thus likely to practice self-censorship through 
understanding. See Taylor, Munitions of the Mind, pp. 276-280. 
346 Ibid., p. 278. 
347 Casey, Selling the Korean War, p. 351. 
348 O’Shaughnessy, Politics and Propaganda, p. 131. 
117 
 
Hall’s theoretical model.349 Furthermore, such professionals may have drawn on experience 
gained during the Second World War and subsequently edited imagery accordingly, based on 
an understanding of how visual material was considered to be particularly sensitive; thus self-
censorship, founded upon the existence of a shared ideological outlook, “sterilised” the view 
of the war, presented to the American public, as suggested by Casey. 
 
As Smith suggests, many of the private newsreel companies relied heavily upon their 
affiliates in the United States for footage, as did the BBC in the early stages of the conflict.350 
This confirms Taylor’s suggestion that Britain viewed the Cold War primarily “through 
American filters”.351 Although Taylor’s remark appears to refer to the wider ideological 
conflict between the two superpowers, it remains highly applicable to our discussion, as the 
British public ‘consumed’ audio-visual news material shaped by ideological filters operating 
on the other side of the Atlantic. This remained the case until the BBC’s television newsreel 
camera team reached Korea in October 1950.352 However, the British cinema patron would 
have been presented with audio-visual news material, which had in effect been filtered twice, 
as once the features reached the UK, in a semi-complete or complete state, the distortive 
process inherent in the production of media material described by Hall, would again come 
into effect. Indeed, further study may wish to separate and analyse which features arrived in 
Britain complete and which were finalised domestically, the accent of the commentator being 
the most prominent, although by no means entirely reliable indicator. 
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Upon arrival in Britain, audio-visual material progressed through the editing process 
of the newsreel companies, who circulated it in its current state, or should the working time-
frame allow made alterations including editing and re-dubbing the audio accompaniment. 
Indeed, Smith suggests that newsreel companies often had to fashion their features out of a 
limited range of identical footage, which pressured editors and producers to create sequences 
which appeared non-reliant on shared imagery.353 In addition to this economic consideration, 
based on the requirement to inform and to an extent entertain the audience, the newsreel 
employees involved in this process would most likely have practised self-censorship. As the 
material had been previously filtered by the system operating in the US, British editors who 
were familiar with the process of war time censorship,354 and operated within personal 
ideological parameters, would have experienced less cause for concern, as the content of the 
footage would have previously been ‘screened’ for information, which may have contributed 
to the formation of an oppositional ideological framework discussed by Hall.355 However, it 
is probable that such professionals remained vigilant for aspects of the coverage likely to 
cause concern specifically amongst the British audience or official sensibilities; in particular 
the depiction of British service personnel and their exposure to danger, the treatment of 
British wounded and material considered alarming to public opinion. The depiction of British 
service men and women will be explored later, although at present it will suffice to suggest 
that the British media were aware of the significance of news features in relation to public 
opinion, through personal experience and shared ideological views, which resulted in the 
implementation of self-censorship.  
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However, scholars have identified additional influences beyond the personal 
implementation of self-censorship. Jenks details the existence of the D-Notice Committee, 
described as an informal body, which comprised of serving government, military and media 
representatives.356 This committee, established in 1944 and remained active until 1954, 
appeared highly organised, met regularly, recorded minutes and was staffed by ‘active’, 
rather than retired officials. Such circumstance may lead one to argue that the body exhibited 
strong signs of a nature, more formal than informal, thus substantiating the claim made 
previously, that as the boundaries between war and peace became blurred, during the Korean 
‘police action’, so legitimately could the boundaries between informal/formal state-media 
interaction. Of course, the evidence remains circumstantial, with further investigation into the 
committees work required to ascertain the substance of such an interpretation. However, such 
a process, when compared against the historical context, may be interpreted as a democracy 
adjusting to the new post war global climate of tension with the Soviet Union, which due to 
the nature of the Stalinist regime remained a menacing and ill-understood entity.357 The 
committee would undoubtedly have been aware of the need to consider any decisions made, 
regarding the censorship of information, in relation to issues surrounding democracy. Clearly 
there was a balance to be struck between the denial of sensitive information and the 
principles which govern a democratic society and the global climate of the period. Britain 
appears to have maintained this balance, illustrated by an example of how the authorities 
responded to the ideologically incompatible stance of the communist domestic newspaper 
The Daily Worker, which although not banned, as during total war, was nonetheless gently 
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excluded from access to the information contained within the D-Notices, issued by the 
committee, to inform the media of which information was to be excluded from circulation.358  
 
The committee also maintained the power to exercise censorship over the newsreels, 
which as Jenks records, remained free if they adhered to the official line.359 Additionally the 
scholar suggests the government could easily influence the newsreels through the Central 
Office of Information.360 Thus it may be suggested that where organic acts of self-censorship 
or informal appeals may have failed to consider all perspectives, there remained official 
safeguards to prevent the release of sensitive material into the public domain. Furthermore, 
both the British media and the D-Notice Committee operated within an ideological climate of 
anti-communism, which although less dramatized than the American experience, had 
developed steadily following the conclusion of the Second World War and was prominently 
championed by Winston Churchill and his “iron curtain” remark.361 Again space prohibits a 
full discussion of the ideological climate; however, it remains sufficient to suggest that 
Hoggart’s description of a society’s ideological atmosphere is applicable to the period in 
question. To offer a brief summary of these ideological conditions it must be considered that 
following the Second World War, where the Soviet Union had been allied with Britain and 
often much admired for her sacrifices, the slow disintegration of relations in the post war era, 
presented British authorities with an image problem; how to turn public opinion which 
favoured Russia, toward a stance which mistrusted and rejected her ideological position.362 
This requirement led to the development of an anti-communist frame, within the domestic 
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media, which steadily publicised “Western virtue and Soviet intransience’s”,363 and became 
well established within the national mind-set, which in a sedimentary manner, gradually 
became a common sense consensus. The Korean crisis was thus integrated easily within the 
established anti-communist media ‘frame’364 which had developed over the preceding years 
and thus simplified coverage of the Korean conflict as it fitted neatly into an established and 
recognisable media format.365 In light of this, we may question if the British public was able 
to follow the defeats of late 1950 in the same “graphic detail” which Casey suggests the 
American public were able to do, or if they were presented with a “sterilised” depiction of the 
war as Casey also suggests the US public witnessed, given much of the audio-visual material 
originated from the united states, but was also subject to influence under the British media 
system. 
 
The informal system operated by General MacArthur may be considered to have been 
an appeal, directed at the media, to share the ideological atmosphere of the West, by the 
practice of self-censorship and the denial or self-restraint of the journalist pursuit of 
entertainment value, which as identified often focused upon the shocking and negative, some 
examples of which i.e. a retreat by UNC, would have directly contrasted with the interests of 
the military. However, media values did not always clash with military or official interests as 
the media’s desire to maintain “balance” regarding the composition of reports, often resulted 
in the viewer being presented with a negative, followed by a positive. Evidently this often 
had a propagandist impact as by concluding with a positive, the emotive response of the 
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viewer, to the preceding negative, which may have provoked concern or fear, was thus 
redressed. Thus, an example has been encountered of how media criteria may render 
coverage to exhibit signs of a propaganda campaign where the emotive response of the 
decoder would have been regulated for fear of causing panic and/or exposure to information 
which may have facilitated the sedimentary build-up of an oppositional ideology. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CRISIS: LATE OCTOBER 1950 TO THE END OF JANUARY 1951 
 
Notably, in a feature of 9 November 1950,366  covering the period of China’s limited 
First Phase Offensive,367  which resulted in the UNC advance being checked for a short 
period,368 Gaumont-British News released a feature stressing the might and success of UNC 
arms and in addition illustrated the ruins of the northern capital of Pyongyang, whilst UNC 
units advanced past cheering civilians. Prior to 27 October, when China engaged the UN for 
the first time, this would have constituted an accurate, if glamorised, depiction of events. 
However, due to the natural delay in the audio-visual news production process it may well 
have proved impossible to include visual coverage of the altered military situation, due to 
footage having departed Korea prior to the commencement of the Chinese attack. Should this 
have been the case, the audio commentary which was added at a later date, provided an ideal 
opportunity to make reference to the new situation, which was passed by.  
 
It is of particular interest that the familiar Gaumont-British introductory sequence, 
generic to all newsreel features produced by the company, altered its wording for this single 
feature. The new introductory phrase now addressed the audience with “Gaumont-British 
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News, presenting the truth to the free peoples of the world”. Such an effort to confirm the 
objective validity of past, present or future coverage, appears clumsy to the attentive viewer 
and was most likely an over enthusiastic attempt, on behalf of the newsreels, to ‘do their bit’ 
during the crisis. Nonetheless, such a remark can readily be considered propagandist in nature 
and intent. Such an interpretation is supported by the opening of the subsequent newsreel 
which had reverted to its original terminology, which thus rendered the brief change a 
significant anomaly.   
 
Chinese intervention was first hinted at in a Gaumont-British newsreel of 13 
November 1950,369 seventeen days after initial contact was made with UNC forces on 27 
October. The viewer’s first visual introduction to the new enemy emanated on 27 November, 
when a small number of Chinese prisoners of war were shown and described as wearing the 
uniform of the “Chinese Red Army”. UNC transportation was depicted as bogged down in 
muddy conditions although advances continued to be stressed, as the UNC “Conquers” 
approached the Manchurian border. This coverage appears to report the period between the 
communist First and Second Phase Offensives, i.e. between the 2 and 25 of November, a 
period where UNC had resumed the advance.370 Thus coverage, to a significant degree, 
remained selective yet objective concerning events at the front.  
 
However, of particular interest is the manner in which China was introduced into the 
narrative of the conflict. Aside from the organic propaganda value of reporting the capture of 
Chinese POWs, which visually illustrated the superiority of Western arms, the captured men 
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were described in relation to the political philosophy they represented and not simply their 
nationality. Thus the sequence implied that a conspiracy of world communism existed, as 
diverse national bodies constituted an international political collective, which therefore 
contextualised events in Korea, as part of communisms bid for world domination and thus 
promoted an associative fear, as was common during this period, that the third world war had 
begun or was indeed imminent.371 Additionally, the entrance of China into the war fitted 
neatly into the well-established anti-communist frame which existed in Britain and added to 
the established consensus of anti-communist sentiment already in existence.372 It remains 
possible to consider this features inherent message to be propagandist in nature, as it 
intensified the fear of communism and thus emotively encouraged the decoder to support the 
military confrontation of the ideology on the battlefield in Korea. However, the message was 
likely to have been produced as a bi-product of media sensationalism, a feature commonly 
associated with newsreels, as noted by Smith.373 
 
On 7 December the newsreels acknowledged the full scale intervention of China and 
reported from the UN on “Chinese communist aggression” and described the Chinese 
representative as “listening carefully”.374 Again the definition of the Chinese position was 
based on political outlook, rather than nationality.375 Furthermore, having described the 
Chinese delegates as “listening carefully”, the sequence conveyed the message that the West 
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dominated the assembly and thus maintained control over the symbolic forum of international 
opinion, which according to O’Shaughnessy, maintains a propagandist value beneficial to the 
ideology in dominance.376 It remains a truism that the UN was indeed dominated by the USA, 
which despite encountering opposition from her allies often prevailed.377  
 
However, the historical record indicates that the Chinese delegation, although 
uncompromising and uncooperative, did speak at the UN, the rhetoric of which failed to 
appear in the newsreels in any form, in a manner similar to that discussed in chapter one. 
Thus one may reasonably conclude that although technical inhibitors may have prevented the 
Chinese ideological position being presented to the audience, it is apparent that the newsreels 
chose not to challenge the Cold War anti-communist consensus. This presents us with 
evidence to support Jenks’ claim, that the British media did not challenge the ‘common 
sense’ consensus of Western society, due to personal agreement with the ideological 
atmosphere rather than in response to official pressure.378  
 
This issue becomes increasingly complex, when considering the newsreel’s depiction 
of the South Korean delegate addressing the UN, where he assertively held China responsible 
for embarking upon an act of aggression. The rhetoric of the emissary was conveyed to the 
viewer, which presented the newsreels with few technical inhibitors as he spoke in English. 
However, one may also suggest that the content of the speech was allowed to reach the 
audience as it was ideologically compatible with that of the dominant ideology and serves as 
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a further example of Jenks’ suggestion that the media maintained little desire to challenge the 
consensus379 and often undertook initiatives at their own discretion. 
 
The suggestion that media organisations often undertook self-censorship or 
potentially propagandist initiatives at their own discretion becomes increasingly relevant at 
this stage in the Korean conflict, as the crisis UNC now faced was considered far greater than 
that of June-July 1950.380 The newsreel of 7 December, described UNC having to fight 
desperately whilst “outnumbered”, “against the odds” and against an “overwhelming 
onslaught”, which “halted the allied advance”.381 This depiction, which likely arose from a 
consideration of the economic benefits of sensationalism, also helped ‘explain’ the allied 
reversal as a set-back which appeared natural in the context of such battlefield circumstance. 
The situation was thus explained in relation to China’s strength, as opposed to allied 
shortcomings or deficiencies, which have since been identified.382 However, the reversal 
itself was described as a ‘stalled advance’. Thus the sequence maintained an inherent 
propaganda value, as the reversal of fortune, which culminated in a retreat, was 
acknowledged and defined by its semantic opposite, i.e. by the word “advance”, used in a 
negative context by the addition of the word ‘stalled’, which itself implied a temporary halt. 
The employment of such selective terminology may be explained by the practice of media 
self-censorship and a desire not to alarm public opinion and maintain a balance within reports 
whilst forestalling official criticism or sanctions for deviancy.383 Perhaps the most effective 
explanation remains the simplest, that during a time when UNC had been achieving victories, 
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it would appear only natural, to a media commentator, that the advance would resume in the 
future, although the propagandist value of describing such negative events to the public in 
such a rhetorically guarded manner cannot be ignored. However, media theory may interpret 
the slightly more positive depiction of a stalled advance, as an example of newsreels adhering 
to the media value of ‘balance’ regarding the composition of features.384 
 
Two Gaumont-British News sequences of 11 December 1950 remain particularly 
significant.385 The first depicted the crew of a US aircraft carrier, engaged in a snowball fight 
on the flight deck, which was jovially described as “a Cold War of their own”. Stationary 
aircraft appeared in the background, covered to protect them from the harsh climate, yet 
described as “ready for an emergency”. This sequence conveyed a sense of relaxed humour, 
and encouraged the viewer to adopt the ideology that all was well in Korea. This is 
particularly evident in the relaxed nature of the crew, the abundance of grounded aircraft and 
most prominently how they were described as “ready for an emergency”. One may interpret 
this sequence as propagandist in nature as, at a time when the Chinese Second Phase 
Offensive was well under way, the imagery and commentary offered the viewer no clue to 
understanding the reality of the developing emergency. Thus, the sequence can be considered 
near devoid of objectivity, beyond the activities of the carrier crew. Additionally, this feature 
may have sought to subtly explain the crisis by illustrating that adverse flying conditions 
were hampering allied air power and preventing them from assisting the troops, should the 
viewer have been aware of the true reality from other news sources. Therefore, the viewer 
encountered an ideological interpretation of events, which would have had less detrimental 
effect on public morale than contrasting interpretations. Thus, the decoder was invited to 
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share a fantasy,386 as he/she encountered “systematically distorted communication”, which 
attempted to construct a reality which was fundamentally misleading regarding the nature of 
events, as described in Hall’s theoretical approach.387  
 
Given that the sequence interpreted events in the best possible light and thus calmed 
public anxieties, whilst not directly referring to any military setback, it remains reasonable to 
assume that the newsreel media ‘played it safe’ and engaged in self-censorship, as previously 
encountered. However, alternative footage may have been unavailable due to the military 
situation,388 or the introduction of informal emergency restrictions in the USA or Britain. The 
latter interpretation remains speculative, but when one considers that the crisis was 
extraordinarily dangerous to global stability and peace,389 one can readily understand why 
authorities may have informally influenced the process at some stage, perhaps through the D-
Notice Committee, which resulted in the public being presented with a carrier crew snowball 
fight, which maintained a significant degree of propagandist value. However, the most 
probable explanation remains that the newsreels engaged in self-censorship, through 
ideological sympathy with the authorities and responded to informal appeals for the restraint 
of the media during the crisis as detailed below. Most strikingly, this feature did not adhere to 
any of the media selection criteria one may expect. There was no ‘balance of composition’, or 
‘unexpectedness’ and the ‘event’ may be considered well below any ‘threshold of scale’ 
which renders an event newsworthy. Indeed “cultural proximity” remains the only applicable 
                                                          
386 O’Shaughnessy, Politics and Propaganda, p. 7. 
387 Hall, ‘Encoding and Decoding’, p. 1. 
388 The disruption of the front lines would most probably have interfered with media output, 
as many reporters operated well forward with the troops. 
389 Catchpole, The Korean War, p. 115. 
130 
 
value, in the sense that an air of relaxation was established through the depiction of an 
activity familiar to the decoder.390 
 
Evidence to support the claim, that the media responded to informal official lobbying 
to restrain press coverage during the crisis, can be found later within the same newsreel. 
British Prime Minister Clement Attlee was shown delivering a speech to the American press 
club, where he stressed the responsibilities of the press in a democratic society. Attlee 
suggested the democratic press must assist audiences to “Make the right judgment”; he then 
contrasted this against the role of the media in a totalitarian society.391 Thus Attlee 
highlighted the difference separating persuasion from coercion, which distinguished the 
democratic world from the oppressed and the free press from the state controlled. The viewer 
was thus presented with a working example of the relationship between state and media in a 
liberal democracy, as the official was illustrated attempting to informally persuade the media 
to assist the West’s cause by behaving in a “responsible” manner when covering events in 
Korea.   
 
O’Shaughnessy would consider such a speech an example of overt propaganda as the 
orator was openly seeking to persuade his audience of the merits of his cause.392 Such 
lobbying may legitimately include rhetorically persuasive techniques such as flattery and 
appeal to higher ideals, as evident in Attlee’s diatribe, where the Prime Minister described the 
role of the press as “vital” and immediately linked his audience’s role to higher democratic 
principles including the rule of law, the maintenance of the Western way of life and the 
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defence of peace. Having educated his audience regarding their station and responsibilities, 
Attlee proceeded to announce that he regretted the necessity of defence preparations due to 
the current world situation and that the military situation in Korea had deteriorated due to the 
intervention of China. The unity of Britain and the strength of the ‘special relationship’ were 
also proclaimed,393 as the newsreel screened images, towards the end of the speech, of UNC. 
 
This feature is of great significance to our discussion as it demonstrated how the 
government of a democracy could influence media content in an informal manner, which in 
turn, helps explain how and why much of the media text examined can be interpreted through 
the prism of ideology and thus considered propagandist in nature. Evidently, the newsreel, 
which depicted the snowball fight amongst deckhands, may be perceived as the audio-visual 
media response to Attlee’s plea, insofar as it contained little that would alarm public opinion 
and furthermore may well be perceived as an example of the media behaving “responsibly”. 
Of course, it is necessary to define “responsible” behaviour as news coverage that was 
ideologically compatible with the official line, or failing that, coverage that was not 
excessively ideologically disruptive to societal opinion, concerning the war. However, 
Attlee’s motivation becomes apparent with an examination of the historical context in which 
the speech was conceived and delivered.  
 
As the military situation worsened394 and MacArthur’s reports became increasingly 
pessimistic,395 President Truman came under increased pressure to find a solution to a 
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conflict that was, to a considerable extent, unpopular in America.396 This climaxed when the 
president remarked that the use of atomic weapons was under “active consideration”, which 
‘scoop hungry’ journalists interpreted in an exaggerated manner.397 British ministers, who 
had received word via what Hockley described as “news tapes”,398 began to demand Attlee’s 
intervention.399 The Prime Minister hastily proceeded to Washington for a series of regular 
formal and informal meetings with the president and his close advisors,400 which gave rise to 
the myth that the visit prevented the US from using the atomic bomb.401 The emotion 
surrounding the crisis is symbolised by the reaction of some diplomats at the UN, who with 
tears in their eyes, truly anticipated the start of a third world war.402 However, Attlee soon 
discovered the US had no intention of deploying ‘the bomb’, which probably led him to 
conclude that the media had acted irresponsibly and had further sensationalised the crisis, 
thus distressing the public and politicians alike. Furthermore, as the Truman-Attlee meetings 
continued, “morale and information” were discussed and placed eighth on the meeting’s 
agenda on 4 December 1950.403 Thus both the US and Britain had officially begun to 
consider how best to respond to the developing situation of undeclared war with China, 
having experienced the disruptive potential of an irresponsible and un-restrained press, which 
had contributed to the panic surrounding the reversal of fortune in Korea, through the pursuit 
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of media selection criteria including “conflict” and “danger to the community” as described 
by McShane.404 
 
The concluding feature of the sequence covering Attlee’s speech illustrated UNC 
units in action and praised General MacArthur. This may be considered a rather unsubtle 
example of patriotic news coverage, but again, serves to illustrate that a positive media 
response, to informal lobbying, occurred in the wake of Attlee’s address. However, it is 
necessary to question what effect Attlee’s request had upon media coverage of the crisis, 
which lasted into the New Year. Certainly only Pathe referred to the international reaction to 
the A-bomb remark,405 although to what degree of sensationalism or objectivity remained 
impossible to ascertain for this research. However, it is significant that a further sequence, in 
the feature of 11 December, entitled “The Big Retreat South”,  illustrated that the newsreels 
may have refrained from ‘atomic sensationalism’, but were not prepared to completely 
sacrifice selection criteria concerning coverage of the military situation.  
 
Historically, governments and armies have been reluctant to acknowledge battlefield 
reversals, which were detrimental to their public image and also, in modern theoretical terms, 
afforded decoders the opportunity to access information which, if read from an oppositional 
stance, may contribute to the sedimentary formation of an oppositional ideology to that of the 
hegemonic ideological position.406 Thus the use of the word “Retreat”, in the title of this 
sequence, is significant as it demonstrated that the newsreels were unwilling to engage in 
self-censorship, as to censor sensationalism was to deny the newsreel media the ability to 
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shock their audience through emotive negativity, thus reducing the ‘thrill’ an attentive 
audience may have experienced when exposed to distressing events within the new-
entertainment context. In conclusion the coverage of the A-bomb remark lacked the media 
value of ‘balance’ and thus constituted an example of unrestrained sensationalism.  
 
By contrast however, the features of the fifteenth and eighteenth of December, despite 
visually illustrating the retreat of UNC and the climatic conditions endured by those at the 
front, the coverage may well be perceived as having evolved a more subtle propagandist 
nature. This is particularly evident as the coverage began to place more emphasis upon 
elements which could have adversely affected public opinion, attitudes and behaviours. 
Initially, the withdrawal of UNC, described by Thompson as a “flight”407 and later by 
historians as exhibiting the characteristics of a retreat,408 was described in the newsreel as an 
“orderly withdrawal”.409 Such inaccurate terminology can be considered non-alarmist and 
may have been an attempt by the newsreels to avoid provoking additional hysteria, as 
witnessed following Truman’s A-bomb remark. Thus, the media may consciously have 
wished to avoid sensationalist reporting, based on a consideration of professional practice and 
ethics. Additionally, this may constitute an example of the media having relied upon official 
press releases of UNC, the “horrible inaccuracy” of which, described by Thompson, was said 
to have “angered all ranks”.410 However, a further interpretation is that the newsreels had 
evidently, to a degree, responded to Attlee’s appeal and deliberately selected phraseology that 
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would not unsettle an already shaken public, whose disenchantment with the war had 
increased following the intervention of China.411  
 
Further evidence to support this claim is identifiable in the depiction of UNC troops. 
Although UNC was said to be facing “overwhelming hordes of Chinese”, soldiers were 
shown in good spirits and smiling, which was verbally confirmed by the audio commentary. 
The cold was described as the “worst enemy”, which played down the severity of the Chinese 
intervention, but may also be considered a subtle way of objectively illustrating the hardships 
facing UNC personnel, without causing too greater concern amongst viewers, particularly as 
troops were depicted enjoying good morale. A further interpretation may consider this 
depiction of events propagandist in nature as, by accrediting the cold as the “worst enemy”, 
other factors were blamed for the depth of the crisis beyond the actions of the Chinese. 
Additionally, it is notable to remember how during the initial setbacks of June, July and 
August 1950, many press reports featured battle shocked and disillusioned soldiers, which 
concerned military authorities and remained markedly absent from the audio-visual narratives 
of events during the November crisis.  
 
Throughout this period the descriptive vocabulary employed by the newsreels, can 
frequently be considered more explicit than the imagery they accompanied. Technical 
restraints may have contributed to the necessity of this, as could the guidelines concerning the 
depiction of harrowing events. However, one may consider this to support Casey’s claim that 
the image was subject to greater self and/or informal censorship,412 based on the significance 
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of the image in the process of ‘political communication’. Coverage of the battles around the 
Chosin Reservoir, famously endured by the United States Marines and a unit of Royal Marine 
Commandos, witnessed the employment of phrases during coverage, including “cut off”, 
“nightmare”, and “surrounded on all sides”. Additionally, Chinese forces were defined as 
“mighty”, whilst hardships endured by the troops were described; at the same time turbulent 
music accompanied the report. Historiography confirms the approximate accuracy of such 
reports and confirms the difficulties facing many UNC units.413 However, numerous elements 
of the sequence of 18 December can be interpreted as having maintained a propaganda value, 
in spite of the elements of media selective objectivity identified.  
 
UNC troops were depicted having adopted an orphaned boy, its self not an uncommon 
practice during the Korean War.414 Such a depiction conveys a sense of compassion and 
humanity upon UNC personnel, which although commonly witnessed,415 maintained a 
positive propagandist “hearts and minds” message, as described by Taylor, who suggested 
that the Cold War was indeed a battle for the hearts and minds of the world between the two 
competing ideologies.416 Furthermore, the now familiar depiction of the evacuation of 
wounded was included. Even though coverage was often accurate concerning this topic, as 
the sequence depicting air evacuation from a frozen airstrip remains testament to,417 
participants shown in good spirits encouraged the decoder to generalise that all casualties, 
were treated in a similar manner. However, the historical record contains evidence to the 
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contrary, as practical circumstance on occasion necessitated the abandonment of wounded 
during the withdrawal.418 
 
In addition, UNC supply and morale were illustrated positively, the latter of which 
may be considered an over estimation, as by early January morale was said to have reached 
its lowest ebb.419 Finally, a number of remarks imply that the newsreel media had taken it 
upon themselves to support United Nations efforts in Korea by directly addressing the 
domestic audience. The fighting resolve of the troops was stressed, as was their appreciation 
of what was “at stake”, regarding the battle between the liberal democratic and the autocratic 
way of life. The decoder was further encouraged to be mindful of the debt, owed to those 
making sacrifices in Korea, which as casualty figures reached some 13,000 by the end of the 
crisis period,420 were considerable indeed. Additionally, the viewer was questioned as to their 
contribution, confirming that the newsreel media had awoken to their responsibilities in times 
of conflict. This address contains an element of propaganda described by O’Shaughnessy, 
who suggests that an appeal to selflessness, in any circumstance, maintains a powerful 
emotive appeal.421 
 
The climatic conditions faced by UNC were illustrated and provided a backdrop to a 
sequence depicting a truck convoy moving southwards.422  Multiple trucks were shown in 
good working order; however a fleeting shot of a burnt-out truck also appeared as the 
vehicles passed. Significant this is the first imagery of destroyed UNC equipment the viewer 
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had been presented with since coverage of the conflict began during the summer. Hall 
suggests the viewer is not confronted with the physical manifestation of the topic contained 
within audio-visual material, but rather with messages concerning the particular topic.423 
Thus, regarding this audio-visual news item, the viewer was not confronted with war, but 
received messages about war. Therefore, the coverage of the retreat presented the decoder 
with a message, in this case, one which encouraged the viewer to believe, that although a 
small proportion of military equipment was lost, the majority was saved. To a significant 
degree this remains true, as many units were able to salvage their equipment,424 however, 
losses were often much greater than the generalisation implied by this sequence.425  
 
In addition, the sequence cognitively dispelled the fear that a ‘Korean Dunkirk’ style 
evacuation was imminent. Such sentiment remained common during the crisis amongst civil 
and military authorities, as indeed, most adults on either side of the Atlantic, though 
particularly in Britain, would have been familiar with the withdrawal of 1940, where the 
British Expeditionary Force were required to abandon much of their war materials. Thus, by 
encouraging the public mind to develop a generalisation, that the UNC retreat was orderly 
and had safeguarded much of its equipment, the viewer was encouraged to develop a less 
sensationalist and distressing perception of events. Therefore, the coverage of the truck 
convoy was indeed accurate, to a significant degree, although the message about war and the 
generalised view of events it encouraged the decoder to develop can be considered 
propagandist in nature. Thus, the reader has encountered an example of how the knowledge 
of history or an awareness of past events, possessed by the decoder, may assist with the 
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conveyance of ideology, within audio-visual texts, as described by Hall,426 as events in Korea 
were depicted as non-comparable to the disastrous situation of 1940. Thus, one may suggest 
that the newsreels had restrained their sensationalist tendencies and begun to develop the 
value of composite “balance”, as the decoder was presented with positive news albeit, in the 
context of a negative, but less sensationalist “orderly withdrawal”. 
 
The seaborne evacuation, of UNC units from the North-East of Korea, was also 
covered in the feature of 25 December as their “ordeal” was said to be over, having been 
“trapped on all sides”. The phraseology, yet again, may well be considered accurately 
explicit, although it retained some degree of, in this case justifiable, sensationalism.427 It is 
possible to identify an increasingly common trend within newsreel coverage, as the reports 
concerning negative events were often concluded with a positive.  In this case the “ordeal”, 
the initial negative event, was described as “over” and therefore in the past tense. This may 
be the product of circumstance surrounding the production of the report, as the saga may have 
concluded by the time the footage reached the editorial and studio production phase. 
However, one may also interpret this as a method of alleviating audience anxiety, whilst 
maintaining selectivised and sensationalist objectivity, through covering a negative 
development in the context of a positive conclusion. It is important to consider this as an 
attempt, by newsreel companies, to maintain a balance between self-censorship and official 
gratification, whilst pursuing their own interests regarding news-entertainment.  
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A further interpretation may consider this to constitute an example of ‘perception 
management’, as to follow a ‘negative’ with a ‘positive’ assisted in alleviating the anxiety of 
an audience and thus regulated their emotional response to adverse situations. This cannot 
necessarily be considered a malign undertaking, as the regulation of emotion prevents panic 
and thus encourages the decoder to make progress by following a course of action determined 
by higher authority and designed to rectify the situation, whilst being aware of the perils of 
the moment. Thus, the psychological basis of the familiar propaganda slogan of the Second 
World War; “keep calm and carry on”, has been established. This offers a fitting summary of 
some elements of the message contained within newsreel coverage concerning events in 
Korea. In this respect, there is an expansion of the readers understanding of Jenks’ suggestion 
that the British media of the immediate post war era remained tightly “self-disciplined” due 
to experience of total war; a war in which the regulation of public attitudes and morale was 
pursued.428 Therefore, Jenks’ explanation may be applicable beyond the realms of self-
censorship and into the territories of a perception management campaign, undertaken through 
personal initiative, amongst media professionals, or instigated by informal interaction with 
higher authority. Thus there is logical reason to suggest, that as the military and political 
crisis intensified, following china’s escalation of the conflict and the misfortune of UNC, so 
did the state-media response. This is particularly applicable to the features of the fifteenth and 
eighteenth of December, as following the depiction and description of the adverse military 
situation, the positive aspects of UNC morale and the adequacy of supply was stressed to the 
audience, as the features both concluded with positive remarks, following an initially 
unsettled opening. One final point is relevant as the “Keep calm and carry on” psychological 
outlook and approach to adverse events may simply be an aspect of Britain’s ideological 
atmosphere, in essence part of the national psyche. However, media theory would suggest 
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that such ‘regulation’ was the organic bi-product of the media implementing ‘balance’ within 
coverage. 
 
The feature of 25 December additionally depicted a UNC solider treating the frost bite 
injury of a Chinese prisoner. The unfortunate man’s foot, shown in some detail, appeared 
encased in a block of ice. The medical assistance he received was similarly presented in some 
lingering detail. This sequence remained the most explicit of wounds contained within the 
newsreel coverage, with no equivalent example discernible regarding injuries to UNC 
personnel. Practical factors aside, it would not have been difficult to locate and film a frost 
bitten UNC soldier, as the climatic conditions during the crisis were indeed severe.429 It is 
however notable that no UNC personnel were depicted in this way, or similar, as previously 
identified regarding coverage of the wounded. Had such a sequence depicted UNC soldiers 
suffering in this manner, regulatory guidelines would undoubtedly have prevented its 
circulation. Failing that, cinema considerations, regarding audience entertainment, would 
likely have prohibited screening as the material could in no way be considered compatible 
with the entertainment industry ethos. Thus the reader is left to question the value of 
including such unsettling footage in newsreel coverage.  
 
One explanation can be found in the treatment of UNC prisoners, by North Korean 
forces of several months previous. The feature again appealed to “hearts and minds” and thus 
international opinion, as it bestowed the qualities of ‘the good Samaritan’ and soldierly 
respect upon UNC. Therefore, by publicising such actions, undertaken by UNC members 
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towards their adversary, the Chinese were thus pressured to reciprocate, through genuine 
sympathy for those UNC they captured, or through consideration of international opinion. 
Therefore, one interpretation suggests this was a propagandist move aimed at encouraging 
China to treat its acquired prisoners well, which accounts confirm was the case.430 The 
propagandist value would have remained had evidence surfaced that China had mistreated 
prisoners, as domestic and international opinion would have been outraged; thus, conveying 
additional validity upon the UN cause and inspiring hatred towards the enemy, which in itself 
remains a powerful propagandist tool.431 Furthermore, the sequence can be decoded as 
containing a message recording the existence of common humanity amongst the belligerents, 
something which O’Shaughnessy considers the antithesis of emotive propaganda,432 which is 
designed to create a mind-set that “facilitates the act of killing”.433 Should this footage be 
considered propagandist, then it must be deemed positive propaganda, as it appeals in support 
of common humanity and made no attempt to dehumanise the enemy as was occasionally 
evident.434  
 
Additionally, the propagandist value encouraged the viewer to sympathise with the 
enemy, and perceive the frost-bitten oriental as a victim of an uncaring system. Thus the 
feature reflected negatively upon the opposing ideology, via juxtaposition, as ‘they’ failed to 
equip their forces, to an adequate level, which the UNC had apparently achieved, as the 
Western soldier was not suffering from the cold. Furthermore, the footage conveyed a sense 
of virtue upon UNC conduct and thus juxtaposed this against the memory of communist 
atrocities previously committed. This fitted neatly into the well-established anti-communist 
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media frame. Thus O’Shaughnessy may consider this an example of the “villain” having 
tested the virtue of the “hero”,435 which the soldiers of UNC had overcome. Of the vast array 
of possible decoding, concerning the footage, the most prominent remains that the camera 
crew chose to record this event, as despite its gruesome nature, the narrative emits a feel- 
good factor grounded upon the warmth of common humanity, which may have cheered the 
audience during an inescapably bleak period of the war, particularly as other newsreel 
features contained examples of festive sentimentality.436 Thus, an example of the 
extraordinary nature of the political communication process has been encountered, as 
multiple interpretations may be offered, when attempting to perform a content analysis, as 
advocated by Hall, which in turn leads us to question if we have allocated the meaning 
ourselves.437 Features such as this embodied multiple criteria which made the feature 
attractive to newsreels. This included ‘individualism’, in this case an example of common 
humanity, a ‘familiarity’ based on what the viewer would expect to see insofar as UNC 
members behaving compassionately, something which could also be considered to maintain 
“cultural proximity” to Western values. 
 
On 25 December Gaumont-British News presented Truman’s speech which suggested 
a peaceful solution could be found. Thus, the US publically suggested it was willing to 
negotiate, something which China refused, as it held the military advantage at this time. Thus, 
the above reference to common humanity can be linked to the apparent softening of the 
position held by the US. However, during the Truman/Attlee talks, the US concluded that 
China would only understand and respond to strength;438 something which the British 
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government failed to concur with,439 but had little choice other than to accept given the 
necessity of maintaining the ‘special relationship’ and promoting greater US involvement in 
Europe and NATO.440 Additionally, during the Anglo-American talks, those officials present 
discussed American, British and Asia public opinion, although Hockley’s otherwise thorough 
work supplies the reader with no further details concerning the matter.441  
 
Therefore, it remains conceivable that during the discussions the issue of public 
information was considered significant. This becomes particularly significant when the reader 
recalls that these meetings took place in the wake of the media hysteria surrounding the 
employment of the A-bomb. This circumstantial and therefore speculative evidence helps 
explain Catchpole’s remark that the British public regarded the conflict marginally, despite it 
being Britain’s third largest war of the century, due to a “paucity of information”.442 
Therefore, one may expect coverage of the conflict to have lacked detail, particularly 
following the introduction of formal censorship, in Korea on 22 December 1950, which took 
until 26 December to become fully implemented.443 The introduction of formalised and 
regulated censorship began a period, which Casey described as one of “double censorship”; 
journalists were required to operate with official guidelines in addition to MacArthur’s 
informal system.444  Initially the introduction was well received by the media, although it 
remained keen to establish its boundaries.445  
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It is testament to the dangers of media exaggeration and urgency with which reporters 
and editors pursued ‘scoops’, which could endanger military security,446 that one hundred and 
eighty one stories were censored in the last six days of December.447 Controversially 
however, the new system, which sparked a new round of ‘cat and mouse’ between military 
authorities and the media,448 contained clauses that restricted coverage. Anything potentially 
harmful to UNC morale or that could cause embarrassment to the US or its allies, was to be 
prohibited.449 This scenario prompted one accusation in the New York Times that the system 
was being used to “cover up military errors and defeats”; particularly as the word “retreat” 
was banned from use, to be replaced with more neutral phrases such as “withdrawal”.450 
Thus, the reader has witnessed the commencement of the process where authorities began to 
formally assert control over media coverage or rather over some of the more detrimental 
media selection criteria which had governed coverage thus far.  
 
It is logical to assume, that following the introduction of the formal system, newsreel 
coverage would become more heavily censored and thus help maintain a more favourable 
public perception of the war, as the viewer would have been denied information, which may 
have contributed to the formation of an oppositional ideology. However, in stark contrast to 
this interpretation, the Gaumont-British News feature of 15 January 1951451 included the 
word “retreat”, which testifies to the media’s desire to remain independent. However, despite 
numerous examples of accuracy many features between December 1950 and January 1951 
may be interpreted as conveying an ideological message.  
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This phenomenon, inherent in all social communication, was partially evident in the 
Gaumont- British review of the year feature of 28 December. Aside from a brief referral to 
“the worsening world situation”, which its self remained objective, if sensationalist, yet 
allowed the newsreels to circumvent negative news events in Korea, the feature stressed 
many positives, particularly that UNC “never lost command of the air”, a technique, which as 
discussed previously, defines negative events via reference to a  positive semantic opposite.  
 
Therefore, the reader is provided with evidence to support Hall’s claim that the 
transfer of ideology, itself the product of “systematic distortion”, is intrinsically linked to 
semantics and the connotations word(s) provoke within the decoders map of meaning.452 
Thus, the propagandist, or conveyor of ideology, in this case most likely a media professional 
seeking to avoid antagonising the censors, whilst remaining objective and less-sensationalist, 
has chosen to refer to the adverse situation facing UNC, by describing the specific positive 
aspect of the campaign, as opposed to the more immense negative aspects. To offer an 
explanation: it can be considered less sensationalist and therefore more propagandist, to 
employ a phrase such as ‘not winning’ than to employ the word ‘losing’, as the connative 
association to the word ‘winning’, or even ‘not winning’ are less dramatic and negative than 
the conative associations to ‘losing’. Thus, the possible negative effect upon audience morale 
would be reduced, pleasing officials whilst allowing the media to continue reporting events 
despite the need to be more aware of the phraseology selected when describing potentially 
ideologically disruptive events.  
 
                                                          
452 Hall, Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse. 
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The reader may interpret the military’s lobbying of the media, to become less 
sensationalist when reporting events, particularly during adverse circumstance, as a method 
of informal censorship; as Tokyo was attempting to ensure that journalists selected their 
words more carefully, which therefore increased the potential of decoders interpreting media 
texts in an ideologically compatible manner; thus rendering much of the coverage 
propagandist in nature, without the need for more direct informal or formal intervention. 
However, the reader should not forfeit a sense of balance, as both military and media may be 
interpreted as having understandably, considering the tense circumstances, over-stepped 
acceptable boundaries. The media had clearly allowed sensationalism and potentially panic to 
distort coverage of Truman’s remark concerning atomic weapons, which consequently 
became sensationalist. Alternatively the military, under the informal and later formal system, 
attempted to exert too greater an influence over media content, particularly as certain words 
were prohibited, including phrases that were open to duel or ambiguous interpretation which 
may have embarrassed UNC.453 This ideological gulf, despite both parties operating within a 
“shared ideological atmosphere”454 of anti-communism, is best illustrated when Tokyo 
suggested that UNC lines had been shortened for “tactical reasons”, when units were actually 
engaged in a withdrawal in the face of Chinese pressure,455 as depicted by the newsreel of 
15/01/1951,456 confirming Casey’s remark that the credibility gap had become immense.457 
 
As UNC withdrew, Russian built and often piloted Mig-15 fighter jets had 
increasingly challenged allied air supremacy,458 which played a vital role in helping UNC 
                                                          
453 See Casey, Selling the Korean War, p. 162. 
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units escape what a Gaumont British newsreel dubbed the Chinese “avalanche”.459 A feature 
of 11 January 1951460 featured a fifteen second clip illustrating Soviet built jets in Korea. The 
film was said to have been captured by UNC, whilst operating in North Korea, and depicted 
Mig fighters in formation in the air and on the ground. Such material was beneficial to the 
economic viability of the cinema newsreel industry, as it maintained intrigue coupled with a 
sensationalist and selective objective value as current affairs news. The footage would have 
been ideologically compatible with Western society and helped appeal to international 
opinion, that Soviet Russia was aiding international aggression, thus fitting well with the 
established anti-communist frame described by Jenks.461 However, the material may be 
considered alarmist as it connectively suggested the possibility of escalation, or that UNC air 
supremacy had been significantly challenged. However, any concerns the audience may have 
experienced were quickly dispelled following gun camera footage, depicting UNC aircraft 
scoring a ‘kill’ against a Soviet aircraft. Thus the informative, yet potentially unsettling 
narrative, detailing a Soviet presence in Korea, was swiftly concluded with a reassuring UNC 
victory over the Communist aggressor and thus maintained a propagandist value, despite 
presenting an objective, yet generalised and entertaining narrative of the air war to the 
audience. Thus the sequence can be considered news worthy as it illustrated a “danger to the 
[Western] community”, which McShane describes as a central criteria of news selection.462   
 
The coverage concerning early and mid-January 1951 remained objective, to a degree, 
as communist forces were said to have attacked and later re-taken Seoul, whilst UNC was 
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149 
 
now operating south of the 38th parallel.463 Additionally, the emphasis on the good morale of 
the fighting troops and wounded continued as British tank crew were illustrated smiling464 
and wounded were described “looking forward to the joys of recovery”.465 Communist 
villainy continued to be stressed, with phrases including “[communists] threaten to engulf the 
entire Asiatic world” and that “[UNC] guns have a message of defiance”. Objective reporting 
also remained a feature as, although sanitised and semi-sensationalised, losses in the form of 
wounded were acknowledged in a campaign which “cost many allied lives”.466 President 
Rhee of South Korea was said to have evacuated the capital for Pusan as UNC pulled back 
across the 38th parallel having initiated a “scorched earth policy”.467 The strength of Chinese 
forces was regularly described, particularly within audio commentary, which included 
phrases such as, “horde”, “avalanche” and well-armed “juggernauts”. This depiction of 
oriental communist strength contrasted sharply to the depiction of Korean civilians, 
throughout the coverage of the conflict, who in summary, were depicted as passive and in 
warm sympathetic human terms, as a “tragedy”.  
 
Unfortunately, there is minimal space for a full consideration of the coverage of the 
plight of civilians, who were covered predominantly in passive and sympathetic terms, but 
whose plight was given political significance, as many were, somewhat objectively, said to 
have voted with their feet and accompanied UNC southwards, as they had no desire to be 
“slaves to communism”.468 This can be perceived to have maintained a semi-objective and 
sensationalist yet propagandist value, particularly when considering that UNC could not 
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always accommodate civilians, the plight of whom was a notable feature of newsreels 
coverage in both private and BBC reports;469 although UNC was always depicted enjoying 
positive interaction with civilians, something which was common yet not always the case.470 
Similarly, South Korean General Paik Sun Yup, expressed regret for the inability of the 
Republic of Korea forces (ROK), to extend much concern for the civilian plight,471 which did 
not appear in graphic detail in audio-visual coverage. The depiction of civilians during the 
conflict remains worthy of further study, particularly as Catchpole claims that domestic 
public sentiment, in Britain was hardened to such emotive scenes, having witnessed  
coverage of refugees in post war Europe,472 something which raises questions concerning the 
interaction between the media sensationalism of negative events and the impact they had 
upon a desensitised populous. 
 
On 29 January, Gaumont-British News positively depicted ROK troops, in their own 
right, for the first time, albeit wearing American uniforms and equipment. Likewise the 
arrival of General Ridgeway was included as UNC soldiers constructed defences. The audio 
overlay included remarks such as “[the] days of withdrawal seem a thing of the past” and 
“war takes a better turn”. The sequence concluded with the portrayal of anti-guerrilla 
operations, machine gun fire and a remark suggesting the allies were prepared for the 
worst.473  
                                                          
469 Smith’s article details a number of features which found their way into the television 
newsreels. Smith, ‘The BBC Television, Newsreel and the Korean War’, pp. 233-234. 
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This feature accurately marked the beginning of  what can be termed ‘stabilisation’, a 
significant change, both in the tactics and strategy by which the war was to be fought and also 
in military media relations, which although never completely devoid of problems, began to 
create an improved working relationship, often due to the efforts of Ridgeway.474 However, 
this change raises something of a paradox, as the military was now fighting a ‘limited war’ 
with more restrained goals, unlike during the previous six months of fighting, which can be 
considered more akin to a total war, with undefined yet more total objectives and sweeping 
manoeuvres resulting in the occupation of territory. Yet as war aims became more limited, 
based on a strategy of attrition, the introduction of formal censorship in December, the 
regulation of the media can be considered to have shared more in common with censorship 
measures adopted during a total war. Thus, when the war aims were more opportunistically 
total in nature, the regulation of media coverage by the US government remained informal in 
nature; whereas, as the war became more limited in nature, the regulations became more 
formal.  
 
However, the reader should not attach too great a significance to this observation, as 
there was no master plan, only responses to individual circumstances, as censorship was 
introduced during a more total phase of the war; the crisis of November-December 1950, not 
the period of battlefield stabilisation of early 1951 onwards. Nevertheless, at this point one 
can perceive the US authorities, through the necessity of appointing a new commander 
following Walker’s death, the introduction of censorship during crisis and media 
irresponsibility, in addition to the realisation of the necessity of adjusting to the tactical and 
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strategic demands of limited war, the US government steadily developed control over the 
situation. Although how this change affected the coverage of the war, received by the 
American and British audience, remains to be explored. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE DEPICTION OF BRITAIN AND THE COMMONWEALTH AT WAR IN 
KOREA 
 
It is not possible to engage in further chronological exploration of the audio-visual 
media coverage of the period of attrition, stabilisation and tentative negotiation which 
followed until the ceasefire was signed on July 27 1953. Despite the gradual onset of static 
warfare, the military and political situation presented the media with a number of newsworthy 
events, which ensured that conflict in Korea would remain in the public eye, although to a 
lesser extent than during the initial seven months of hostilities.475 However, Hastings suggests 
that by 1953 there remained little public interest in Korea,476 nevertheless, newsworthy events 
included: General Ridgway’s operations of early 1951, the communist fourth and fifth phase 
offensives, Truman’s dismissal of General MacArthur on 11 April 1951, the loss of the 
British Gloucesters battalion on the Imjin River, the painfully slow negotiation process, 
unsubstantiated claims of UNC having undertaken germ warfare operations and the prisoner 
of war riots on Koje-do. However, it will prove illuminating to engage in a brief case study of 
how media coverage represented primarily British aspects of the conflict. 
 
Newsreel representation conveyed a distinct sense of British and Commonwealth 
political unity at national level in support of American policy. Thus the newsreels accurately 
conveyed a sense of British policy to the domestic audience. Furthermore, British political 
leaders including, Attlee, Bevin and Churchill were depicted receiving popular support as 
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they were shown enjoying the adulation of the public.477 Naturally such socially significant 
personalities would receive media attention and the camera operator would not find it 
difficult to ‘shoot’ such a sequence at the entrance to a political hub such as Downing Street. 
Such imagery associated decision makers and thus policy with widespread popular support, 
thus validating the decision to support collective security operations in Korea. Nonetheless, it 
is important to recall that policy decisions of this period were taken with one eye on the threat 
posed by the Soviet Union and the other on the events of Munich. Thus assertive action 
received much support across the social spectrum as evident in Catchpole’s research into 
popular opinion.478 
 
Coverage also included a portrayal of the determination and commitment at a more 
personal level amongst the domestic and commonwealth public. Canadians were depicted 
enlisting, with emphasis placed on Second World War veterans.479 Similarly, Canadian air 
force personnel were shown saying their goodbyes to family members, who displayed little 
evidence of concern or sorrow. Under such circumstances one would expect to encounter a 
full range of emotive responses to men departing for war, thus the reader may interpret this as 
an example of media selectivism, which illustrated the process in a positive manner, 
something which became increasingly evident when combined with the anti-communist 
rhetoric.480 Additionally the crew of an Australian fighting ship, which had reportedly 
‘volunteered for service’, was depicted preparing to sail.481  
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The cumulative result of such coverage of subsidiary events closely connected to the 
primary news event, applied subtle pressure upon the viewer to follow their peers and join the 
war effort. This organically occurring bi-product of coverage would not have displeased 
political leaders as Britain’s post war man-power shortages, additional foreign military 
commitments and the common unpopularity of recalling veterans in addition to conscription, 
a sensitive political issue,482 to which subtle media pressure may well have provided a 
welcome method of encouraging volunteers or in helping persuade the public to accept 
official measures. 
 
British support for the United States and later the UNC was included by the newsreels 
from the outset, both visually and verbally. The re-commissioning of HMS Warrior483 and the 
loading of HMS Theseus484 coupled with statements of solidarity towards the USA was 
enthused with inoffensive patriotism. Such sentiment was echoed on 31 July 1950,485 where 
British troops, armour and aircraft were illustrated on parade whilst described as “rallying to 
aid American allies”, whom thus far, had “borne the brunt of the fighting.” The latter 
statement remained accurate as the American commitment was the largest of all UNC 
participants. However, given that Britain was keen to demonstrate its commitment to 
collective security and combating aggression, the audio-visual depiction of British troops at 
the front contrasts greatly with what viewers may have expected to see: British units in 
action.486  
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The vast majority of coverage detailing the activities of British service personnel 
illustrated contented soldiers in rear areas drinking tea, opening mail,487 or engaging in 
positive interaction with civilians. The latter example can be considered an exercise in ‘hearts 
and minds’ and thus propagandist in nature as the camera crew were most likely aware of the 
public relations value of the material they either spontaneously captured, as attractive and 
emotive news material, or were directed by their media superiors to seek for similar reason.488 
Understandably combat footage was not easy to acquire, thus news worthy sequences had to 
be sought elsewhere. Additionally and with specific regard to the private newsreel companies 
that were reliant on American stock, American camera crews may not have enjoyed sufficient 
time to reach the forward areas of British units and thus been forced by circumstance to 
‘shoot’ in rear areas, whilst visiting allied contingents. Regardless, the coverage conveyed 
two separate messages, one of which becomes evident during interpretation of the material 
from an American perspective, the other following a reading from a British perspective. 
 
Images of relaxed British troops, clearly at a distance from danger, would have 
demonstrated to an American audience that although their allies were present, there was still 
more they could do in the fight against totalitarian communism. This was particularly 
emphasised when considering that American troops were often shown in combat and exposed 
to danger. Thus the material adopted a symbolic representation of America’s burden in the 
fighting, therefore encouraging American domestic opinion to pressure its allies for greater 
involvement.  
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Additionally, such reports may have inspired guilt amongst a British audience and 
persuaded them to support a greater commitment to Korea or adopt a more sympathetic view 
toward American policy. Finally, the British viewer, particularly those with relatives serving 
overseas, may have taken solace from viewing British troops enjoying home comforts and not 
exposed to the risks of combat, compared to other nationalities. Therefore, despite the verbal 
acknowledgment of risk, such footage contains little that would cause the viewer to contest 
the reality constructed by the sequence that British troops were not suffering too stringent 
hardship or risk. However, we must remain mindful that media ‘angles’, as described by 
Hoggart,489 may have been responsible for the creation of this substitute reality, generated 
and encouraged by the desire on behalf of the media not to antagonise hegemonic societal 
authorities. 
 
On occasion the dangers faced by British troops were indirectly demonstrated, albeit 
in a sterilised and selective manner. British ‘K Force’ was said to have been targeted by 
“fierce artillery” but was nonetheless “standing firm”.490 Furthermore, wounded personnel 
were illustrated smiling as they were stretchered off a transport aircraft. The men appeared 
well ordered and cared for with wounds well dressed, as bananas appeared prominently ‘in 
shot’.491 Evidently such footage encouraged the decoder to apply the treatment of the 
wounded depicted, to all soldiers. However, practical circumstance would often inhibit such 
care under battlefield conditions, thus the organic propaganda value of the feature becomes 
evident and was instigated by the nature of the “heavily selected interpretation of events” 
                                                          
489  Hoggart, Bad News, p. ix. 
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described by Hoggart,492 which in turn allows the media to cover emotive newsworthy stories 
without antagonising authorities. 
 
However, the sequence may simply have been captured and deemed newsworthy for 
another reason, concerning the ideological outlook of British society of the period. The post 
war world, although retaining rationing restrictions and austerity measures, experienced an 
elevation in the concern for social welfare. The rise of the socially responsible welfare state 
granted access to personal healthcare for the first time, thus in an age of increased value 
being placed on the welfare of the individual, in a war weary nation, the newsreels may have 
mirrored this in their coverage as it would have been ideologically compatible with and 
familiar to their audience. The care of the wounded thus became newsworthy and was 
embodied in the symbolic value of the rare fruit provided for the casualties aboard the flight, 
something which may have proved reassuring to the decoder when integrated with their 
personal ‘map of meaning’493 concerning the topic of wounded and the wider Korean 
conflict. 
 
The great deal of emphasis placed upon the positive morale amongst British units by 
the newsreels was evident in the vast majority of features concerning British troops. Two 
prominent examples of this can be identified, with the first describing troops as “full of 
cheery optimism” whilst facing “a tough job ahead”494 and the second depicting tank crew 
grinning during the crisis period of January 1951.495 The existence of high morale, even in 
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the face of adversity remained a key feature of coverage concerning British units. This is 
nowhere more evident than within coverage concerning the Gloucesters stand on the Imjin 
River of April 1951.  
 
The epic last stand of the Gloucesters, by no means adequately covered here, has 
received close attention in A. Salmon To The Last Round, which may be considered the 
primary work detailing the event.496 The thirty-six hour battle, which inflicted more British 
casualties sustained than any other clash of the post-war period, was not the first British 
experience of loss during the Korean War. One incident of note occurred during the ‘big bug 
out’, which saw a unit of Royal Marine Commandos ambushed with the loss of 
approximately one-third of their strength.497 The newsreels do not appear to have covered this 
event, nor are particularly direct references to British losses common; casualties were either 
discussed via a focus on the positive treatment of wounded or in relation to “replacements”.  
 
However, the saga of “the Glorious Gloucesters”, as they came to be known, would 
have been difficult to avoid featuring from a media perspective as the action made 
stimulating news, containing the basic elements of a good story. Nevertheless, media 
professionals would have clearly remained aware of the political and emotional sensitivity of 
the event and would thus have wished to avoid causing distress to the families’ concerned or 
provoking official condemnation. Coverage therefore lacked the detail which would have 
offended either sensibilities and focused upon the heroism and gallantry of the troops 
involved. Some of the evident ‘spin’ was likely facilitated by the practice of media self-
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censorship, although elements of repetition following the official UNC line are also evident. 
The newsreel feature of 24 May 1951,498 described the “team of hero’s” as saving the whole 
front from destruction, something now considered to be an over estimation by modern 
military historians, who feel a delaying action followed by a withdrawal would perhaps have 
served the situation better.499 Whilst not detracting from the merits of the Gloucesters, it is 
necessary to recall that the loss of an allied unit, operating under American command 
presented the United States with a delicate public relations issue.500 The allocation of a 
presidential unit citation and the accreditation of preventing the front from collapsing may be 
perceived as a response to such an issue.501 
 
Such praise served to legitimise the losses involved, which although briefly referred 
to as a “high price” by the commentator, was to a considerable extent excluded from the 
coverage. Naturally one cannot expect to see particularly graphic images of wounded and 
dead; however, the limited number of Gloucesters who made a return to UNC lines 
immediately following the action was exaggerated by the numbers of British troops depicted 
on parade at the award ceremony. Of course, the one hundred and ninety survivors, of a pre-
battle total of eight hundred and fifty,502 may well have been sufficient to organically give 
such an impression; although the effect was nevertheless misleading. This may perhaps be 
employed to explain why domestic cinema audiences were said to have cheered newsreel 
                                                          
498 Primary source index Gaumont-British News, 24/05/1951. 
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reports of the Gloucesters action,503 although this may present us with an example of an 
emotional and cultural response of a patriotic nation to such events. 
 
The method of reporting evident in the above sequence appears as follows. The heavy 
cost was briefly stated, which can be interpreted as ‘acknowledgment’ of the negative event; 
the odds facing the Gloucesters were described, which shall be interpreted as the newsreel 
offering a ‘reason’ for the occurrence of the negative event; finally a positive ending was 
added, which shall be perceived as a ‘nullification’ or ‘resolution’ of the traumatic/distressing 
issue. Such an approach can be considered a healthy emotional response to a difficult series 
of events, however, by subtly minimising the negative aspects whilst focusing upon the 
heroism involved, the post event commemorations of UNC and  swiftly concluding with 
positive progress instilled by the media, led the material to assume propagandist qualities as 
the regulation of emotion is clearly linked to opinion; something which is particularly 
significant when the scale of the audience will provoke a massed emotive response and thus 
effect public opinion on mass. Therefore the news media must proceed with caution when 
reporting significant and therefore sensitive events to an audience. Thus the reader has 
identified an aspect of the reasoning underpinning the claim made by Hoggart that the notion 
of ‘objectivity’ amongst media professionals can be considered mythical and that the media 
produce a “heavily selected interpretation of events”.504 
 
 
 
                                                          
503 Ibid., p. 255. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION 
 
The following conclusion is based upon the application of theoretical analysis and a 
consideration that all social communication remains inherently self-gratifying to the encoder 
and decoder alike and that social communication remains a tool of survival utilised by our 
species, the employment of which will become exaggerated in times of peril. 
 
The complexities inherent to the study of historical social/political communication 
require scholars to consider and assess the value of many multifaceted factors when 
considering the potential propagandist value of audio-visual material. The debate therefore 
must continue regarding the definition of terms. Furthermore, the value of interdisciplinary 
study has been demonstrated, as the work of scholars from diverse academic fields has 
proven indispensable. In addition, this thesis has demonstrated the value of theoretical tools 
which facilitate increased understanding of the audio-visual medium and its value as a 
historical source, which in this instance, has provided scholars with further insight into the 
complexities of the Korean conflict and wider Cold War. 
 
The difficulties of the working environment endured by media, military and political 
personnel, during the conflict, have been established. The sudden eruption of hostilities 
clearly impacted upon the production of news material circulated in Britain; particularly due 
to media reliance upon material of American origin, which was produced within a similar yet 
contrasting ideological atmosphere. 
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Whilst it remains challenging to precisely identify the influences which affected the 
process of encoding, this thesis has illustrated that British media texts may be perceived to 
have contained and transmitted ideologies favourable to Western hegemonic institutions 
between 1950 and 1951. This rendered coverage of the conflict, to a notable degree, 
propagandist in nature as audiences were seldom, if ever, exposed to information which 
would have encouraged them to challenge Britain’s anti-communist consensus or 
participation in the UN response to North Korean aggression. 
  
Aspects of coverage, which comply with scholarly definitions of propaganda/ 
propagandist activity, include the potential regulation of emotion, particularly in relation to 
battlefield reversals and the occurrence of British casualties. In addition the denial of 
sensitive information through censorship/self-censorship was evident when media material 
was compared against the historical record. Furthermore, diplomatic and military events were 
framed in an emotive and moral manner, which applied a justifiable, yet legitimising, veneer 
of moral validity to UN action. Additionally, the audience was subtly encouraged to imitate 
desirable behaviours including; the rejection of incompatible ideologies such as communism 
or pacifism, volunteering for military service and to express gratitude towards those already 
under arms. Such features were often enthused with an emotive appeal to patriotism, fear, 
guilt or selflessness. These examples may be interpreted as the media having undertaken a 
public service role within Western society, as such social actions would have indeed 
benefited the parent society; thus the Western media evidently remained tightly self-
disciplined based on previous war-time experience as suggested by Shaw and Jenks. 
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The majority of the ‘heavily selected narratives’ and their inherent messages, clearly 
arose from the media pursuit of economic gratification. However, it remains plausible that 
media organisations often undertook propagandist activities of their own accord. Nonetheless, 
when contemplating the grave circumstances of the period, informal/formal input from the D-
Notice Committee most likely occurred on occasion, particularly during the crisis period of 
late 1950 to early 1951.  
 
Such a statement is justifiable, as news items fundamentally demonstrated a keen 
awareness of hegemonic sensibilities from the outset of the conflict and most significantly 
during times of military reversal.  Despite the existence of openness within some reports, 
which often sprung from sensationalism, the ‘balance’, manifest within newsreel coverage, 
cannot be considered sufficient to contradict the conclusion that audio-visual coverage of the 
Korean conflict can be considered, to a significant degree, propagandist in nature. This 
finding further indicates the value of theoretical approaches to the study of human culture, 
including those forwarded by Gramsci and Hall amongst others, who sought/seek to study 
and explain the practical existence of hegemony within human social interaction. 
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GAUMONT-BRITISH NEWS AND FOX MOVIETONE  
 
25/06/1950      Fox Movietone                 X25065002 
29/06/1950      Gaumont-British News    BGU411270037 
03/07/1950      Gaumont-British News    BGU411280004 
03/07/1950      Gaumont-British News    BGU411280029 
06/07/1950      Gaumont-British News    BGU4112800024 
13/07/1950      Gaumont-British News    BGU411280024 
17/07/1950      Gaumont-British News    BGU411280003 
17/07/1950      Gaumont-British News    BGU411280026 
20/07/1950      Gaumont-British News    BGU411280062 
21/07/1950      Fox Movietone                 X210775001 
24/07/1950      Gaumont-British News     BGU411280061 
27/07/1950      Gaumont-British News     BGU411280047 
31/07/1950      Gaumont-British News     BGU411280020 
03/08/1950      Gaumont-British News     BGU411290011 
07/08/1950      Gaumont-British News     BGU411290049 
10/08/1950      Gaumont-British News     BGU411290046 
11/08/1950      Fox Movietone                 X14085001 
14/08/1950      Gaumont-British News    BGU411290056 
14/08/1950      Gaumont-British News    BGU411290056 
14/08/1950      Gaumont-British News    BGU411290057 
14/08/1950      Gaumont-British News    BGU411290057 
14/08/1950      Gaumont-British News    BGU411290001 
17/08/1950      Gaumont-British News    BGU411290009 
21/08/1950      Gaumont-British News    BGU411290022 
21/08/1950      Gaumont-British News    BGU411290024 
21/08/1950      Gaumont-British News    BGU411290004 
24/08/1950      Gaumont-British News    BGU411290032 
24/08/1950      Gaumont-British News    BGU411290033 
 
 
24/08/1950      Gaumont-British News    BGU411290035 
28/08/1950      Gaumont-British News    BGU411290015 
28/08/1950      Gaumont-British News    BGU4112900170 
28/08/1950      Gaumont-British News    BGU411290018 
31/08/1950      Gaumont-British News    BGU411290038 
31/08/1950      Gaumont-British News    BGU411290016 
31/08/1950      Gaumont-British News    BGU411290042 
04/09/1950      Gaumont-British News    BGU411300020 
04/09/1950      Gaumont-British News    BGU411300019 
07/09/1950      Fox Movietone                X07095001 
07/09/1950     Gaumont-British News    BGU411300021 
11/09/1950     Gaumont-British News    BGU411300027 
11/09/1950     Gaumont-British News    BGU411300024 
14/09/1950     Gaumont-British News    BGU411300011 
15/09/1950     Gaumont-British News    BGU411300029 
18/09/1950     Gaumont-British News    BGU411300012 
18/09/1950     Gaumont-British News    BGU41130007 
18/09/1950     Gaumont-British News    BGU411300041 
18/09/1950     Gaumont-British News    BGU411300040 
18/09/1950     Gaumont-British News    BGU411300045 
18/09/1950     Gaumont-British News    BGU411300003 
25/09/1950     Gaumont-British News    BGU411300032 
27/09/1950     Gaumont-British News    BGU411300009 
27/09/1950     Gaumont-British News    BGU4113000039 
29/09/1950     Fox Movietone                X29095001 
02/10/1950     Gaumont-British News    BGU412010027 
10/10/1950     Gaumont-British News    BGU412010020 
12/10/1950     Gaumont-British News    BGU412010034 
12/10/1950     Gaumont-British News    BGU412010014 
12/10/1950     Gaumont-British News    BGU412010022 
16/10/1950     Gaumont-British News    BGU412010044 
16/10/1950     Gaumont-British News    BGU412010046 
19/10/1950     Gaumont-British News    BGU412010051 
19/10/1950     Gaumont-British News    BGU412010050 
19/10/1950     Gaumont-British News    BGU412010057   
19/10/1950     Gaumont-British News    BGU412010058 
23/10/1957     Gaumont-British News    BGU412010055 
23/10/1950     Gaumont-British News    BGU412010062 
26/10/1950     Gaumont-British News    BGU412010010 
27/10/1950     Fox Movietone                 X27105002 
27/10/1950     Fox Movietone                 X27105003 
27/10/1950     Fox Movietone                 X27105001 
09/11/1950     Gaumont-British News    BGU41220015 
13/09/1950     Gaumont-British News    BGU412020036 
 
 
17/11/1950     Gaumont-British News    BGU412020036 
17/11/1950     Fox Movietone                 X17115001 
27/11/1950     Gaumont-British News    BGU412020010 
27/11/1950     Gaumont-British News    BGU412020010 
27/11/1950     Gaumont-British News    BGU412020050 
04/12/1950     Gaumont-British News    BGU412030025 
07/12/1950     Fox Movietone                 X07125001 
07/12/1950     Gaumont-British News    BGU412030046 
11/12/1950     Gaumont-British News    BGU412030043 
11/12/1950     Gaumont-British News    BGU412030041 
15/12/1950     Gaumont-British News    BGU412030006 
15/12/1950     Gaumont-British News    BGU412030003 
15/12/1950     Gaumont-British News    BGU412030013 
18/12/1950     Gaumont-British News    BGU412030012 
21/12/1950    Gaumont-British News     BGU412030050 
25/12/1950     Gaumont-British News    BGU412030035 
25/12/1950     Gaumont-British News    BGU412030033 
25/12/1950     Gaumont-British News    BGU412030052 
27/12/1950     Fox Movietone                 X27125001 
28/12/1950     Gaumont-British News    BGU412030008 
01/01/1951     Gaumont-British News    BGU412040069 
01/01/1951     Gaumont-British News    BGU412040068 
04/01/1951     Gaumont-British News    BGU412040042 
04/01/1951     Gaumont-British News    BGU412040070 
11/01/1951     Gaumont-British News    BGU412040048 
11/01/1951     Gaumont-British News    BGU412040041 
11/01/1951     Gaumont-British News    BGU412040036 
11/01/1951     Gaumont-British News    BGU412040049 
15/01/1951     Gaumont-British News    BGU412040040 
15/01/1951     Gaumont-British News    BGU412040051 
18/01/1951    Gaumont-British News    BGU412040073 
22/01/1951     Gaumont-British News    BGU412040061 
29/01/1951     Gaumont-British News    BGU412040029 
29/01/1951     Gaumont-British News    BGU412040060 
01/02/1951     Gaumont-British News    BGU412050015 
01/02/1951     Gaumont-British News    BGU412050004 
05/02/1951     Gaumont-British News    BGU412050009 
07/02/1951     Gaumont-British News    BGU412050030 
07/02/1951     Gaumont-British News    BGU412050019 
12/02/1951     Gaumont-British News    BGU412050034 
15/02/1951     Gaumont-British News    BGU412050054 
15/02/1951     Gaumont-British News    BGU412050048 
26/02/1951     Gaumont-British News    BGU412050062 
26/02/1951     Gaumont-British News    BGU412050063 
 
 
05/03/1951     Gaumont-British News    Missing 
14/03/1951     Gaumont-British News    BGU412060037 
14/03/1951     Gaumont-British News    BGU412060038 
19/03/1951     Gaumont-British News    BGU412060056 
19/03/1951     Gaumont-British News    BGU412060008 
02/04/1951     Gaumont-British News    Missing 
05/04/1951     Gaumont-British News    BGU412070041 
05/04/1951     Gaumont-British News    BGU412070042 
05/04/1951     Gaumont-British News    BGU412070037 
16/04/1951     Gaumont-British News    BGU412070011 
21/05/1951     Gaumont-British News    BGU412080021 
24/05/1951     Gaumont-British News    BGU412080046 
31/05/1951     Gaumont-British News    BGU412080041 
28/06/1951     Gaumont-British News    BGU412090024 
02/07/1951     Gaumont-British News    BGU412100036 
02.07/1951     Gaumont-British News    BGU412100038 
12/07/1951     Gaumont-British News    BGU412100013 
16/07/1951     Gaumont-British News    BGU412100018 
23/07/1951     Gaumont-British News    BGU412100025 
28/07/1951     Gaumont-British News    BGU412090055 
17/09/151       Gaumont-British News    Missing                  
01/10/1951     Gaumont-British News    BGU412130008 
15/10/1951     Gaumont-British News    BGU412130029 
01/11/1951     Gaumont-British News    BGU412140091 
15/11/1951     Gaumont-British News    BGU412140006 
03/12/1951     Gaumont-British News    BGU412150004 
03/12/1951     Gaumont-British News    BGU412150007 
20/12/1951     Gaumont-British News    BGU412150044 
24/12/1951     Gaumont-British News    BGU412150049 
27/121951      Gaumont-British News    BGU4121500390 
31/12/1951     Gaumont-British News    BGU412150046 
31/12/1951     Gaumont-British News    BGU412150047 
03/01/1952     Gaumont-British News    BGU412160025 
04/02/1952     Gaumont-British News    BGU412170010 
21/02/1952     Gaumont-British News    BGU412170061 
25/02/1952     Gaumont-British News    BGU412170014 
13/03/1952     Gaumont-British News    BGU412180013 
20/03/1952     Gaumont-British News   BGU412180052 
24/03/1952     Gaumont-British News    BGU412180041 
24/03/1952     Gaumont-British News    BGU412180085 
24/03/1952     Gaumont-British News    BGU412180114 
27/03/1952     Gaumont-British News    BGU412180113 
03/04/1952     Gaumont-British News    BGU412190074 
03/04/1952     Gaumont-British News    BGU412190080 
 
 
01/05/1952     Gaumont-British News    BGU412200002 
19/05/1952     Gaumont-British News    BGU412200071 
19/05/1952     Gaumont-British News    BGU412200072 
26/05/1952     Fox Movietone                 X26055201 
02/06/1952     Gaumont-British News    BGU412210000 
05/06/1952     Gaumont-British News    BGU412210043 
16/06/1952     Fox Movietone                 X16065202 
16/06/1952     Gaumont-British News    BGU412210007 
16/06/1952     Gaumont-British News    BGU412210083 
19/06/1952     Gaumont-British News    BGU412210036 
23/06/1952     Gaumont-British News    BGU412210077 
18/07/1952     Fox Movietone                 X18075201 
24/07/1952     Gaumont-British News    BGU4122220025 
28/07/1952     Gaumont-British News    BGU4122220050 
01/08/1952     Fox Movietone                 X01085201 
11/08/1952     Gaumont-British News    BGU412230007 
01/09/1952     Gaumont-British News    BGU412240008 
01/01/1953     Gaumont-British News    BGU412280041 
19/01 /1953    Gaumont-British News    BGU412280073 
18/05/1952     Fox Movietone                 X18055301 
18/06/1953     Fox Movietone                 X08065301 
 
BRITISH PATHE 
 
10/07/1950                                   UN2273E 
10/07/1950                                   50/055 
20/07/1950                                   50/058 
27/07/1950                                   50/060 
21/08/1950                                   50/067 
22/08/1950                                   UN2280A 
06/09/1950                                   UN2293A 
12/10/1950                                   UN2293E 
12/10/1950                                   UN2295E 
04/12/1950                                   501097 
August 1951                                 UN2385F 
08/01/1951                                   51/003 
28/01/1952                                   52/009 
19/07/1951                                   51/058  
06/08/1951                                   51/063 
13/08/1951                                   51/065 
16/08/1951                                   51/006 
Missing                                        UN2295B 
23/06/1952                                   52/051 
22/09/1952                                   52/077 
 
 
27/11/1952                                   52/096 
Missing                                        UN2296C 
Winter 1953                                 UN2527C 
1953                                             UN2502B 
February 1953                              UN2503B 
February 1953                              UN2503D 
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